Union Trust Co. v. Calhoun

142 Misc. 466, 254 N.Y.S. 637, 1931 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 980
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 27, 1931
StatusPublished

This text of 142 Misc. 466 (Union Trust Co. v. Calhoun) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Union Trust Co. v. Calhoun, 142 Misc. 466, 254 N.Y.S. 637, 1931 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 980 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1931).

Opinion

Rodenbeck, J.

When the facts and circumstances concerning the relations of the parties to these joint accounts are examined, they indicate a fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant to secure the moneys and other property of the incompetent. She has completely succeeded in this attempt, and has in her possession all of the life savings of the incompetent, while the latter is confined in the Rochester State Hospital as a charity patient. The facts and circumstances in the case point to a persistent effort on the part of the defendant to defraud the incompetent of her savings.

The relation that the incompetent sustained to the defendant -was that of a domestic servant. There was no other relationship existing between them. This relation, however, became confidential and the defendant, in the transactions in question, abused this confidence and imposed upon the incompetent to tire extent of acquiring all of her property and leaving her a pauper to be [467]*467supported by the public. The young lady who lived with the defendant, who had taken the defendant’s name but was not legally adopted, testified that the incompetent was treated as a member of the family.

The incompetent was sixty-two years of age when she first went to work for the defendant, and, during her simple and industrious life, she had accumulated considerable money which was on deposit in banks in the city of Rochester in her own name.

The first step in the effort of the defendant to obtain control of the incompetent’s property was to secure the withdrawal of $500 from one of the bank accounts of the incompetent and have it deposited, October 9, 1923, in a joint account in the names of Melina K. Yogan and Lotta F. Calhoun, either or the survivor may draw.”

The next step was to have transferred to the defendant’s safe deposit box the contents of the safe deposit box of the incompetent, June 25, 1924. This gave the defendant control of the bank books and other papers of the incompetent, and put her in a position where she could complete her plans to secure all of the incompetent’s savings.

Thereafter, two other joint bank accounts were opened in the same names as the previous one, December 30, 1924, and, in time, all of the moneys in the banks belonging to the incompetent were transferred, without any consideration whatever from the defendant, to these joint accounts.

When these joint bank accounts were completed, the defendant had some doubt about the accounts, and she took the incompetent to her attorney, the latter part of the year 1925, to discuss the transfer of the accounts to her individual name. This course was disapproved by the attorney, and the nature of a joint account was explained, .and it was suggested that, in order to take care of any other property, a will should be made out in favor of the defendant.

Thereafter the defendant and her husband went south for the winter. In May of the following year, 1926, the incompetent suffered a stroke of apoplexy while at her brother’s home. The defendant, then, fearful of the moneys in the joint accounts, proceeded to withdraw them from the joint accounts and to place them in her individual name," June 8, 1926.

The incompetent, sick and unable to work and being then of no further use to the defendant, was placed in St. Mary’s Hospital, the Monroe County Hospital, and, then, sent for a short time into the country, and, later, placed in St. Ann’s Home, the almshouse of Monroe county, and the Monroe County Hospital, as a [468]*468charity patient, and, finally, in the Rochester State Hospital as insane, where she now is.

Not only has the defendant appropriated to herself all of the savings of the incompetent, deposited in the banks of the city, but she has assumed to take possession of a fur coat, a small legacy belonging to the incompetent, the contents of a registered letter, and all of the personal effects of the incompetent.

What made the influence of the defendant so potent and the consummation of the fraudulent scheme of the defendant so easy was the mental condition that the incompetent was in during the years when the joint accounts were opened, and when the funds were transferred from these accounts to the individual name of the defendant, and when the other transactions between the parties occurred. She was not insane, but she was in the incipient stages of a mental condition which subsequently developed into insanity. Lay witnesses were called on behalf of the defendant to testify to her acts and conduct while employed by them during a part of the period when the joint accounts were opened, and they testified that her acts were rational. But the testimony of the expert, called on behalf of the incompetent, shows that she would be able to work, although suffering from the incipient stages of the mental disease which subsequently developed, and that her condition might not be revealed to her employers. This expert, who was the superintendent of the State hospital where the incompetent is confined, was not willing to say that she was insane during the time that the joint accounts were opened, but he did say that he was of the opinion that she was not competent.” The defendant told a former employer of the incompetent, in 1919, that the incompetent was acting strangely and was mentally unbalanced, which was not denied by her. This evidence was not overcome by any evidence on the part of the defendant, and may not be sufficient to set aside the transactions on the ground of the insanity of the incompetent, but, nevertheless, it has a strong bearing upon the mental condition of the incompetent which enabled the defendant to accomplish the appropriation of all of her life savings.

The cupidity of the defendant is further illustrated, and her desire to accomplish the appropriation of everything the incompetent possessed is further revealed, by her employment of an attorney to come to her house June 1, 1926," after the incompetent had suffered the stroke of apoplexy, and by the payment to him of his fee for drawing a will, which the incompetent was only able to execute by making her mark. This action of the defendant also supports the conclusion that the defendant realized the questionable character of her right to the moneys in the joint [469]*469accounts, and, therefore, resorted to the execution of the will, so that, if the appropriation of the joint accounts failed, she could still have recourse to the will. The execution of this will at a time when the incompetent was so ill that she could not sign her name favors the conclusion that the incompetent intended to retain control of her property until her death, and that the joint accounts were a mere matter of convenience.

If the transactions relating to the joint accounts were had in good faith, the defendant would not be making misrepresentations with reference to the moneys of the incompetent for the purpose of misleading those who were interested. To the officers of the bank, which has been appointed a committee of the incompetent, she reluctantly mentioned one of the joint accounts, and said that it had been placed there for the purpose of meeting funeral expenses, saying masses, and care and maintenance, and, later, admitted that there was another joint account to be used for masses. This statement of the defendant, not denied by her, probably indicates the purpose for which the joint accounts were opened.

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Bluebook (online)
142 Misc. 466, 254 N.Y.S. 637, 1931 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 980, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/union-trust-co-v-calhoun-nysupct-1931.