Union Pacific Railroad v. City of Russell

240 P. 264, 119 Kan. 350, 1925 Kan. LEXIS 465
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedOctober 10, 1925
DocketNo. 26,089
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 240 P. 264 (Union Pacific Railroad v. City of Russell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Union Pacific Railroad v. City of Russell, 240 P. 264, 119 Kan. 350, 1925 Kan. LEXIS 465 (kan 1925).

Opinion

[351]*351The opinion of the court was delivered by

Johnston, C. J.:

This is an action brought by the Union Pacific Railroad Company to enjoin the assessment and collection of special improvement taxes for paving a part of Main street in the city of Russell. A temporary restraining order was granted by the probate judge, but on the final hearing of the cause before the district court that order was vacated and the injunction denied. Plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff is a railroad corporation which operates a line through the city .of Russell. Russell is a city of the third class, and having determined to pave a portion of Main street which divides/ blocks 50 and 51 as platted, crosses the right of way of the railroad company a distance of 400 feet and divides blocks 68 and 69 on the south of the railroad right of way, it passed an ordinance placing blocks 50 and 51, together with the right of way, in an assessment district. An assessment was made on this territory as a unit extending from Ninth street to Eleventh street, embracing one-half of blocks 50 and 51, and the same distance from Main street on each side of the unplatted railroad right of way. The accompanying sketch illustrates the situation.

Blocks 68 and 69 south of the right of way were treated as distinct units and separately assessed. The amount assessed against the territory from the north line of Ninth street to the south line of Eleventh street for the pavement was $12,703.59, of which $11,329 was charged against the railroad right of way—$636.26 against the lots comprising the west half of block 50 and $759.04 against the lots in the east half oLblock 51. The railroad company insisted that it was only chargeable with the cost of the improvement upon which its right of way abutted on each side of the street, and tendered $8,652.32—an amount sufficient to meet assessment for the improvement if its ground had been separately assessed.

The contention of the plaintiff is that the action of the city in placing the platted and unplatted territory together in the assessment district was contrary to the statute and that a charge upon its territory for the improvement in blocks 50 and 51 was unauthorized. It insists that blocks 50 and 51 should each be regarded as separate units and that lots therein should be assessed for the improvement upon which they abut, and that the unplatted ground of the plaintiff should be separately assessed for the improvement of that part of [353]*353the street which passes across its grounds. The theory of our law is that land platted into lots or blocks abutting on an improvement shall be assessed for such improvement, the block being the unit and the levy to extend to the middle of the block. It is contended by the city that as blocks 50 and 51 are not completely surrounded by streets they cannot be regarded as units for assessment purposes. It will be observed that block 51 is surrounded by streets except a few feet on the south line, where that line intersects the right of way, and that block 50 is surrounded on three sides by streets and on the other side by the railroad right of way, which in a sense is a public highway. It appears that the city was platted after the right of way was established and the land north of it was platted and the tracts designated as blocks, including the ones in question. These blocks could not be made regular in form, and Tenth street extended south of them because of the existence of the railroad right of way, but they do accord with the general scheme of the plat. To all intents and purposes they are blocks, and within the meaning of the statute relating to the assessment for improvements should be so regarded. In the recent case of Atchison, T. & S. F. Rly. Co. v. City of Ellinwood, 119 Kan. 218, 238 Pac. 341, tracts of ground platted as blocks which were less in area than other blocks and bounded by the right of way of a railroad on one side were held to be blocks within the meaning of the statute for assessment purposes. It was said:

[352]

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Related

Bell v. City of Topeka
553 P.2d 331 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1976)
Mai v. City of Topeka
383 P.2d 553 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1963)
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287 P. 587 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1930)
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. City of Kingman
252 P. 220 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1927)
Brown v. City of Junction City
251 P. 726 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1926)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
240 P. 264, 119 Kan. 350, 1925 Kan. LEXIS 465, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/union-pacific-railroad-v-city-of-russell-kan-1925.