Union Pacific Railroad v. United States

142 Ct. Cl. 340, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 141, 1958 WL 7325
United States Court of Claims·Decided May 7, 1958·No. No. 49448·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Jones, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff sues to recover amounts deducted which it alleges represent charges due on transportation services performed for defendant in early 1944. In defense of these deductions, the Government now asserts that the freight charges as determined were excessive.

The underlying issue of the case is whether the transportation privilege extended to rail shipments of ammunition and explosives routed through defendant’s Bialto Ammunition Back-up Storage Point, located near Bialto, California, constituted a “storage-in-transit”. If it is affirmatively so held, then the freight charges are to be computed on the basis of [341] the Association of American Railroads’ Section 22 Quotation 40-B. On tbe other hand, if it is determined that the service merely amounted to a “holding for orders”, which is the theory advanced by defendant, then the charges are to be arrived at under the authority of the Association of American Railroads’ Section 22 Quotation 31-C and the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company’s Circular No. 2140. Should it be decided that AAR 31-C had no application to the shipments in question, defendant takes an alternative position that Circular 2140 is applicable to all of the shipments.

The issue before us is substantially the same in fact and law as that which we considered in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. United States, decided this date ante, p. 204. For that reason, and in view of our decision, the opinion is necessarily brief. Only those facts relevant to a determination of the basic legal issue will be set forth. The facts in detail may be found in the findings of fact.

Defendant’s case is based essentially on its contention that the shipments here considered, following arrival at the Rialto depot, were “held for orders” within the contemplation of Circular 2140 (finding 20). The answer we supplied to defendant’s argument in the Chesapeake & Ohio case is here appropriate. Upon delivery to the Rialto depot’s enclosure, custody and possession of the cars passed from the carrier to the defendant (finding 8). Basically, Circular 2140 and Chesapeake & Ohio’s Freight Tariff No. 2418-H, considered in Chesapeake & Ohio, are the same. A comparison of the two will reveal identical language in most instances. As we ruled in Chesapeake & Ohio, we repeat here: the tariff contemplated possession by the carrier. This is true whether the service sought is diversion or reconsignment, or merely holding for written orders. Thus, the service ' performed at Rialto met the requirements of a “storage-in-transit” as plaintiff contends. That privilege was made available at the request of defendant under the terms and conditions of AAR 40-B (finding 15). Charges are properly to be assessed under that quotation.

Since defendant’s argument for the application of AAR 31-C is premised on the theory that the service performed at [342] Eialto depot was not a “storage-in-transit”, we have no need to mention that quotation further.

According to stipulation, payments due plaintiff under an application of AAE 40-B' amount to $8,486.10. With the addition of $11,190.68, which is owing to plaintiff on other shipments not disputed, the total amount plaintiff is entitled to recover is $19,676.78, and judgment will be entered in that amount.

It is so ordered.

Laramore, Judge; Madden, Judge; Whitaker, Judge; and Littleton, Judge, concur.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner Wilson Cowen, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. The plaintiff, a corporation of the State of Utah, is a common carrier by railroad over its own lines and in connection with other carriers.

2. After the petition was filed, a number of the plaintiff’s claims were disposed of by administrative settlement, withdrawal, and by stipulation of the parties. The only claims in controversy raise the issue as to the tariffs that are applicable to certain shipments of ammunition and explosives which were stopped in transit at the Eialto Ammunition Back-up Storage Point while enroute from inland points in the United States to the West Coast for export.

This dispute involves 30 bills of lading. As to the remaining claims in suit, the parties are agreed that plaintiff is entitled to be paid $11,190.68.

3. During the period from March 3,1944, to July 20,1944, plaintiff and connecting carriers performed transportation services for the defendant by transporting and delivering to defendant at the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation 30 shipments of ammunition and explosives, which were designated as explosive bombs, ammunition for cannon, projectiles for cannons, and explosive mines. Plaintiff was the final line-haul carrier. The shipping points shown on the Government bills of lading were Avondale, Colorado; Herlong, [343] California, and Clover, Utah, except for one shipment originating at Edgewood, Maryland. Each shipment was consigned to the Port Transportation Officer of the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, and the destination in each case was Victory Pier, Long Beach, California. By order of the defendant, each of the shipments was stopped in transit at the Rialto Ammunition Back-up Storage Point near Rialto, California, and was thereafter transported on to Victory Pier for loading aboard ship to be exported overseas. Delivery of each shipment was made and accepted at Long Beach, California, where the Port Transportation Officer receipted for the shipments and accomplished the bills of lading.

4. With the exception of one shipment which originated at Edgewood, Maryland, after February 1,1944, all the shipments in suit moved from original points of origin in the United States prior to February 1,1944, and were thereafter stored in transit at either Avondale, Colorado; Herlong, California, or Clover, Utah. The stoppage in transit at these points, sometimes hereinafter referred to as the inland transit stations, was for the purpose of enabling the defendant to unload the explosives from the car, store them, and, where necessary, to repaint the projectiles, to box, re-box, crate, re-crate or mark the explosives, or to replace any defective assemblies on the bombs before reshipment to the port. After the storage in transit, the shipments moved to the port by way of the Rialto depot under new outbound bills of lading issued at Avondale, Herlong, or Clover, after February 1,1944.

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Union Pacific Railroad v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 340, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 141, 1958 WL 7325 (cc 1958).

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