Underfeed Stoker Co. of America v. American Ship Windlass Co.

165 F. 65, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5352
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island
DecidedOctober 3, 1908
DocketNo. 2,669
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 165 F. 65 (Underfeed Stoker Co. of America v. American Ship Windlass Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Underfeed Stoker Co. of America v. American Ship Windlass Co., 165 F. 65, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5352 (circtdri 1908).

Opinion

BROWN, District Judge.

The bill charges infringement of four patents relating to underfeed stokers:

No. 470,052, issued March 1, 1892, to E. W. Jones, claims 6 and 9;

No. 560,871, issued September 1, 1896, to John M. Roe, claim 1;

No. 595,837, issued December 21, 1897, to John M. Roe, claim 1 ;

No. 644,604, issued March 6, 1900, to F. A. Daley, claims 1 to 0, inclusive.

The defendant questions the sufficiency of complainant’s proof of title to the Jones and Roe patents. Title to these patents was formerly* in the Jogada Furnace Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Oregon. By stipulation defendant admits that the complainant has acquired title to the patents in suit—

“except so far as the title to said patents, or any of them, is derived under the transfer from Tallmadge Hamilton, as special master for the Jogada Furnace Company, to M. S. Klauber, as to which the defendants require the complainant to produce its proofs, and reserve to themselves the right to make any legal objection they may be advised.”

The special master, by order of the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in a creditors’ suit in equity, Benjamin M. Weil v. Jogada Furnace Company, was authorized to sell at public auction the patents and patent rights of the Jogada Furnace Company, with directions to report the sale to the court for confirmation. It appears that prior to the sale copies of the notice of sale were sent by post to all the stockholders of record. In the list of stockholders were the names of four out of five of the directors of the Jogada Furnace Company.

The sale having been confirmed by the court, the special master executed an assignment of the various letters patent, including the Jones and Roe patents now in suit. This assignment was recorded in the Patent Office on May 14-, 1900.

The defendant contends that the Wisconsin court was without jurisdiction to authorize this assignment of intangible property, for the reason that the appearance and assent of the Jogada Furnace Company to the appointment of a receiver was not authorized by the corporation. 1'he defendants urge that there was no jurisdiction of the court sitting-in Wisconsin, without a valid consent of the Jogada Furnace Company to be sued there, and that it now appears that the consent was not authorized, but was the act of a committee of management having no such power.

[67]*67The record in the case of Weil v. Jogada Furnace Company shows an appearance for the Jogada Furnace Company, and an assent to the appointment of a receiver according to the prayer of the bill, by Philip S. Abbott, its attorney.

In the deposition of Fred A. Daley appears the following:

“Tlie management of the company, whose authority was based upon a resolution passed by the board of directors at their regular annual meeting February i:i, 1893, appointed riiilij) S. Abbott as solicitor for the company, with authority to assent to the appointment of a receiver as prayed for by the creditors,” etc.

The resolution of the board of directors referred to is in the record. This resolution contains very broad language authorizing three agents of the company, one of whom was a director, to —

“do all and every matter and thing which it is within the power of this board to lawfully confer upon them the right to do in the conduct of business for ■and on behalf of this company; it being intended to confer upon. 1 hem the amplest powers possible.”

The complainant contends that by the terms of the resolution this authority is limited to the conduct of business in a 'specific territory. The proper interpretation of the resolution is somewhat doubtful, since the circumstances which might aid in interpretation are not in evidence. Conceding, however, for the purposes of the case, that it should be so limited, it does not follow of necessity that the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Wisconsin ivas without jurisdiction. Ordinarily a record showing the appearance of an attorney at law constitutes prima facie evidence of the authority of the attorney. Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 830, 6 L. Ed. 204; Hill v. Mendenhall, 21 Wall. 453, 22 E. Ed. 616; Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235-241, 16 Sup. Ct. 171, 40 L. Ed. 133.

It was not necessary to the complainant’s case to offer any other evidence of the consent of the Jogada Furnace Company to the jurisdiction of the court than evidence afforded by the record. Strictly speaking the testimony of Daley that the attorney was authorized by particular agents does not negative other authority. The long-continued acquiescence of the corporation in a sale which was made after notice to all of the stockholders, including four out of five of the directors of the corporation, is evidence tending to show original authority, and is sufficient proof of ratification, if original authority was lacking.

Tlie assumption is justified that notice to four out of five of the governing body of the company must have resulted in notice to the company itself (see Eumbermen’s Insurance Company v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407-438, 25 Sup. Ct. 483, 49 L. Ed. 810), and that a sale and assignment made after such notice was in conformity with the interests of the stockholders and of the corporation. If neither the creditors of the corporation, its stockholders, nor its directors have seen fit to question the validity of the decree of the Wisconsin court, this court should make every presumption in favor of tlie regularity of the decree.

In raising this objection to complainant’s title the defendant is in no privity with creditors, stockholders, or directors of the Jogada Furnace Company. The court, having acquired jurisdiction by consent [68]*68of the corporation, had authority to subject the patent rights to the payment of judgment debts (Agcr v. Murray, 105 U. S^. 126, 26 D. Ed. 942), and to order the execution of an assignment. The decree in the Wisconsin case omitted to direct the Jogada Furnace Company to make the assignment, but directed the master to execute and deliver to the purchaser a good and sufficient deed of conveyance. This omission is formal, and insufficient to constitute a substantial defect in the complainant’s title. It was clearly within the chancery powers of the court to compel an assignment, even against the will of the defendant, and a deed of assignment executed by the master of a court having jurisdiction would have in every other jurisdiction the same force as a deed executed by the officials of the corporation. The AVisconsin court having made an order that the assignment of the patents should be made by a special master, it might be assumed, were it necessary, that the proper conditions for the exercise of that power were shown to the court before the entry of the decree. There seems to be no substantial reason why the decree should be regarded as invalid because it does not in terms provide for the execution of the deed by officers of the corporation, when such execution would be merely in obedience to the decree of a court, not involving any voluntary choice of the corporation.

The Jones Patent.

The complainant’s fundamental patent is the Jones patent No. 470,-052.

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Bluebook (online)
165 F. 65, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/underfeed-stoker-co-of-america-v-american-ship-windlass-co-circtdri-1908.