Birdzell, T.
This is an action to recover $70 and interest on a promissory note made by the defendant to the Sageng Threshing Machine Company, and by it transferred to the plaintiff. The judgment was entered in favor of the defendant upon a verdict of the jury, and the plaintiff appeals. The defense is that the note was given for-stock in a threshing machine company which turned out to be worthless, and that the plaintiff is not a holder in due course nor one who has-derived title from a holder in due course. The note is as follows:
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Birdzell, T.
This is an action to recover $70 and interest on a promissory note made by the defendant to the Sageng Threshing Machine Company, and by it transferred to the plaintiff. The judgment was entered in favor of the defendant upon a verdict of the jury, and the plaintiff appeals. The defense is that the note was given for-stock in a threshing machine company which turned out to be worthless, and that the plaintiff is not a holder in due course nor one who has-derived title from a holder in due course. The note is as follows:
On the back of the note is the following indorsement of payment r “April 15, 1910, pd. $30.” The plaintiff received the note in Tune,. 1910.
[399]*399The trial court excluded evidence offered to prove that the plaintiff was a holder in due course, and instructed the jury that, inasmuch as the payments referred to in the marginal notations had not been made in full, the plaintiff was the purchaser of overdue paper, and, as such, could not be a holder in due course.
The note in suit is what is frequently termed an “on or before note.” On its face, in the body of the instrument, the promise is to pay $100 on or before September 2, 1910. There is no ambiguity as to the ■ time of payment, except such as might be thought to arise from marginal notations in the lower left-hand corner of the note. Unless these marginal memoranda amount to unqualified promises to pay instalments at the times designated, they cannot be said to qualify the promise to pay $100, which matures on September 2, 1910. While the court is not free to disregard the plain meaning of a portion of the language appearing upon the face of the instrument in so far as it forms a part of the contract of the parties, it is nevertheless true that where, as here, the body of the instrument speaks in plain terms and sets forth a contract wholly different in its obligations and legal effect from that which would result were the marginal notations considered as binding, it should not be prone to alter a plain meaning in order to give effect to words and figures of doubtful legal import. There can be no doubt whatever that it was the intention of the parties to make the note in suit absolutely payable on September 2, 1910; neither can there be any doubt that under the terms of the note, separate and apart from the memoranda, the maker reserved the right to pay in advance of his legal liability to pay. The marginal notations are such as to convey neither a promise, an agreement, nor a condition in any way changing the legal effect of the words in the body of the instrument, and are in terms which merely express a likelihood that certain amounts will be paid before maturity, giving the dates of such prospective payments. The court is not warranted in giving to the words used a meaning and legal significance entirely contrary to that expressed in the body of the instrument. The language embraced in the marginal memoranda is not sufficiently strong to warrant the bringing of actions for the nonpayment of the sums named, and does not, in our judgment, accelerate the obligation to pay any portion of the note. In these notations, as we view them, it only appears what the expectations of the parties were with [400]*400reference to advance payments, rather than what the obligation of the maker was to be in that respect.
In determining whether or not an instrument is overdue for the purpose of fixing the status and rights of the parties thereto, it is proper to inquire whether, under its terms, a cause of action has accrued to the holder. The case of Fisk v. McNeal, 23 Neb. 726, 8 Am. St. Rep. 162, 37 N. W. 616, applies the controlling principle of this decision to notes somewhat similar to that in the instant case. The .action in that case was upon two promissory notes, dated July 1, 1878, the bodies of which contained promises to pay ten days after date. Upon one there was a marginal notation as follows: “Due September '30, 1878,” and upon the other “Due October 30th, 1878.”. The action was commenced on the 18th day of September, 1883, which was within the period of the Statute of Limitations if the accrual of the action was governed by the marginal notations, but which was barred by the statute if the accrual of the action was governed by the maturity as fixed by the language appearing in the bodies of the notes. The court held that the marginal notes or memoranda could not control the body of the notes, and that consequently the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The case would clearly be different here if the marginal notations contained words strong enough to obligate the debtor to pay before September 2, 1910.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.