Union Federal Bank v. Minyard

Fifth Circuit

Union Federal Bank v. Minyard

919 F.2d 335, 1990 WL 187053

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedDecember 18, 1990

DocketNo. 90-2341

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 919 F.2d 335 (Union Federal Bank v. Minyard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Union Federal Bank v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335, 1990 WL 187053 (5th Cir. 1990).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Today’s appeal arises from the foreclosure of property on which a Texas joint venture had, in palmier times, proposed to erect a shopping center. The venturers had guaranteed payment of the purchase money note in various individual percentages, and the transferee holder of the note recovered judgments against them in a state court trial. In that trial, the ventur-ers contended unsuccessfully that the holder was seeking to recover interest of them at usurious rates, though not that the loan documents themselves specified such rates.

Subsequent to the entry of judgment, the holder was declared insolvent; and first the FSLIC, and later the FDIC, was appointed receiver and substituted as counter-defendant in this case. FSLIC had removed the case after judgment but while the ventur-ers’ motion for new trial was pending. The federal court overruled that motion and, in essence, re-entered the state judgment as its own.

As the FDIC had neither opportunity nor occasion to assert the D’Oench doctrine ¹ in the trial court, we will entertain its assertion here. See FDIC v. Castle, 781 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.1986). Under it, and because the venturers’ attempt to base a usury claim on pleading contentions is perforce not one reflected in the lender’s records, it is therefore of no use — offensive or defensive — against the FDIC. Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.1989).

As for the claim against Union Federal Savings Bank, the assignee of the note, no serious attempt is made by the appellants to assert that, as takers from one which held “at least holder in due course status,” ² its rights were less than those of its assignor. Various other reasons support the judgments of the trial court; but, as those recited suffice to do so, we write no further.

AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM:

Today’s appeal arises from the foreclosure of property on which a Texas joint venture had, in palmier times, proposed to erect a shopping center. The venturers had guaranteed payment of the purchase money note in various individual percentages, and the transferee holder of the note recovered judgments against them in a state court trial. In that trial, the ventur-ers contended unsuccessfully that the holder was seeking to recover interest of them at usurious rates, though not that the loan documents themselves specified such rates.

Subsequent to the entry of judgment, the holder was declared insolvent; and first the FSLIC, and later the FDIC, was appointed receiver and substituted as counter-defendant in this case. FSLIC had removed the case after judgment but while the ventur-ers’ motion for new trial was pending. The federal court overruled that motion and, in essence, re-entered the state judgment as its own.

As the FDIC had neither opportunity nor occasion to assert the D’Oench doctrine ¹ in the trial court, we will entertain its assertion here. See FDIC v. Castle, 781 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.1986). Under it, and because the venturers’ attempt to base a usury claim on pleading contentions is perforce not one reflected in the lender’s records, it is therefore of no use — offensive or defensive — against the FDIC. Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.1989).

As for the claim against Union Federal Savings Bank, the assignee of the note, no serious attempt is made by the appellants to assert that, as takers from one which held “at least holder in due course status,” ² its rights were less than those of its assignor. Various other reasons support the judgments of the trial court; but, as those recited suffice to do so, we write no further.

AFFIRMED.

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Bluebook (online)

919 F.2d 335, 1990 WL 187053, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/union-federal-bank-v-minyard-ca5-1990.

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