Union Carbide Corp. v. Montell N.V.

179 F.R.D. 425, 1998 WL 247483
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 14, 1998
DocketNo. 95 CIV. 0134(SAS)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 179 F.R.D. 425 (Union Carbide Corp. v. Montell N.V.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Union Carbide Corp. v. Montell N.V., 179 F.R.D. 425, 1998 WL 247483 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

Opinion

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

I. Nature and Complexity of the Action

Plaintiff Union Carbide Corporation filed a Fourth Amended Complaint in this action on [426]*426September 25, 1996. This 118 page document contains sixteen claims for relief, including claims for Sherman Act and Clayton Act violations, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective contractual relationships, and equitable estoppel. Many of these claims revolve around the parties’ transactions in the highly technical field of polypropylene manufacturing. The Complaint requests compensatory, restitutionary, punitive and treble damages, attorney’s fees, and permanent mandatory and prohibitory injunctive relief. The parties are all major multinational corporations or their subsidiaries. Hundreds of millions of dollars are potentially at stake. The docket report already contains over 150 entries. In short, this is a highly complex, technical and important case.

II. Complexity of the Motions and the Prolixity of the Parties’ Submissions

Defendants have served motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment directed at eight of plaintiff’s claims. They announced their intention to do so at a conference before the Court held on February 26, 1998. See Feb. 26 Transcript at 4. I stated at that time that I anticipated three motions. See id. at 9. Defendants said nothing to indicate that this expectation was erroneous. On April 9, however, the Court learned from plaintiff that defendants had served not three but seven separate summary judgment motions. Defendants’ motions are completely unprecedented in this Court’s experience. Defendants filed separate summary judgment motions directed to various claims, rather than a single, partial summary judgment motion directed at the Complaint.

The Court has subsequently received a staggering number of papers regarding these motions. Defendants’ statement filed pursuant to Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (“Local Rules”) is accompanied by 236 exhibits filling five bound volumes. Plaintiff’s response is supported by 314 exhibits contained in eight volumes. Plaintiff has also served, without justification under Rule 56.1, its own, independent 56.1 statement accompanied by 459 exhibits contained in fifteen bound volumes. Thus, in clear derogation of Local Rule 56.1’s requirement of a “short and concise” statement of material facts, the court has received twenty-eight volumes containing over 1,000 exhibits. The parties have submitted twelve additional volumes of exhibits in support of, or in opposition to, various motions as well.

The memoranda of law submitted by the parties also warrant comment. Papers filed in support of and in opposition to motions in this Court are not to exceed twenty-five pages. See Individual Rules and Procedures 2(e). Reply papers may not exceed ten pages. See id. For any one motion then, the parties are limited to sixty pages total. Defendants’ multiple submissions have effectively raised this limit to 420. The Shell defendants have exacerbated the burden by filing memoranda with 11 point type, substantial footnotes, and one and a half spaced lines.

III. The Need for Swift Resolution of the Motions

In reliance on my belief that no more than three motions would be made, I set September 14, 1998 as the date the trial of this action would commence. A three month trial is anticipated. In light of the complexity of the case, the Court requires assistance in order to address all seven motions sufficiently in advance of September 14 to allow the parties adequate pre-trial preparation. It will be impossible to reschedule such a lengthy trial for at least another six months. This case is now more than three years old. Plaintiff, who made no motions, is entitled to a prompt trial, despite its excessive submissions to the Court. Thus, defendants’ surprise motions threaten to impose significant and unwarranted prejudice on plaintiff.

IV. Disregard of this Court’s Rules

As noted above, both parties’ submissions violate the plain language of Local Rule 56.1.1 [427]*427They also violate this Court’s rules regarding the length of affidavits submitted.2 Finally, as I have indicated, defendants’ multiplicity of motions have effectively eviscerated the Court’s rules regarding the length of legal memoranda. Of course, in a case of this size and complexity, I would have agreed to a limited increase in the page limit had such a request been made. Instead, defendants unilaterally raised their limit from 105 pages (for three motions) to 245. This conduct, like plaintiffs conduct in submitting totally inappropriate 56.1 statements, is an affront to this Court’s inherent authority to control its own procedures.

V. Appointment of Special Masters

In circumstances such as these, the Court is authorized to seek the assistance of a special master. Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b) provides that “[i]n actions to be tried by a jury, reference [to a master] shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury ... a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.” The scope of the reference pursuant to Rule 53 may include a report and recommendation on a motion for summary judgment. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 586, 113 S.Ct. 1689, 123 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1566 (Fed.Cir.1988); In re Armco, Inc., 770 F.2d 103, 104-05 (8th Cir.1985) (“We believe ... that the district court acted properly in granting the master the ... power to hear motions for summary judgment____”); Richardson v. Bedford Place Housing Phase I Associates, 855 F.Supp. 366, 367 (N.D.Ga. 1994) (special masters appointed pursuant to Rule 53 have “the authority to make proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law on dispositive motions such as those ... for summary judgment”); Roberts v. Heim, No. C-84-8069, 1990 WL 306009, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 27, 1990) (argument that Rule 53 did not authorize master to make a report on summary judgment motion “finds no support in any authority”). A reference may be made without the consent of the parties. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 865 (Fed.Cir.1995), vacated on other grounds, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1240, 137 L.Ed.2d 323 (1997).

This action is to be tried to a jury; and, as I have discussed, the issues presented are unquestionably complex. Thus, a reference is appropriate. See Festo Corp., 72 F.3d at 865 (citing Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312, 40 S.Ct.

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179 F.R.D. 425, 1998 WL 247483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/union-carbide-corp-v-montell-nv-nysd-1998.