Unauthorized v. Gordon

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedNovember 10, 1992
Docket92-1710
StatusPublished

This text of Unauthorized v. Gordon (Unauthorized v. Gordon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Unauthorized v. Gordon, (1st Cir. 1992).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


November 10, 1992

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
___________________

No. 92-1710

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEE,
AND AVRAM COHEN
Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

REVEREND GERALD GORDON,
Defendant, Appellant.

__________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
______________

___________________

Reverend Gerald Gordon on brief pro se.
______________________
James E. O'Neil, Attorney General, and Richard B. Woolley,
________________ __________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees.

__________________

__________________

Per Curiam. In July 1991, Gerald Gordon filed a notice
___________

of removal in the Federal District Court for the District of

Rhode Island, purporting to remove a civil action, charging

Gordon with the unauthorized practice of law, that had been

filed against him in the Rhode Island state Superior Court in

June 1987. The state plaintiffs moved for summary dismissal

or, alternatively, to remand, alleging lack of jurisdiction,

untimeliness, res judicata,1 and insufficient service of

process. The motion was referred to a magistrate judge. The

magistrate held a hearing on November 20, 1991. Although

Gordon was notified of the hearing, he did not appear.

On January 8, 1992, the magistrate entered an order

remanding the matter to the state court. The magistrate

concluded that the federal court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because the state court complaint did not aver

the existence of diversity of citizenship and the claims do

not arise under federal law. The magistrate also concluded

that the notice of removal failed to contain a short and

plain statement of the grounds for removal together with a

copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon Gordon

in state court, see 28 U.S.C. 1446(a), and that it failed
___

____________________

1. This was Gordon's third attempt to remove this state
court case to the federal court. We dismissed the appeal
from his first failed attempt for lack of jurisdiction.
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Gordon, No. 87-1941
____________________________________ ______
(1st Cir. 1988). We dismissed the appeal from the second
failed attempt for lack of prosecution. Gordon v.
______
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., No. 88-1452 (1st Cir.
____________________________________
1988).

to comply with 28 U.S.C. 1446(b), in that Gordon had not

filed the notice of removal within 30 days after receipt of a

copy of the state court complaint. Gordon did not file any

objections nor did he seek review of this order in the

district court.

On June 2, 1992, the district court entered an order,

which stated:

The Memorandum and Order of Remand
entered by United States Magistrate Judge
Jacob Hagopian on January 7, 1992, in the
above matter, has become final since no
appeal has been timely filed and the time
for appealing has expired.

Gordon filed a notice of appeal from this order on June 16,

1992. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The Motion to Remand
The Motion to Remand
____________________

We digress briefly at the outset to consider the

authority of the magistrate vis-a-vis a motion to remand.

There is a split in the caselaw as to whether a magistrate

has the authority to enter a final order of remand or whether

a magistrate's power extends only to making a report and

recommendation on the issue of remand to the district court,

which, in turn, renders a determination. The disparity in

views turns on whether a motion for remand is a dispositive

matter.

Section 636(b)(1)(A) of Title 28 permits the district

court to refer to a magistrate for hearing and determination

-3-

any pending pretrial matter, with the exception of, what have

been termed, dispositive matters, therein listed as:

a motion for injunctive relief, for
judgment on the pleadings, for summary
judgment, to dismiss or quash an
indictment or information made by the
defendant, to suppress evidence in a
criminal case, to dismiss or to permit
maintenance of a class action, to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and to
involuntarily dismiss an action.

As for a nondispositive matter referred to a magistrate, the

magistrate enters a final order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

Within 10 days of service of a copy of the order, a party may

serve and file objections, which the district court judge

shall consider, under a standard of review of clearly

erroneous or contrary to law. Id.
___

Pursuant to 636(b)(1)(B), the district court may also

refer to a magistrate any of the excepted dispositive matters

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