2026 CO 56
Unite for Colorado, Petitioner:
v.
Colorado Department of State; Jena Griswold, in her official capacity as the Colorado Secretary of State; and Andrew Kline, in his official capacity as the Colorado Deputy Secretary of State. Respondents
No. 24SC281
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc
June 29, 2026
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 23CA989
2
Attorneys for Petitioner: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP
Jason R. Dunn Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondents: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Peter G. Baumann, Assistant Solicitor General Denver,
Colorado
3
CHIEF
JUSTICE MARQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.
OPINION
4
MÁRQUEZ, CHIEF JUSTICE.
¶1
This campaign finance dispute arising out of the 2020
election concerns whether Unite for Colorado
("Unite") qualifies as an issue committee, a type
of organization subject to registration, reporting, and
disclosure requirements under Colorado's campaign finance
laws.[1]
¶2
As relevant here, article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) of the
Colorado Constitution defines an issue committee as an
organization "[t]hat has a major purpose of supporting
or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question." Unite
and the Colorado Secretary of State[2] disagree on two parts of
this definition: (1) the meaning of the phrase "a major
purpose," and (2) whether the phrase "any ballot
issue or ballot question" allows consideration of an
organization's spending on ballot issue advocacy in the
aggregate, or instead limits consideration to the
5
organization's activities on a proposition-by-proposition
basis. Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).
¶3
First, we interpret the phrase "a major purpose" to
require a fact-specific analysis of an organization's
creation, spending, and ballot campaign-related activities,
as guided by a nonexhaustive list of factors established in
case law and statute at the time of this dispute. In
conducting this fact-specific analysis, we interpret the
phrase "any ballot issue or ballot question" to
allow consideration of an organization's aggregate
activity and spending across multiple ballot issues.
¶4
Next, we apply the fact-specific analysis to Unite to
determine whether it meets article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a)(I)'s definition of issue committee. We conclude
that Unite's decision to engage in statewide ballot issue
advocacy soon after its creation and its in-kind
contributions to gather signatures in support of propositions
both weigh in favor of a major purpose. On the other hand,
the fact that Unite spent less than a quarter of its overall
spending during the 2020 election cycle on issue advocacy
weighs strongly against a major purpose. Under the totality
of the circumstances, we hold that Unite did not have a major
purpose of ballot issue advocacy in 2020.
¶5
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals.
6
I.
Legal Background
¶6
Because this dispute concerns Unite's activities in 2020,
we first summarize the relevant campaign finance laws
applicable at that time.
¶7
Colorado's campaign finance laws can be traced back to
the Campaign Reform Act of 1974, which focused on the
regulation of political committees that support or oppose the
nomination or election of candidates for public office. Ch.
57, sec. 1, §§ 49-27-101 to -121, 1974 Colo. Sess.
Laws 261, 261-70. In 1996, voters updated and reenacted the
law via a ballot measure (Amendment 15) as the Fair Campaign
Practices Act ("FCPA"). Legis. Council of the Colo.
Gen. Assemb., An Analysis of 1996 Ballot Proposals,
at 27-32, 56-67 (1996),
https://historicalelectiondata.coloradosos.gov/document/191?page=26
[https:// perma.cc/P7K4-4YM9]; Colo. Sec'y of State,
State of Colorado: Abstract of Votes Cast 1995-1996,
at 159,
https://historicalelectiondata.coloradosos.gov/document/
232?page=168 [https://perma.cc/8SGT-F9A8] (showing the
abstract of votes cast for Amendment 15 in the November 5,
1996 general election). The FCPA included the regulation of
issue committees that support or oppose ballot issues, §
1-45-108(1), (3), C.R.S. (1997), and required the disclosure
of information about "contributions received . . .
expenditures made; and obligations entered into," §
1-45-108(1), C.R.S. (1997).
7
¶8
In 2002, voters adopted Amendment 27, which enshrined
comprehensive campaign finance regulations, including the
regulation of issue committees, in the Colorado Constitution.
See Colo. Const. art. XXVIII. Article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a) defines an issue committee as:
any person, other than a natural person, or any group of two
or more persons, including natural persons:
(I) That has a major purpose of supporting or opposing any
ballot issue or ballot question; or
(II) That has accepted or made contributions or expenditures
in excess of two hundred dollars to support or oppose any
ballot issue or ballot question.
Only
the first prong of this definition is at issue in the
majority of cases, including this one, because the Secretary
of State has interpreted this provision to require an
organization to meet both the major purpose element
and spend in excess of two hundred dollars to
qualify as an issue committee. Dep't of State, 8 Colo.
Code Regs. 1505-6:1.9 (2022).[3] Because no party disputes the
Secretary of State's interpretation, we proceed under
this interpretation.
¶9
Article XXVIII requires organizations that qualify as issue
committees to meet the disclosure requirements set out in
section 1-45-108, C.R.S. (2025).
8
Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 7. Section
1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2025), requires issue committees
to "report . . . their contributions received, including
the name and address of each person who has contributed
twenty dollars or more; expenditures made, and obligations
entered into by the committee or party." And the issue
committee must also disclose "the occupation and
employer of each person who has made a contribution of one
hundred dollars or more." § 1-45-108(1)(a)(II),
C.R.S. (2025). Such disclosures must be made every year, even
when the issue committee is inactive. Dep't of
State, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6:17.2.3 (2022).
¶10
In 2008, a division of the court of appeals first analyzed
article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) in Independence
Institute v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130, 1136-39 (Colo.App.
2008). There, the Independence Institute argued that the
phrase "a major purpose" was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. Id. at 1136. The division
rejected the vagueness challenge, reasoning that
"[c]onstitutional provisions need not be so exact as to
eliminate any need for [a] fact-specific analysis," and
that an organization's "major purpose" could be
assessed by "compar[ing] the purposes stated in its
charter, articles of incorporation, and by-laws; the purposes
of its activities and annual expenditures; and the scope of
issues addressed in its print and electronic
publications." Id. at 1139. The division also
rejected the Independence Institute's First Amendment
overbreadth challenge because article
9
XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) did "not burden a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech." Id. at 1140.
¶11
Two years later, a different division of the court of appeals
expounded on the definition of the phrase "a major
purpose" in Cerbo v. Protect Colorado Jobs,
Inc., 240 P.3d 495, 501 (Colo.App. 2010). There, the
division examined the plain language definition of the term
"major" at the time Amendment 27 passed in 2002.
Id. It concluded that an organization has "a
major purpose" of ballot issue advocacy if it expends
"a considerable or principal portion of the
organization's total activities" on ballot issue
advocacy. Id. (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc.
v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael,
J., dissenting)). The division also applied the phrase to
Protect Colorado Jobs, Inc., and relied on several factors to
assess whether the organization's ballot issue advocacy
amounted to a considerable or principal portion of its
activities. Id. at 501-04.
¶12
That same year, the General Assembly passed a new statutory
definition of "a major purpose" that essentially
codified the factors identified in Independence
Institute. Ch. 270, sec. 4, § 1-45-103(12), 2010
Colo. Sess. Laws 1239, 1241. This new legislation stated that
an organization's "major purpose" could be
reflected by: (1) "[a]n organization's specifically
identified objectives in its organizational documents";
or (2) "an organization's demonstrated pattern of
conduct based upon its . . . [a]nnual expenditures in support
of or opposition to a ballot issue or
10
ballot question" or "[p]roduction or funding . . .
of written or broadcast communications . . . in support of or
opposition to a ballot issue or ballot question." §
1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2011).
¶13
Finally, in Colorado Ethics Watch v. Gessler, 2013
COA 172M, ¶¶ 32-35, 363 P.3d 727, 731-32, a
division of the court of appeals rejected a rule promulgated
by the Secretary of State. The rule sought to clarify that an
organization has a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy if
more than 30% of its annual expenditures are directed to such
activity. Id. at ¶ 31, 363 P.3d at 731. The
division concluded that the 30% threshold was arbitrary and
capricious because it was unsupported by competent evidence
and was untethered to the language in section
1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2013), that required a broader
analysis of an organization's "pattern of
conduct." Colo. Ethics Watch, ¶¶
32-35, 363 P.3d at 731-32 (citing § 1-45-103(12)(b),
C.R.S. (2013)).[4]
11
II.
Facts and Procedural History
¶14
Unite began operations in January 2020 and described itself
on its website as "an issue advocacy organization"
with the mission of "support[ing] policies that increase
economic opportunity and greater government
transparency" and "oppos[ing] policies that would
be harmful to Colorado's economic wellbeing, and efforts
to unnecessarily grow the size and reach of government."
Katie Kennedy, Unite's registered agent and only board
member, and Dustin Zvonek, a contractor, directed all of
Unite's activities.
¶15
In 2020, Unite spent a total of $17,174,246.70. Of that
amount, $4,026,017.26, approximately 23.4%, was directed to
ballot issue advocacy:
• Unite spent $1,500,808.85 opposing Proposition 113, a
ballot initiative to join the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact, including spending on advertising, text
messages, and direct contributions to Protect Colorado's
Vote, an issue committee opposing Proposition 113.
• Unite spent $964,998.25 supporting Proposition 116, a
ballot initiative to reduce the state income tax rate.
Spending on Proposition 116 included in-kind contributions
for signature gathering to support Energize our Economy, an
issue committee supporting Proposition 116.
• Unite spent $1,560,210.16 supporting Proposition 117,
a ballot initiative to require voter approval of certain new
state-owned businesses. This spending also included
advertising to support the initiative and in-kind
contributions for signature gathering to Voter Approval of
Fees, an issue committee supporting Proposition 117.
¶16
In August 2020, members of the public filed a campaign
finance complaint against Unite with the Elections Division
of the Department of State ("the Elections
12
Division"), alleging that Unite was an issue committee
under the definition in article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) of
the Colorado Constitution and had failed to register and make
the required disclosures.
¶17
After investigating the complaint, the Elections Division
ultimately moved to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that
Unite did not meet article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)'s
definition of an issue committee. The Elections Division
reached this conclusion in part because it construed article
XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) to require a major purpose of
supporting a specific ballot initiative, not a major purpose
of supporting ballot initiatives generally.
¶18
However, then-Deputy Secretary of State, Ian Rayder,
disagreed with this interpretation, denied the motion, and
remanded the case back to the Elections Division with
instructions to commence administrative proceedings against
Unite for failing to register as an issue committee and make
the required disclosures. The Elections Division did so, and
after proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ"), the ALJ found that Unite had a major
purpose of ballot issue advocacy because of its activities in
connection with Propositions 113, 116, and 117. On review,
the new Deputy Secretary of State, Christopher P. Beall,
adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions in
part.[5] The Final Agency Order adopted by
13
the Deputy Secretary of State imposed a $40,000 fine on Unite
and required Unite to register and make the required
disclosures.
¶19
Pursuant to section 24-4-106, C.R.S. (2025), Unite sought
review of the Final Agency Order in district court. Unite
challenged the Deputy Secretary of State's interpretation
and application of the major purpose standard and argued that
the requirement to register and make disclosures violated
Unite's First Amendment rights. The district court
reversed the Final Agency Order, concluding that Unite was
not an issue committee. The district court reasoned that the
statutory definition of an issue committee, section
1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2020), did not support aggregating
Unite's activity across all three ballot initiatives. The
district court did not rule on Unite's First Amendment
claims. The Secretary of State appealed the district
court's order.
¶20
A division of the court of appeals unanimously reversed the
district court. Colo. Dep't of State v. Unite for
Colo., 2024 COA 31, ¶ 1, 551 P.3d 687, 693. The
division conducted its own major purpose analysis. Starting
with the constitutional language in article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a), the division held that the language contemplates an
organization's aggregate conduct across multiple ballot
issues or ballot questions. Id. at ¶¶
41-43, 551 P.3d at 699. The division also rejected this
interpretation in the Final Agency Order because the ALJ
raised the issue sua sponte without any argument on that
point from the Elections Division.
14
identified seven factors to guide its analysis of whether
Unite had a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during the
2020 election cycle. Id. at ¶ 38, 551 P.3d at
698. The division applied these factors and held that Unite
had a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during the 2020
election cycle. Id. at ¶ 58, 551 P.3d at 702.
The division also considered and rejected Unite's First
Amendment claims. Id. at ¶¶ 59-70, 551
P.3d at 702-04.
¶21
Unite petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari. We
granted review to consider the interpretation of the
"major purpose" standard.[6]
III.
Standard of Review
¶22
Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law
subject to de novo review. Gessler v. Colo. Common
Cause, 2014 CO 44, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 232, 235. We
accord administrative proceedings a "presumption of
validity" and resolve "all reasonable doubts as to
the correctness of administrative rulings . . . in favor of
the agency." Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d
1267, 1272 (Colo. 1990). That said, such deference is
unwarranted where "the agency's interpretation is
contrary to constitutional and statutory law."
Gessler, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d at 235.
15
IV.
Analysis
¶23
We begin with our guiding principles of constitutional
interpretation. We then analyze the phrase "a major
purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot
question." Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).
First, we analyze the meaning of the phrase "a major
purpose" and conclude that it requires a factspecific
analysis of an organization's creation, spending, and
ballot campaign-related activities. Second, we examine the
phrase "any ballot issue or ballot question" to
determine whether the major purpose analysis allows
consideration of an organization's aggregate spending
across multiple ballot issues. We conclude that it does. We
end our analysis by applying article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a)(I) to Unite and hold that Unite is not an issue
committee because it did not have a major purpose of ballot
issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle.
A.
Principles of Constitutional Interpretation
¶24
Our goal when interpreting amendments to the Colorado
Constitution is twofold: effectuate the intent of the framers
of our constitution and the people of the State of Colorado
and prevent evasion of the constitution's legitimate
operation. Markwell v. Cooke, 2021 CO 17, ¶ 33,
482 P.3d 422, 429. To do so, we start with the plain language
of a constitutional provision, giving its terms their
ordinary and popular meanings. People v. Smith, 2023
CO 40, ¶ 20, 531 P.3d 1051, 1055. That said, we may look
beyond the plain and ordinary definitions of phrases
16
if "they have acquired a technical meaning through . . .
judicial construction." Parrish v. Lamm, 758
P.2d 1356, 1368 (Colo. 1988); see also Colo. Ethics Watch
v. Senate Maj. Fund, LLC, 2012 CO 12, ¶ 26, 269
P.3d 1248, 1255-56 (applying the legal meaning of the phrase
"express advocacy" in interpreting a different
provision of article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution). We
may also consider the objective the provision sought to
achieve and the mischief it sought to avoid. Senate Maj.
Fund, LLC, ¶ 20, 269 P.3d at 1254. In discerning
voter intent, we consider the ballot title and submission
clause, as well as the voter Blue Book, "which is the
analysis of ballot proposals prepared by the
legislature." In re Submission of Interrogatories on
House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo. 1999).
¶25
We favor constructions that harmonize different
constitutional provisions over those that create conflict,
and where possible, we adopt a construction consistent with
those given by coordinate branches of government. In re
Interrogatory on House Joint Resol. 20-1006, 2020 CO 23,
¶¶ 32-33, 500 P.3d 1053, 1062-63. We also presume
that voters know the existing law when they vote to amend the
constitution. Dwyer v. State, 2015 CO 58, ¶ 19,
357 P.3d 185, 191.
B.
The Phrase "a Major Purpose" Demonstrates the
Voters' Intent to Adopt a Fact-Specific Analysis
¶26
Here, we begin with the plain language of the phrase "a
major purpose." We conclude that the plain language sets
an overarching standard for whether an organization qualifies
as an issue committee but sheds little light on how to
17
analyze whether an organization meets this standard. So, to
better understand how the voters would have understood the
phrase in 2002 when they approved Amendment 27, we review the
origins of the phrase in United States Supreme Court case law
and trace its development in Colorado. We examine the policy
declaration voters approved alongside Amendment 27, the Blue
Book that accompanied Amendment 27 on the ballot, and the
voter informational interest undergirding the disclosure
requirements in Amendment 27.
¶27
All these sources of the voters' intent clarify that the
major purpose test is a holistic, case-by-case assessment of
an organization's creation, spending, and ballot
campaign-related activities to determine whether it spent a
considerable or principal amount of its time and resources
engaging in ballot issue advocacy.
¶28
We conclude by highlighting some guiding factors from the
legislature and case law that courts should consider when
conducting this analysis.
1.
The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of "a Major
Purpose"
¶29
Common definitions of "major" and
"purpose" at the time voters passed Amendment 27
offer some insight. In 2002, the Webster's Third New
International Dictionary defined "major" as
"notable or conspicuous in effect or scope:
considerable, principal." Cerbo, 240 P.3d at
501 (quoting Major, Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (2002)). "Considerable"
was defined further as "rather large in extent or
degree." Id. (quoting Considerable,
Webster's Third New
18
International Dictionary (2002)). And as of 2002, Black's
Law Dictionary defined "purpose" as "[a]n
objective, goal, or end." Purpose, Black's
Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). These definitions indicate the
voters' intent to categorize as issue committees those
organizations that spend a considerable or principal amount
of their time and resources on ballot issue advocacy.
Finally, we note that by using the phrase "a major
purpose," voters recognized that organizations could
have more than one major purpose. Cerbo, 240 P.3d at
501 ("[B]y using the indefinite article 'a,' the
phrase 'a major purpose' brings within its ambit
organizations for which promoting a ballot issue is but one
major purpose.").
¶30
Because the phrase "major purpose" has its origins
in United States Supreme Court case law, we turn next to that
history.
2.
The Origins of the Major Purpose Test and Its Understanding
in 2002
¶31
The Supreme Court first invoked what has come to be called
the major purpose test in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976). Buckley concerned various challenges to
the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 ("FECA"), one of which claimed that FECA's
definition of "political committee" was
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 7-8, 76-80. FECA
defined "political committee" as a group of people
that spent over one thousand dollars in a calendar year for
the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a
candidate. Id. at 62-63. The Court held that this
definition of "political committee" was not
19
unconstitutionally vague in part because it "only
encompass[ed] organizations that are under the control of a
candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate." Id. at
79 (emphasis added). Because the Court tied the definition of
"political committee" to the organization's
"major purpose," federal courts started using the
major purpose definition as a test for whether an
organization qualified as a political committee. See,
e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Machinists
Non-Partisan Pol. League, 655 F.2d 380, 392 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Fla. for Kennedy
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 1982).
¶32
The Supreme Court applied the major purpose requirement ten
years later in Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986) ("MCFL"). MCFL concerned a
constitutional challenge to a different provision of FECA
that prohibited corporations from using treasury funds to
make expenditures "in connection with" a federal
election and required that any such expenditures be financed
by voluntary contributions to a separate segregated fund.
Id. at 241. FECA then regulated these separate
segregated funds as political committees. Id. at
253. For a nonprofit corporation like MCFL that engaged in
issue advocacy, this meant that its independent expenditure
activity could be regulated as though MCFL's major
purpose was to further the election of candidates.
20
¶33
The Court ultimately held the provision at issue
unconstitutional as applied to MCFL. Id. at 254-64.
It began by summarizing the circumstances of MCFL's
creation and its activities as an organization—noting
when the organization was created, quoting the
organization's purpose statement in its articles of
incorporation, describing from whom the organization did and
did not accept funding, listing the various types of
activities the group pursued in the community, and detailing
its campaign-related spending. Id. at 241-44.
¶34
From all this information, the Court concluded that MCFL was
not a political committee (and therefore could not be
subjected to the full panoply of regulations that accompany
political committee status) because it did not have the major
purpose of nominating or supporting a candidate. Id.
at 241-42, 252 n.6, 262. The Court cautioned, however, that
"should MCFL's independent spending become so
extensive that the organization's major purpose
may be regarded as campaign activity," then it would be
"classified as a political committee" and subject
to FECA's requirements. Id. at 262 (emphasis
added).
¶35
In sum, the Court examined the specific facts of MCFL's
creation, spending, and campaign-related activities to reach
its conclusion that campaign activity was not MCFL's
major purpose. Id. at 241-44, 252 n.6, 262.
[7]
21
¶36
We too encountered the major purpose test in the lead up to
the passage of Amendment 27 in 2002. In Common Sense
Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748, 753-57 (Colo. 2000),
we interpreted the earlier statutory definition of issue
committee in the FCPA (Colorado's Fair Campaign Practices
Act). At that time, the FCPA did not include "a major
purpose" in its definition of issue committee but
instead defined an issue committee as "[t]wo or more
persons who are elected, appointed, or chosen, or have
associated themselves, for the purpose of accepting
contributions and making expenditures to support or oppose
any ballot issue or ballot question." §
1-45-103(8)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2000) (emphasis added). Though an
ALJ in Common Sense Alliance read the major purpose
test from Buckley and MCFL into the
FCPA's definition, we refused to do so because the plain
language of the definition omitted it. Common Sense
All., 995 P.2d at 751, 753. We noted that the FCPA's
definition created a "loophole" that "may be
troubling" but refused to read the major purpose test
into the definition because we were "bound by the
[FCPA's] plain language." Id. at 755.
22
3.
Amendment 27's Passage, the Voters' Policy
Declaration, the 2002 Blue Book, and the Informational
Interest
¶37
It was against this legal backdrop that the voters in 2002
adopted Amendment 27's new definition of issue committee:
"Issue committee" means any person, other than a
natural person, or any group of two or more persons,
including natural persons:
(I) That has a major purpose of supporting or opposing
any ballot issue or ballot question; [and]
(II) That has accepted or made contributions or expenditures
in excess of two hundred dollars to support or oppose any
ballot issue or ballot question.
Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a) (emphasis added).
¶38
This definition expressly incorporated the same major purpose
language from Buckley and MCFL that we had
declined to read into the earlier FCPA definition in
Common Sense Alliance. And because we assume that
voters knew the law at the time, we interpret the definition
in section 2(10)(a) as adopting the major purpose test as
articulated in Buckley and MCFL—i.e.,
as a fact-specific analysis of an organization's
spending, creation, and ballot campaign-related activities.
Additional evidence of the voters' intent supports this
interpretation.
¶39
The declaration that appears at the beginning of Amendment 27
serves as a guide to the voters' intent. See Weld
Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550, 555
(Colo. 1998). Specifically, the voters of Colorado declared
that
23
the interests of the public are best served by . . . full and
timely disclosure of campaign contributions, independent
expenditures, and funding of electioneering communications,
and strong enforcement of campaign finance requirements.
Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 1. This language reveals
that the voters' intent in adopting Amendment 27 was to
ensure robust compliance with and enforcement of
Colorado's campaign finance law requirements.
¶40
The Blue Book voter guide offers additional insight into the
voters' intent. In re Submission of Interrogatories
on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d at 554. Specifically,
the 2002 Blue Book clarifies that the disclosure provisions
focused on the importance of providing the electorate with
sufficient information about who is spending money to
influence elections:
Requiring greater disclosure of who pays for political
advertising provides more information about who is spending
money to influence elections.
Legis.
Council of the Colo. Gen. Assemb., 2002 Ballot
Information Booklet: Analysis of Statewide Ballot Issues and
Recommendations on Retention of Judges, at 6 (2002),
https://hermes.cde.state.co.us/islandora/object/co%3A27117
[https://perma.cc/7W4L-BFY7].
¶41
This voter "informational interest," like the major
purpose test itself, traces its origins back to
Buckley, where the Court identified it as the first
of three "substantial governmental interests" that
can support campaign disclosure requirements. 424 U.S. at
67-68, 81.
24
¶42
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this informational
interest as a justification for disclosure requirements in
both ballot issue and candidate elections. In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792,
n.32 (1978), for example, the Court invalidated a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporate expenditures
to influence certain types of ballot issues, but noted the
importance of disclosure requirements, observing that
"identif[ying] . . .the source of advertising may be
required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be
able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being
subjected." And in Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 203
(1999), the Court observed that such disclosures ensure
"voters are informed of the source and amount of money
spent by proponents to get a measure on the ballot."
Id. at 20203 (upholding Colorado's law requiring
a ballot issue's proponents to disclose the amount spent
on collecting signatures). The electorate's informational
interest appeared again in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010), where the
Court upheld disclosure requirements in political
advertisements and explained that such disclosures were
justified because "the public has an interest in knowing
who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an
election."
¶43
The information provided through disclosure requirements can
be particularly valuable for voters assessing ballot
propositions because they often
25
concern "divisive and controversial public issues"
such as taxation, business regulation, and hot-button
political and social issues. Common Sense All., 995
P.2d at 756. Given the stakes, voters often face a deluge of
sophisticated special interest groups trying to influence
their vote on proposed legislation. It is important to
remember that when Colorado voters exercise the power of
initiative, they are quite literally acting as legislators
because the power of the initiative derives from the
legislative power the people have reserved to themselves
under the constitution. Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(1)
("The legislative power of the state shall be vested in
the general assembly . . . but the people reserve to
themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the
constitution ...."); see also Vagneur v. City of
Aspen, 2013 CO 13, ¶¶ 36-37, 295 P.3d 493, 504
(explaining that voters are exercising a part of the same
legislative power as the General Assembly when they exercise
the initiative power).
¶44
Given this dynamic, the disclosure of information regarding
who is spending money to influence the decisions of
Colorado's electorate is directly analogous to
legislators understanding who is funding the lobbyists trying
to influence their vote. See Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 369 (noting that the Court has upheld disclosure
requirements for lobbyists because "Congress 'has
merely provided for a modicum of information from those who
for hire attempt to influence legislation'" (quoting
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625
(1954)));
26
Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1,
6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("More than fifty years ago, the
Supreme Court held that the public disclosure of 'who is
being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much'
they are spending to influence legislation is 'a vital
national interest.'" (quoting Harriss, 347
U.S. at 625-26)). Without this information, "the voice
of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice
of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while
masquerading as proponents of the public weal."
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625. The purpose of disclosure
requirements is to bring this essential information to light.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371
("[T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages.").
4. The
Major Purpose Test Requires Analyzing an Organization's
Creation, Spending, and Ballot Campaign-Related Activities
¶45
Colorado voters adopted a definition of "issue
committee" against a backdrop of case law that applied a
fact-specific analysis. They prefaced it with a declaration
insisting on full and timely disclosures and strong
enforcement of campaign finance laws. And the Blue Book
indicates that voters wanted to ensure access to full and
accurate information about who is trying to influence their
vote. For these reasons, we conclude that analyzing whether
an organization has a "major purpose" of ballot
issue advocacy requires a holistic, case-by-case assessment
of an organization's creation, spending, and ballot
campaign-related
27
activities to determine whether it spent a considerable or
principal amount of its time and resources engaging in ballot
issue advocacy.
¶46
We adopt a case-by-case analysis also to avoid
interpretations that allow for easy evasion of the
constitution's requirements. We have long considered it
an obligation to "construe the constitution in such a
manner as will prevent . . . evasion of its legitimate
operation." Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810
P.2d 201, 207 (Colo. 1991) (citing Inst. for the Edu. of
the Mute &Blind v. Henderson, 31 P. 714, 716 (Colo.
1892)). And campaign finance regulation is an area rife with
sophisticated evasion. See Chisun Lee, et al.,
Secret Spending in the States, Brennan Ctr. for
Just., at 6-9, 14-18 (2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/media/210/
download/Report_Secret_Spending_in_the_States.pdf?inline=1
[https://perma.cc/DC3H-MYC8] (explaining the precipitous rise
of undisclosed campaign finance spending on ballot measure
elections, even in states—such as Colorado—with
laws intended to require disclosure); see also McConnell
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 176 (2003)
("Experience under the current law demonstrates that
Congress' concerns about circumvention are not merely
hypothetical.").
¶47
Accordingly, we agree with and adopt the factors identified
by the division below as guidelines in determining whether an
organization has a major purpose
28
of ballot issue advocacy, while cautioning that no single
factor is necessarily dispositive, nor is the list exclusive:
(1) the organization's specifically identified
objectives, as expressed in its organizational documents or
in its public statements (such as on its website or in
correspondence with potential donors);
(2) its activities and annual expenditures relative to its
ballotmeasure-related activities and expenditures;
(3) the scope of issues addressed in its print and electronic
publications relative to its ballot-measure-related
communications;
(4) the length of time of the organization's existence
relative to its ballot measure advocacy;
(5) the organization's structure;
(6) the interrelatedness of the organization and the ballot
measure's proponents or opponents; and
(7) the various issues with which the organization has been
involved.
See Unite, ¶ 38, 551 P.3d at 698.
¶48
Some of these factors can be traced directly to the 2010
legislation. Id. (citing § 1-45-103(12)(b),
C.R.S. (2020)). And "[w]here possible, courts should
adopt a construction of a constitutional provision in keeping
with that given by coordinate branches of government."
In re Great Outdoors Colo. Tr. Fund, 913 P.2d 533,
538 (Colo. 1996).
¶49
Importantly, all of these factors can also be traced back to
the circumstances the Supreme Court considered in
MCFL. Most are drawn from Independence
Institute, 209 P.3d at 1139, and Cerbo, 240
P.3d at 501-04. Both of those cases, in
29
turn, relied on Judge Michael's dissent in North
Carolina Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d at 328-29
(Michael, J., dissenting). And Judge Michael cited the
Court's analysis in MCFL as support for those
elements. Id.
¶50
Although the Court in MCFL did not list these
factors explicitly, each factor captures circumstances the
Court deemed relevant in that case. The Court discussed (1)
the organization's stated purpose, MCFL, 479
U.S. at 241-42; (2) the purposes of MCFL's activities and
its annual expenditures, id. at 242-43; (3) the
scope of issues MCFL addressed in its various publications,
id. at 242-44; (4) the timing of MCFL's
election-related advocacy relative to its creation as an
organization, id. at 241-44; (5) MCFL's
organizational structure, id. at 241-42, 252-54,
259, 263-64; (6) MCFL's inability to serve as a
"conduit[]" for the direct spending of other
organizations—i.e., its (lack of) interrelatedness with
other organizations, id. at 264; and (7) the various
issues in which MCFL had been involved, id. at
241-44.
¶51
In short, the major purpose test is a flexible, fact-specific
analysis of an organization's creation, spending, and
ballot campaign-related activities. Because these factors
carry the authority of both our legislature and Supreme Court
case law, we adopt them as a nonexhaustive list of guidelines
for courts to rely on when assessing whether an organization
has a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy.
30
C.
The Phrase "Any Ballot Issue or Ballot Question"
Permits Aggregation
¶52
The parties also dispute the scope of the phrase "any
ballot issue or ballot question" in article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a)(I) of the Colorado Constitution. Unite
insists that "any ballot issue or ballot question"
means courts must assess an organization's major purpose
on a proposition-by-proposition basis.
¶53
As relevant here, Unite supported or opposed three ballot
issues during the 2020 election cycle: Propositions 113, 116,
and 117. Unite contends that, to qualify as an issue
committee, the court must determine whether it had a major
purpose of supporting or opposing each specific proposition.
The Secretary of State argues the opposite—that a court
may assess whether Unite had a major purpose of ballot issue
advocacy by examining the organization's activities in
the aggregate.
¶54
"Any" has an expansive meaning that includes
"one or more." Any, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ any
[https://perma.cc/37HA-PXMT]. Colorado courts have
consistently interpreted "any" to mean
"all." See, e.g., Winslow v. Morgan
Cnty. Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1141, 1141 (Colo.App. 1985)
(relying on Filmore v. Wells, 15 P. 343, 345 (Colo.
1887)) (interpreting the word "any" to mean
"all" when interpreting zoning requirements in the
Colorado code); see also BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Colo.
Dep't of Revenue, 2016 CO 23, ¶ 18, 369 P.3d
281, 286 ("When used as an adjective in a statute, the
word 'any' means 'all.'" (quoting
Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 447
31
(Colo. 2007))); Stamp, 172 P.3d at 447 (construing
the phrase "any derivative claim" to mean "all
derivative claims"); Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S.
399, 405 n.2 (2020) (explaining that the word "any"
has an expansive meaning). Given our presumption that the
voters understood the expansive meaning applied to
"any," we interpret the plain language of the
phrase "any ballot issue or ballot question" to
permit consideration of an organization's activities
across all ballot issues or ballot questions it supports or
opposes.[8] Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).
¶55
This plain language interpretation of section 2(10)(a)(I) is
bolstered by the voter informational interest that underlies
the regulation of issue committees. This
32
informational interest is only amplified, not diminished,
where a group is seeking to influence the electorate's
vote on more than one measure in an election cycle.
¶56
Finally, we note that Unite's interpretation that an
organization's activities must be evaluated on a
proposition-by-proposition basis would lead to absurd
results. Under Unite's view, if an organization devotes
literally 100% of its resources and activity to ballot issue
advocacy but spreads those resources equally across ten
separate ballot issues, that organization does not have
"a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot
issue or ballot question" because it has spent only 10%
of its resources on each individual proposition. Such a
result cannot be squared with the voters' intent in
passing Amendment 27.
D.
Applying Article XXVIII, Section 2(10)(a) to Unite
¶57
After weighing all of the facts available in the record
before us, we conclude that, while it is a close call, Unite
did not have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy during
the 2020 election cycle. Of the seven factors listed above,
we find four relevant to our analysis here.
¶58
First, we assess Unite's organizational objectives. And
although Unite's articles of incorporation do not include
a purpose statement, Unite described itself on its website as
an "issue advocacy organization" with the goals of
"support[ing] policies that increase economic
opportunity and greater government transparency" and
"oppos[ing] policies that would be harmful to
Colorado's
33
economic wellbeing, and efforts to unnecessarily grow the
size and reach of government." But while Unite calls
itself an "issue advocacy organization," it has
also repeatedly disclaimed in its formal correspondence any
status as, or intention to be, an issue committee. So, this
factor does not weigh strongly in either direction.
¶59
Second, we consider the length of time from Unite's
creation to its ballot issue advocacy. The record indicates
that Unite began actively supporting Proposition 116 as early
as April 2020, only three months after its creation in
January 2020. Given this relatively short period of time
between creation and supporting a ballot issue, this factor
weighs in favor of a major purpose finding.
¶60
Third, we compare Unite's overall activities and
expenditures to its ballotinitiative-related activities and
expenditures. Unite spent approximately $1.5 million opposing
Proposition 113 (8.7% of its total spending); approximately
$965 thousand supporting Proposition 116 (5.6% of its total
spending); and approximately $1.5 million supporting
Proposition 117 (9.1% of its total spending). In sum, Unite
spent just over $4 million across three statewide
initiatives, and such a high dollar amount demonstrates a
significant commitment to ballot issue advocacy. But
assessing an organization's major purpose requires
comparing its ballot campaign-related spending with its
overall spending. This is essential to determine whether the
ballot campaign-related spending constituted a
34
considerable or principal amount of the organization's
overall spending. Here, even considering its spending in the
aggregate, Unite devoted only 23.4% of its expenditures
during the 2020 election cycle to ballot issue advocacy.
¶61
While we largely align with the division's analysis
elsewhere, we disagree with the division's holding that
directing less than a quarter of all expenditures to ballot
issue advocacy supports a conclusion that an organization has
a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy. Unite,
¶ 51, 551 P.3d at 701. Spending less than a quarter of
all expenditures on ballot issue advocacy does not reflect a
major purpose because it does not reflect a considerable or
principal amount of an organization's overall spending.
For this reason, we hold that Unite's
ballotinitiative-related spending, relative to its total
annual expenditures, weighs strongly against a major purpose
finding.
¶62
Finally, we examine the interrelatedness between Unite and
the propositions' other opponents or supporters. The
record indicates that Zvonek, Unite's contractor, met
with Independence Institute, a policy think tank, in April
2020, where he discussed Unite gathering signatures to
qualify Proposition 116 for the ballot. Soon after this
meeting, Independence Institute created an issue committee to
support Proposition 116.
¶63
Unite also made approximately $1.5 million worth of in-kind
contributions to issue committees in the form of services,
specifically, work to print petitions and
35
gather signatures to get the propositions on the ballot.
Because such in-kind contributions in the form of services
require a higher degree of coordination than purely monetary
contributions, they also demonstrate interrelatedness and
weigh in favor of a major purpose finding.
¶64
We emphasize this evidence of interrelatedness
because—given the factspecific nature of the major
purpose analysis—slightly different facts with a
similar amount of spending could support a major purpose
finding. Nevertheless, Unite's low percentage of overall
spending on ballot issue advocacy weighs strongly enough
against a major purpose finding that it counterbalances the
evidence of interrelatedness.
¶65
We do not apply to Unite the remaining factors (three, five,
and seven) because there is insufficient evidence in the
record on the facts necessary to assess those factors, namely
the scope of Unite's activities outside of its ballot
issue advocacy and whether its organizational structure
indicates a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy. Again,
the seven factors are a nonexhaustive list of guidelines, and
they all may or may not be appropriate in any given case.
¶66
Overall, the totality of the circumstances here leads us to
conclude that Unite did not have a major purpose of ballot
issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle.
36
V.
Conclusion
¶67
The voters adopted a major purpose test with broad language
and a legal history of fact-specific analysis. They did so to
protect their informational interest in knowing who is trying
to influence their vote and accompanied the test with a
declaration insisting on full and timely disclosures achieved
through strong enforcement. For these reasons, we interpret
article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a) of the Colorado Constitution
to require a fact-specific assessment of an
organization's creation, spending, and ballot
campaign-related activities. Here, countervailing facts make
Unite's status a close call. But ultimately, the facts
demonstrate that Unite did not have a major purpose of ballot
issue advocacy during the 2020 election cycle. Therefore, it
was not an issue committee pursuant to article XXVIII,
section 2(10)(a).
¶68
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals.
---------
Notes:
[1] We granted certiorari to review the
following issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in interpreting the
Colorado Constitution's "major purpose"
standard, Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I), which
qualifies an organization as an "issue committee"
subject to registration, reporting, and disclosures, by
adopting a multifactor test that permits a major purpose
finding when an organization spends 10% or less of its total
outlays supporting or opposing a particular ballot
measure.
[2] Respondents in this case are the
Colorado Department of State; Jena Griswold, in her official
capacity as the Colorado Secretary of State; and Andrew
Kline, in his official capacity as the Colorado Deputy
Secretary of State. For the sake of brevity, we refer to them
as "the Secretary of State" throughout.
[3] We note that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held, when interpreting
the definition of "political committee" in
Amendment 27, that a two-hundred-dollar spending threshold,
standing alone, is unconstitutional. Colo. Right to Life
Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1153 (10th Cir.
2007).
[4] In addition to these developments, in
2016, the legislature amended section 1-45-108 to exclude
"small-scale issue committee[s]" from the general
issue committee disclosure requirements. Ch. 269, sec. 2,
§ 1-45-108(1.5), 2016 Colo. Sess. Laws 1113, 1114.
Section 1-45-103(16.3)(a), C.R.S. (2025), defines small-scale
issue committees as those that have "accepted or made
contributions or expenditures in an amount that does not
exceed five thousand dollars during an applicable election
cycle."
Finally, in 2022, the legislature again amended the
definition of "a major purpose" in section
1-45-103(12)(b). Ch. 400, sec. 1, § 1-45-103(12)(b),
2022 Colo. Sess. Laws 2851, 2852. However, because the 2022
legislation does not appear to apply retroactively to
Unite's activities in 2020, we decline to apply those
factors to Unite or otherwise comment on the factors the
legislature provided in that legislation.
[5] The ALJ also held that under article
XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(II), spending more than two hundred
dollars on ballot issues or ballot questions qualifies an
organization as an issue committee. But the Deputy Secretary
of State ultimately
[6] Unite also raises various free speech
and freedom of association arguments under the First
Amendment throughout its briefing. Opening Brief for
Petitioner at 36-40. We do not address these arguments
because we denied certiorari review of Unite's First
Amendment claims.
[7] The Federal Election Commission has
also interpreted the Court's case law regarding the major
purpose test as requiring a broad, fact-specific
analysis. See The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 681 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir. 2012)
(highlighting that the Federal Election Commission interprets
the major purpose test as requiring "the flexibility of
a case-by-case analysis of an organization's conduct that
is incompatible with a one-size-fits-all rule" (quoting
Political Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5601 (Feb. 7,
2007))). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has similarly interpreted article XXVIII, section
2(10)(a) as adopting a version of Buckley's
major purpose test. Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc.,
498 F.3d at 1155.
[8] Unite points out that the statutory
definition of "issue committee" refers to "a
ballot issue or ballot question." §
1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. (2020). It contends that the
statute's use of the indefinite article "a" and
the singular terms "issue" and "question"
indicate that a major purpose must be assessed with respect
to an individual ballot measure. See Opening Brief
for Petitioner at 44. We disagree. First, the
legislature's use of the article "a" is not
necessarily more restrictive than "any." And in any
event, we are bound, first and foremost, by the
constitutional language. Here, the voters chose to use the
term "any" and thereby implicate our case law
interpreting "any" to mean "all." Colo.
Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I).
Unite further contends that if the voters had intended
to allow for aggregation of an organization's conduct
across multiple ballot issues, they would have used "one
or more" for the definition of "issue
committee" as they did in the definition of
"political committee." See Colo. Const.
art. XXVIII, § 2(12)(a) (defining "political
committee" as supporting or opposing the nomination or
election of "one or more candidates"
(emphasis added)). Again, we disagree. The voters chose to
use the expansive term "any." The fact that they
used another expansive phrase ("one or more") for
political committees does not undermine the established,
expansive meaning of "any."
---------