United Fire & Casualty Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance

684 F. Supp. 1030, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4387, 1988 WL 47725
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedMay 13, 1988
Docket87-0521-CV-W
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 684 F. Supp. 1030 (United Fire & Casualty Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United Fire & Casualty Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance, 684 F. Supp. 1030, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4387, 1988 WL 47725 (W.D. Mo. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDERS

JOHN W. OLIVER, Senior District Judge.

United Fire and Casualty Company (UFCC) has filed the above-styled action seeking a declaratory judgment against New Hampshire Insurance Company (NHIC). UFCC’s complaint seeks a declaration that NHIC’s insurance policy provided liability coverage for the personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident involving an auto owned by NHIC’s insured, Royal Chevrolet, but operated at the time of the accident by an employee of UFCC’s insured, J & K Clean-Up Company (J & K). In addition, UFCC is seeking indemnification from NHIC for the cost of defending two suits filed as the result of the above-noted accident and the cost of the settlements of those two suits.

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment along with a joint stipulation of facts. The stipulation of the parties is attached hereto as Appendix A and incorporated by this reference as our findings of fact.

The parties have also filed suggestions in support of their respective motions for summary judgment. For the reasons we now state, we find and conclude that summary judgment in favor of defendant NHIC should be granted.

I

A.

NHIC contends that the “activity in question — the delivery by an employee of J & K Clean-Up of an automobile owned by Royal Chevrolet following the ‘detailing’ of that vehicle at J & K’s facility ... is expressly excluded by the plain wording of IV.D.l.b(2) of the NHIC insurance policy.” Defendant’s Brief at 1. We agree.

This Court’s construction of the policy at issue is governed by the general rules relating to the construction of insurance policies in Missouri. Under Missouri law plain and unambiguous language must be given its plain meaning. See, e.g., Jordan v. United Equitable Life Insurance, 486 S.W.2d 664, 666-67 (Mo.App.1972). Missouri law also provides:

Exceptions to liability are to be construed to give the insured the protection which he reasonably has a right to expect. * * * These general rules do not, however, authorize a perversion of language or the exercise by the court of inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity. Our function is to give force and effect to the contract as it is written, * * * and the contract should receive reasonable interpretations in order to accomplish the intention of the parties.

Id.; see also McRaven v. F-Stop Photo Labs, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Mo.App.1983).

The specific exclusionary clause which NHIC relies provides in pertinent part:

b. Anyone else is an insured while using with your permission a covered auto except:
(2) Someone using a covered auto while he or she is working in a business of selling, servicing, repairing or parking or storing autos unless the business is your garage operations.

*1032 IV.D.l.b(2). We find and conclude that this exclusionary clause unequivocally excludes coverage under the circumstances of this case.

The stipulated facts establish that at the time of the above-noted automobile accident, J & K Clean-Up was in the business of performing detail work on . automobiles, i.e., interior and exterior washing and polishing on motor vehicles. Stip. 112. At the request of Royal Chevrolet, J & K periodically performed detail work on used cars owned by Royal Chevrolet. Stip. 114. As part of J & K’s service agreement with Royal Chevrolet, J & K’s employees were responsible for picking up automobiles which needed detail work at Royal Chevrolet’s Harrisonville, Missouri dealership and returning the automobiles to Royal’s dealership upon completion of the detailing work at J & K’s Kansas City, Missouri shop. Id. J & K performed such pick up and delivery service each time it performed detailing work on Royal Chevrolet’s automobiles. Id.

The stipulation of facts further establishes that an employee of J & K, after completion of a detailing job at the J & K. shop, was returning an automobile owned by Royal Chevrolet to its Harrisonville dealership when the car struck the rear of a vehicle. Stip. 1Í 5.

In light of the above-stipulated facts, we find and conclude that Section IV.D.l.b.(2) unequivocally excludes coverage of the automobile in question. For the J & K employee who was delivering Royal Chevrolet’s automobile at the time of the accident was clearly performing a service in furtherance of J & K’s “business” of “servicing” automobiles.

B.

Plaintiff contends, however, that when J & K’s employee was returning Royal Chevrolet’s vehicle after completion of the detailing work, he was engaged in Royal Chevrolet’s “garage operations” within the meaning of the NHIC policy. 1 (Emphasis added). Plaintiff therefore contends that the exclusion embodied in Section IY.D. l.b(2) is not applicable. Plaintiff’s Brief at 5. Plaintiff’s contention is untenable.

The facts of this case, specifically those set forth in part A of our opinion, establish that, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, J & K’s delivery of Royal Chevrolet’s automobiles to Royal’s Harrisonville dealership was an activity necessary and incidental to J & K’s detailing business. See Weston v. Great Central Insurance Company, 514 S.W.2d 17, 22-24. (Mo.App.1974). (“Both by custom and agreement, the delivery of the car, following repairs and service was necessary and incidental to the operations of the station”). Applying the clear and unambiguous language of Section IV.D. 1.b(2), we find and conclude that NHIC’s policy does not extend coverage to the activity resulting in the car accident at issue.

Our construction and application of Section IV.D.l.b(2) to the circumstances underlying this case is consistent with the decisions by Missouri and other State courts which involved automobile policies excluding coverage of an automobile while being used by any person engaged in the business of repairing or servicing motor vehicles. See, e.g., Weston v. Great Central Insurance Company, 514 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.App.1974); Humble Oil & Refining Company v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 490 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.Civ.App.1973); 6C J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4372 (1979 & Supp.1987). Those courts have uniformly applied the above-noted exclusion to accidents occurring while an automobile is being picked up or delivered by an automobile dealer or service station for purposes of repair or service. 2 E.g., *1033

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
684 F. Supp. 1030, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4387, 1988 WL 47725, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-fire-casualty-co-v-new-hampshire-insurance-mowd-1988.