United African-Asian Abilities Club v. 3316 W. Carson Owner LLC

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 11, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-10714
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 | UNITED AFRICAN-ASIAN ABILITIES ) Case No. CV 23-10714 FMO (Ex) 1 CLUB, et al., Plaintiffs, ) 12 ) ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT 13 V. PREJUDICE

14 3316 W. CARSON OWNER LLC, 15 Defendant. 16 ) 17 On January 9, 2024, the court issued a Standing Order Re: Disability Cases, (see Dkt. 10, Court’s Order of January 9, 2024), which ordered plaintiffs to file a request for entry of default no later than seven days after the time the response to the complaint would have been due by the 20| defendant. (Id. at 2). The court admonished plaintiffs that “failure to seek entry of default within seven... days after the deadline to file a response to the complaint shall result in the dismissal 22|| of the action and/or the defendant against whom entry of default should have been sought.” (ld. at 2-3) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30, 82 S.Ct. 24| 1386, 1388 (1962)). 25 Here, defendant was served with the summons and complaint on January 2, 2024, by personal service. (See Dkt. 12, Proof of Service). Accordingly, defendant's responsive pleading to the complaint was initially due no later than January 23, 2024. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). On January 22, 2024, the parties filed a first stipulation extending defendant’s responsive pleading

deadline to February 2, 2024. (See Dkt. 11, First Stipulation at 2). On February 1, 2024, the 2|| parties filed a second stipulation extending defendant’s responsive pleading deadline to February 22, 2024. (See Dkt. 13, Second Stipulation at 3). On February 22, 2024, defendant filed a request for an extension of time to respond to the complaint to February 29, 2024, (see Dkt. 14, Request for Extension at 2), which the court granted. (See Dkt. 15, Court’s Order of February 23, 2024). As of the date of this Order, defendant has not answered the complaint, nor have plaintiffs 7| filed a request for entry of default by their deadline of March 7, 2024. (See, generally, Dkt.). 8 A district court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to comply with court orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30, 82 S.Ct. at 1388 (authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute necessary to avoid undue delay in disposing of cases and congestion in court calendars); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss 12] action for failure to comply with any court order). Dismissal, however, is a severe penalty and 13 should be imposed only after consideration of the relevant factors in favor of and against this extreme remedy. Thompson v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.1986). 15 || These factors include: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s 16 | need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability 17 | of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” 18] Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61); see 19 Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2019) (“By its plain text, 20] a Rule 41(b) dismissal . . . requires ‘a court order’ with which an offending plaintiff failed to comply.”). “Although it is preferred, it is not required that the district court make explicit findings 22 | in order to show that it has considered these factors and [the Ninth Circuit] may review the record 23 independently to determine if the district court has abused its discretion.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 24] 1261. 25 Having considered the Pagtalunan factors, the court is persuaded that this action should 26 | be dismissed for failure to comply with a court order and failure to prosecute. Plaintiffs’ failure to 27| file a request for entry of default hinders the court’s ability to move this case toward disposition and indicates that plaintiffs do not intend to litigate this action. In other words, plaintiffs’

1 “noncompliance has caused [this] action to come to a complete halt, thereby allowing [her] to 2 control the pace of the docket rather than the Court.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 3 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, plaintiffs were warned that failure to 4 file a request for entry of default would result in a dismissal of the action for lack of prosecution 5 and failure to comply with a court order. (See Dkt. 10, Court’s Order of January 9, 2024, at 2-3); 6 see also Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 (“[A] district court’s warning to a party that his failure to obey 7 the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the consideration of alternatives requirement.”) 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, having considered the Pagtalunan factors, the court is 9 persuaded that the instant action should be dismissed for failure to comply with a court order and 10 failure to prosecute. 11 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered dismissing this action, 12 without prejudice, for failure to prosecute and comply with the orders of the court. 13 Dated this 11th day of March, 2024. /s/ 14 Fernando M. Olguin United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28