Union Trust Co. v. Detroit & River St. Clair Railway

86 N.W. 788, 127 Mich. 252, 1901 Mich. LEXIS 971
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 2, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 86 N.W. 788 (Union Trust Co. v. Detroit & River St. Clair Railway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Union Trust Co. v. Detroit & River St. Clair Railway, 86 N.W. 788, 127 Mich. 252, 1901 Mich. LEXIS 971 (Mich. 1901).

Opinion

Grant, J.

(after stating the facts). 1. We think the facts found by tho learned circuit judge are fully sustained by the evidence. It is apparent that the decree is eminently just and equitable in so protecting the rights of all parties that each loses nothing, and obtains full compensation for all labor performed, materials furnished, and moneys invested in the construction of this road. Manifestly, such a decree ought to be sustained, unless it' is in conflict with inflexible rules which control courts of equity as well as of law.

The entire trouble has arisen from the fact that the promoters, the original stockholders, of this railway com[265]*265pany, attempted its construction upon nothing more substantial than wind. They paid nothing upon their stock, and did not intend to. Some of the promoters and stockholders formed the construction company, — a company with limited liabilities. What those liabilities were does not appear. It was understood, both by the stockholders of the railway company and by the construction company, that those who should construct and equip the railway should be paid in nothing but stock and bonds. Smith, a man financially irresponsible, was awarded a contract to construct the roadbed, lay the iron, tie and ballast the road. ■ All this was to be done within less than three months. The work was in reality worth about half of the face value of the bonds. Smith expended and incurred liabilities amounting to about $12,770. The bonds he had received were'worth nothing. They had no market value. No one would buy them, or loan money upon them. The construction company failed to pay. The railway company had agreed to pay nothing but its certificates of stock and bonds. In a sentence, the whole enterprise collapsed, with no assets but a right of way over part of the line, and a roadbed which was being washed away by the rains. Affairs continued in this shape for about two years. Meanwhile Smith, in writing, represented the amount he had invested at $12,770. The receiver found no tangible assets; and, unless some way could be devised to provide for the construction of the road, the bonds which had been issued, including those of Smith, were without value. Under the direction and authority of the court, Mr. Stevenson, attorney for the receiver, was allowed to proceed to construct the road by the use of receiver’s certificates. This action alone has made the Smith bonds of any value whatever. That he represented his interest to be $12,770, and that he permitted Mr. Stevenson and the receiver to proceed with that understanding, is established beyond controversy. I think it equally well established that Mr. Mills, when he purchased these bonds, was fully cognizant of the situation, and of [266]*266Mr. Smith’s claims and representations. This being so, both are estopped to claim the face value of the bonds.

It is, however, urged that the estbppel is not pleaded in the answer, and therefore cannot now be made available as a defense. All the other bonds which were issued were collateral for loans to, and material furnished for, the construction company. There is testimony from which it' might be properly inferred that Mr. Stevenson understood that Smith held these bonds as collateral to his claim. However that may be, we think the amended answer sufficiently sets forth tho claim of the defendant to admit this defense. While it does not aver in words that Smith, and Mills are estopped, it does set forth the facts upon which the defense is based. If, however, it were necessary, under the circumstances of this case, to amend the answer in order to make this defense available, we should not hesitate to allow it, even on appeal in this court.

2. When the taking of testimony had been nearly concluded, the court, in the commendable desire to secure to the laborers the amounts due them for work performed upon the roadbed for Smith, made the following order:

“ In this cause it appears that there are claims for labor, material, etc., aggregating about $5,000, against John A. Smith, same being for labor performed and material furnished in connection with the construction of the railway of the defendant company before the institution of the proceedings herein; and it appearing further that said Smith received on account of the work he performed as contractor fifty-two bonds, of the par value of $26,000, which are a part of the bonds secured by the mortgage being foreclosed herein, and that he has sold such bonds to Merrill B. Mills, and received $5,000 in cash and $7,000 in a note dated Match 16, 1899, payable six months after date, which note is under the control of Frank E. Robson,one of complainant’s solicitors; and it further appearing that, since the appointment of the receiver herein, it became necessary to procure a renewal of certain franchises under which the railway company operates and maintains its road, and it was mado a condition in one or more of such ordinances that certain or all of such claims for labor and material should be said, or such ordinances be sub[267]*267ject to forfeiture; and the court conceiving that, under the facts recited, such claims for labor and material owing by said Smith, which the ordinances referred to required the .payment of, may be chargeable against said Smith, and be deducted from the amount remaining unpaid on said $7,000 note; and it being necessary, before a final decree can be made in this cause covering the subjects referred to, that all parties in interest be brought into this cause:

“It is ordered that Monday, July 17, A. D. 1899, at 10 o’clock a. m., be fixed as the time, and the circuit court room in the city of Port Huron the place, for any and all persons who have claims, or are interested in the presentation-of claims, for such labor and material, to appear, present, and prove their claims, under the provisions of such ordinances; and, further, in order that all parties interested in the final determination of matters in controversy in this cause may be formally before the court, it is ordered that Merrill B. Mills, John A. Smith, Elliott Gf. Stevenson, and the River St. Clair Construction Company, Limited, appear in this cause, and file any petition or answer deemed necessary or proper to frame a proper issue for the final disposition and settlement of all matters involved herein, within ten days from this day, and -that any of such parties be permitted to offer any additional proofs relating to the matters in controversy at the hearing above fixed for July 17,1899; and that until such hearing all matters involved in this litigation remain in statu quo; and that the further hearing of the above-entitled cause be continued until July 17, 1899, at 10 o’clock a. m.

“ It is further ordered that notice of such hearing be published once in each week for the two weeks preceding such hearing in each of the following newspapers published in the counties of St. Clair and Macomb: The Port Huron Weekly Times, the Marine City Globe, the Algonac Courier, and the Era of New Baltimore; and that a copy of this order be served on the River St. Clair Construction Company, Limited, eight days before such hearing, and also upon the Detroit National Bank, Abram Smith, Angus Smith, Samuel L. Smith, Jefferson T. Wing, Frank E. Robson; and that leave be and is hereby granted them and each of them to intervene and assert any claim they may have in or to said $7,000 note, or the proceeds thereof; and that any party or parties above named who desire to intervene and assert any claim or present any matter for consideration of the court in [268]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
86 N.W. 788, 127 Mich. 252, 1901 Mich. LEXIS 971, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/union-trust-co-v-detroit-river-st-clair-railway-mich-1901.