Undra Ward a/k/a Undra Delarence Ward a/k/a Undra D. Ward v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: September 24, 2024
• Docket: 2023-CA-00378-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CA-00378-COA

UNDRA WARD A/K/A UNDRA DELARENCE APPELLANT WARD A/K/A UNDRA D. WARD

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/01/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. M. BRADLEY MILLS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM CLAUDE COON ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/24/2024 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2014, Undra Ward pled guilty to second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit

armed robbery and was sentenced to serve consecutive terms of forty years and five years in

the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). In 2022, Ward filed a

motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), alleging that his guilty plea was invalid and that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney erroneously advised him that

he would be eligible for trusty time and early release. The circuit court denied Ward’s

motion, finding that it was barred by the three-year statute of limitations of the Uniform Post-

Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA). Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020).

We find no error and affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On February 18, 2014, Undra Ward pled guilty to second-degree murder as a lesser-

included offense of capital murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. As part of his

plea agreement, Ward agreed to testify against his co-defendant, Joshua Archie.1 The circuit

court found that Ward’s guilty pleas were “freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently

made and entered.” The court then sentenced Ward to serve consecutive terms of forty years

and five years in MDOC’s custody. Ward’s sentence and judgment of conviction were

entered on February 20, 2014.

¶3. Nearly eight years later, on February 3, 2022, Ward filed a PCR motion in the circuit

court. Ward alleged (1) that his guilty plea was invalid because it was not knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney erroneously advised him that he would be eligible for early release.

Ward argued that “he was misinformed and believed that he would be eligible for release

after serving fifty percent” of his sentence. He further stated that both his attorney and the

district attorney’s office believed that he would be eligible for release after serving fifty

percent of his sentence and that this misinformation was communicated to Ward “numerous”

times before and after he pled guilty. Ward claimed that his plea was invalid and involuntary

because he would not have pled guilty or agreed to cooperate against Archie “if he knew that

he would not be eligible for early release.”

1 Ward, an employee at Party City on County Line Road in Ridgeland, and Archie planned and carried out a robbery of the store. Archie shot and killed store manager Bobby Adams during the robbery. For a discussion of the facts of the case and Ward’s testimony against Archie, see Archie v. State, 387 So. 3d 963, 966-68 (¶¶2-16) (Miss. 2024).

2 ¶4. In support of his motion, Ward submitted a sworn affidavit stating that he was assured

“numerous times” and believed that he would be eligible for early release in exchange for his

testimony against Archie. Ward also submitted a sworn affidavit from his plea counsel

stating he advised Ward that he would be eligible for early release on his second-degree

murder sentence based on earned time, trusty time, and meritorious earned time.2 Finally,

Ward submitted a sworn affidavit from an assistant district attorney who had been involved

in Ward’s plea negotiations. The prosecutor stated that his understanding at the time Ward

pled guilty was that Ward would be eligible for early release after serving fifty percent of his

sentence and that he had “conveyed [his] understanding” to Ward’s attorney.

¶5. Ward argued that his claims were excepted from the UPCCRA’s three-year statute of

limitations based on this Court’s “intervening decision” in Ulmer v. State, 292 So. 3d 611

(Miss. Ct. App. 2020). See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i). In response, the State

argued that Ward’s PCR motion was barred by the statute of limitations.

¶6. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Ward’s PCR motion. Ward testified,

“In the plea negotiations it was told to me by my lawyer, when we talked to the DA and we

negotiated with them, that I would be sentenced to 40 years and I will only have to serve 20

years on the second degree murder charge and that . . . I would have a consecutive sentence

of five years under conspiracy to commit armed robbery.” Ward maintained that his attorney

told him that he would only have to serve twenty years of his second-degree murder sentence

“because [he] would be eligible for trusty earned time.” Ward also testified that he was

2 Ward’s consecutive five-year sentence for conspiracy is eligible for trusty time and early release.

3 housed at the Rankin County jail until after Archie’s first trial in 2017. He was then

transferred to MDOC’s custody, where a caseworker told him, for the first time, that he was

not eligible for trusty time. Ward testified that he would not have pled guilty if he had

known that he would not be eligible for trusty time or early release.

¶7. At the conclusion of the hearing, the State argued that Ward’s PCR motion was time-

barred, though the State did not dispute that Ward had been misinformed regarding his

eligibility for early release. In response, Ward argued that his claim was excepted from the

statute of limitations because he alleged a violation of his “fundamental rights” and based

on this Court’s “intervening decision” in Ulmer.

¶8. On February 1, 2023, the circuit court denied Ward’s PCR motion as time-barred.

The court relied on Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2023), decided just six days

earlier, in which the Mississippi Supreme Court overruled prior precedent and held that there

is no “fundamental-rights exception” to the UPCCRA’s statute of limitations. Id. at 615 (¶8).

Ward filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing, inter alia, that Howell should not be applied

“retroactively.” The circuit court denied Ward’s motion, and Ward appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶9. On appeal, Ward argues that (1) Howell should not be applied “retroactively,” (2) he

is entitled to relief under this Court’s decision in Ulmer, (3) the circuit court and MDOC

violated his due process rights, and (4) the circuit court “erroneously failed to exercise its

discretion to extend . . . [his] deadline” to file his PCR motion. For the reasons explained

below, Ward’s arguments are without merit, and the circuit court was correct to deny his

4 PCR motion as time-barred.

¶10. A PCR motion must be filed within three years after the entry of a judgment of

conviction based on a guilty plea. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). Prior to Howell, certain

“errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights” were excepted from the UPCCRA’s

statute of limitations. Smith v. State, 334 So. 3d 1199, 1203 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)

(quoting Rowland v. State, 42 So. 3d 503, 506 (¶9) (Miss. 2010), overruled by Howell, 358

So. 3d at 615 (¶8)), cert. denied, 334 So. 3d 1161 (Miss. 2022). The Supreme Court had held

that this exception applied to some claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but only “in

exceptional circumstances” or “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. (emphasis omitted)

(quoting Conley v. State, 364 So. 3d 641, 642 (Miss. 2020) (order); Chapman v. State, 167

So. 3d 1170, 1174 (¶12) (Miss. 2015), overruling recognized by Ronk v. State, No. 2021-DR-

00269-SCT, 2024 WL 131639, at *7 (¶36) (Miss. Jan. 11, 2024)). However, in Howell the

Supreme Court expressly abolished the “fundamental-rights exception” to the statute of

limitations. Howell, 358 So. 3d at 615 (¶8); Ronk, 2024 WL 131639, at *7 (¶36). Therefore,

Ward’s reliance on pre-Howell caselaw is misplaced.

¶11. In addition, Ward’s argument that Howell should not apply “retroactively” is without

merit. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Ronk, holding that Howell

applied to Ronk’s case even though Howell “handed down after Ronk filed [his PCR]

motion.” Ronk, 2024 WL 131639, at *2 (¶16). As the Court explained, “[g]enerally, all

judicial decisions apply retroactively unless the Court has specifically stated the ruling is

prospective.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gibson v. Bell, 312 So. 3d 318, 324

5 (¶27) (Miss. 2020)). Because Howell applied to Ronk’s case, “the fundamental-rights

exception [was] inapplicable.” Id. The same is true in this case.

¶12. Ward’s reliance on Ulmer is also misplaced. In Ulmer, we held that a PCR movant

was entitled to relief because the record established that he pled guilty to second-degree

murder in reliance on his attorney’s erroneous advice that he would be eligible for early

release. See generally Ulmer, 292 So. 3d at 612-16 (¶¶1-16). Thus, Ward’s substantive post-

conviction claim is similar to the claim made in Ulmer. However, Ulmer is distinguishable

because the PCR motion in that case was filed within the statute of limitations, whereas

Ward’s claim is time-barred. This difference is dispositive. See Smith, 334 So. 3d at 1205

(¶¶14-15) (explaining that time-barred PCR claims are distinguishable from non-time-barred

PCR claims).

¶13. In the circuit court, Ward argued his claim was excepted from the statute of limitations

because Ulmer was “an intervening appellate decision affecting the merits of [his claim].”

Ward cited Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2)(a)(i), which makes an exception

to the statute of limitations for “cases in which the petitioner can demonstrate . . . [t]hat there

has been an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or

the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction

or sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). This argument is also without merit. To begin with,

Ulmer was a decision of this Court—not the Mississippi Supreme Court or the United States

Supreme Court. Therefore, this statutory exception is inapplicable. Moreover, Ulmer simply

applied longstanding precedent that a plea is involuntary if the defendant is affirmatively

6 misinformed regarding his eligibility for parole or early release and pleads guilty in reliance

on the misinformation. See Ulmer, 292 So. 3d at 614-16 (¶¶8-15). Ulmer did not break any

new ground or announce any new rule of law. Accordingly, Ulmer was not “an intervening

decision” that “actually adversely affected the outcome of [Ward’s] conviction or sentence.”

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i). For these reasons, Ulmer provides no exception to the

UPCCRA’s statute of limitations.

¶14. Ward next argues that the circuit court and MDOC violated his “right to due process”

because he was not advised that his second-degree murder sentence was ineligible for early

release. This argument simply repackages Ward’s other claims and is barred by the statute

of limitations for the same reasons.

¶15. Lastly, Ward argues that his claim should be deemed to have been filed within the

UPCCRA’s three-year statute of limitations. Specifically, Ward argues that MDOC did not

inform him that he was ineligible for early release until some “uncertain date in 2017,” that

we should assume that the “uncertain date” was December 31, 2017, and, therefore, that the

statute of limitations did not begin to run until December 31, 2017. Ward further argues that

the statute of limitations should have been suspended from March 13, 2020, until May 20,

2021, based on the Supreme Court’s Emergency Administrative Order, No. 2020-AD-00001-

SCT, at 2 (¶8) (Miss. Mar. 13, 2020), which authorized trial courts “to exercise their sound

discretion in extending deadlines” due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

¶16. This argument is also without merit. The UPCCRA’s statute of limitations began to

run upon the “entry of [Ward’s] judgment of conviction” after he pled guilty. Miss. Code

7 Ann. § 99-39-5(2). Therefore, the statute of limitations expired in February 2017. Moreover,

Ward fails to explain how the COVID-19 pandemic prevented him from filing a PCR motion

for fifteen months.

¶17. For the above reasons, the circuit court did not err by denying Ward’s PCR motion as

time-barred. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. EMFINGER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.