[Cite as Uhrichsville v. McPeck, 2014-Ohio-3798.]
COURT OF APPEALS TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
CITY OF UHRICHSVILLE JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. JohnW. Wise, J. -vs- Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 WILLIAM MCPECK
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Tuscarawas County Court, Case No. 12CRB249
JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed in part
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 27, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
TRAVIS COLLIN JOSEPH I. TRIPODI Assistant Law Director 114 East High Avenue P.O. Box 272 New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663 Uhrichsville, Ohio 44683 Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant William A. McPeck appeals his conviction entered by
the Tuscarawas County Court for criminal trespass and disorderly conduct. Plaintiff-
appellee is the city of Uhrichsville.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant lives in a home abutting a fifteen foot alleyway in Uhrichsville,
Ohio. Appellant is a long distance truck driver. Richard Mann also resides on property
abutting the same fifteen foot alley way.
{¶3} On the date in question, S.M., a minor, observed Appellant walk onto the
covered carport near her house, close enough to the house so that she could have
opened the door and touched him. S.M. began screaming as she was afraid.
{¶4} Wendy Gordon, S.M.'s Mother, testified at trial she observed Appellant
walking towards her home. She then lost sight of Appellant, heard her child yell and ran
to the back door. She then saw Appellant near the back corner of the home.
{¶5} Richard Mann, testified he was sleeping when he heard his daughter,
S.M., yell. He went to the front door. While standing on the front porch, Mann saw
Appellant get into his truck and pull his semi truck towards his home. Appellant then
engaged in a vulgar tirade towards Mann, including calling Mann a "pussy."
{¶6} Appellant later admitted being in the alley, but denied going onto the Mann
property. Appellant further denied the verbal tirade. Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 3
{¶7} Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of criminal trespass,
in violation of R.C. 2911.21,1 a fourth degree misdemeanor, and one count of disorderly
conduct, in violation of Uhrichsville City Ordinance 509.03, a minor misdemeanor.
{¶8} The matter proceeded to trial before the magistrate. The Magistrate issued
a Decision on September 25, 2012. Appellant filed objections to the Magistrate's
Decision on the same date.
{¶9} The trial court overruled Appellant's objections via Judgment Entry of
January 3, 2014. The trial court specifically deemed the testimony of S.M. and Richard
Mann as credible, and found Appellant's testimony not credible.
{¶10} Appellant assigns as error,
{¶11} "I. THE FINDING OF GUILTY OF APPELLANT FOR ALLEGEDLY
CALLING ANOTHER MAN A 'PUSSY' WAS ERROR IN THAT THE WORD 'PUSSY'
INFLICTED NO INJURY OR PROVOKED A BREACH OF THE PEACE."
{¶12} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUPPYLING A LEGALLY FLAWED
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION, THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF REASONABLE DOUBT,
BY STATING CREDIBLE EVIDENCE EXISTS TO FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT WILLIAM MCPECK WAS GUILTY OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND
DISORDERLY CONDUCT."
I.
{¶13} In the first assignment of error, Appellant asserts the record does not
support Appellant's conviction for disorderly conduct.
1 The trial court incorrectly references the statutory citation for criminal trespass as R.C. 2921.11 throughout the record. Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 4
{¶14} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry focuses
primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether the evidence, if believed,
reasonably could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997) (stating that “sufficiency is
a test of adequacy”); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).
The standard of review is whether, after viewing the probative evidence and inferences
reasonably drawn there from in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979); Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273, 574 N.E.2d 492. Furthermore, a reviewing
court is not to assess “whether the state's evidence is to be believed, but whether, if
believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction.” Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d at 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (Cook, J., concurring).
{¶15} Thus, when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, an appellate
court must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. State v.
Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996); State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d
465, 477, 620 N.E.2d 50 (1993). A reviewing court will not overturn a conviction on a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim unless reasonable minds could not reach the
conclusion that the trier of fact did. State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162, 749
N.E.2d 226 (2001); State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001).
{¶16} When an appellate court considers a claim that a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the court must dutifully examine the entire record,
weigh the evidence, and consider witness credibility. A reviewing court must bear in Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 5
mind, however, that credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. E.g.,
State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio
St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Once
the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may reverse the conviction only if
it appears that the fact-finder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’ “ Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶17} If the prosecution presented substantial evidence upon which the trier of
fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements
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[Cite as Uhrichsville v. McPeck, 2014-Ohio-3798.]
COURT OF APPEALS TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
CITY OF UHRICHSVILLE JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. JohnW. Wise, J. -vs- Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 WILLIAM MCPECK
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Tuscarawas County Court, Case No. 12CRB249
JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed in part
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 27, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
TRAVIS COLLIN JOSEPH I. TRIPODI Assistant Law Director 114 East High Avenue P.O. Box 272 New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663 Uhrichsville, Ohio 44683 Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant William A. McPeck appeals his conviction entered by
the Tuscarawas County Court for criminal trespass and disorderly conduct. Plaintiff-
appellee is the city of Uhrichsville.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant lives in a home abutting a fifteen foot alleyway in Uhrichsville,
Ohio. Appellant is a long distance truck driver. Richard Mann also resides on property
abutting the same fifteen foot alley way.
{¶3} On the date in question, S.M., a minor, observed Appellant walk onto the
covered carport near her house, close enough to the house so that she could have
opened the door and touched him. S.M. began screaming as she was afraid.
{¶4} Wendy Gordon, S.M.'s Mother, testified at trial she observed Appellant
walking towards her home. She then lost sight of Appellant, heard her child yell and ran
to the back door. She then saw Appellant near the back corner of the home.
{¶5} Richard Mann, testified he was sleeping when he heard his daughter,
S.M., yell. He went to the front door. While standing on the front porch, Mann saw
Appellant get into his truck and pull his semi truck towards his home. Appellant then
engaged in a vulgar tirade towards Mann, including calling Mann a "pussy."
{¶6} Appellant later admitted being in the alley, but denied going onto the Mann
property. Appellant further denied the verbal tirade. Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 3
{¶7} Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of criminal trespass,
in violation of R.C. 2911.21,1 a fourth degree misdemeanor, and one count of disorderly
conduct, in violation of Uhrichsville City Ordinance 509.03, a minor misdemeanor.
{¶8} The matter proceeded to trial before the magistrate. The Magistrate issued
a Decision on September 25, 2012. Appellant filed objections to the Magistrate's
Decision on the same date.
{¶9} The trial court overruled Appellant's objections via Judgment Entry of
January 3, 2014. The trial court specifically deemed the testimony of S.M. and Richard
Mann as credible, and found Appellant's testimony not credible.
{¶10} Appellant assigns as error,
{¶11} "I. THE FINDING OF GUILTY OF APPELLANT FOR ALLEGEDLY
CALLING ANOTHER MAN A 'PUSSY' WAS ERROR IN THAT THE WORD 'PUSSY'
INFLICTED NO INJURY OR PROVOKED A BREACH OF THE PEACE."
{¶12} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUPPYLING A LEGALLY FLAWED
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION, THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF REASONABLE DOUBT,
BY STATING CREDIBLE EVIDENCE EXISTS TO FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT WILLIAM MCPECK WAS GUILTY OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND
DISORDERLY CONDUCT."
I.
{¶13} In the first assignment of error, Appellant asserts the record does not
support Appellant's conviction for disorderly conduct.
1 The trial court incorrectly references the statutory citation for criminal trespass as R.C. 2921.11 throughout the record. Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 4
{¶14} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry focuses
primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether the evidence, if believed,
reasonably could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997) (stating that “sufficiency is
a test of adequacy”); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).
The standard of review is whether, after viewing the probative evidence and inferences
reasonably drawn there from in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979); Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273, 574 N.E.2d 492. Furthermore, a reviewing
court is not to assess “whether the state's evidence is to be believed, but whether, if
believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction.” Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d at 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (Cook, J., concurring).
{¶15} Thus, when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, an appellate
court must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. State v.
Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996); State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d
465, 477, 620 N.E.2d 50 (1993). A reviewing court will not overturn a conviction on a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim unless reasonable minds could not reach the
conclusion that the trier of fact did. State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162, 749
N.E.2d 226 (2001); State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001).
{¶16} When an appellate court considers a claim that a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the court must dutifully examine the entire record,
weigh the evidence, and consider witness credibility. A reviewing court must bear in Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 5
mind, however, that credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. E.g.,
State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio
St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Once
the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may reverse the conviction only if
it appears that the fact-finder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’ “ Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶17} If the prosecution presented substantial evidence upon which the trier of
fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements
of the offense had been established, the judgment of conviction is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 383 N.E.2d 132
(1978), syllabus. Generally, a reviewing court should find a conviction against the
manifest weight of the evidence only in the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the conviction.'" Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d
541, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717; accord State v. Lindsey,
87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000).
{¶18} Uhrichsville City Ordinance 509.03 contains identical language to R.C.
2917.11(A)(2), which reads,
{¶19} "(A) No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm
to another by doing any of the following:
{¶20} "*** Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 6
{¶21} "(2) Making unreasonable noise or an offensively coarse utterance,
gesture, or display or communicating unwarranted and grossly abusive language to any
person;"
{¶22} Richard Mann testified at the trial before the Magistrate,
{¶23} "Q. What happened then?
{¶24} "A. Then he stopped the truck in the road and started calling me pussy.
He kept saying 'Pussy, pussy,' and he repeated it over and I kept - - 'I can't hear ya.'
And I had heard what he'd said but I put my hand up over my ear and said I can't hear
ya. What's that? And he said it a bunch more times and he hollered other stuff. With
the sound of the loud semi you couldn't hear exact words of what he kept saying and
the was all irate, arms flailing when he said stuff, you know. He was all waving his arms
around.
{¶25} "Q. How did that make you feel?
{¶26} "A. Intimidated. He's, you know, he's done this over and over. He stood
in front of my kids and threatened to kill me.
{¶27} "MR. TRIPODI: Objection, Your Honor. Move to strike. There's no such
charge before the Court. Move for a mistrial. No such evidence has ever been
presented to me in discovery of any such documentation.
{¶28} "THE MAGISTRATE: Motion for Mistrial is denied. I will strike the
comment but the Motion for Mistrial is denied.
{¶29} "MR. COLLINS: Your Honor, you're not striking intimidated part?
{¶30} "THE MAGISTRATE: No, no, no the part about the killing and -
{¶31} "MR. COLLINS: Thank you. Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 7
{¶32} "THE MAGISTRATE: - - the Court will disregard that but.
{¶33} "MR. COLLINS: Thank you, Your Honor. Then what happened?
{¶34} "A. Then he finally I started back toward the front door of my house and he
started finally pulling away and I went into the house, talked to my daughter about what
just happened, talked to my wife and we stood in there and talked about it and then I - -
she was still there. I left to - -
{¶35} "Q. Who was still there?
{¶36} "A. My daughter.
{¶37} "Q. Okay.
{¶38} "A. Then I left to go to the Police Station."
{¶39} Tr. at 31-32.
{¶40} Upon review of the evidence, we find Appellant's conviction is not
supported by the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Richard Mann
testified he put his hands over his ears as Appellant called him a "pussy" and repeated
it over again, and "hollered other stuff," after Mann told Appellant he [Mann] couldn't
hear him [Appellant]. Although Mann testified he was "intimidated," the testimony does
not demonstrate Appellant's statement, though rude and offensive (egged on in part, by
Mann himself), amounted to fighting words. As such the statement was protected free
speech under the First Amendment. See, Cincinnati v. Karlan (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d
107; State v. Frazier, 9th Dist. No. 25338, 2011-Ohio-3189.
{¶41} Appellant's first assignment of error is sustained. Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 8
II.
{¶42} In the second assignment of error, Appellant asserts the Magistrate's
Decision includes findings of fact and conclusions of law which do not find Appellant
guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant asserts R.C. 2901.05
requires a finding by the trier of fact guilt is found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶43} R.C. 2901.05 states,
{¶44} "(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements of the
offense is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an
affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for
an affirmative defense, is upon the accused."
{¶45} Here, the trial court's January 3, 2014 Judgment Entry states,
{¶46} "The Court has carefully reviewed the transcript of the proceedings from
September 21, 2012 as well as the objections. The Court finds that the objections
should be overruled and that the Plaintiff, City of Uhrichsville has presented sufficient,
credible evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that William A. McPeck is GUILTY
of criminal trespassing and disorderly conduct."
{¶47} Appellant argues the trial court exceeds its jurisdiction by supplying a
statutory factor absent in the Magistrate's Decision. We disagree. The City of
Uhrichsville properly met the burden of proof for all of the statutory elements necessary
to sustain a conviction for criminal trespass. The trial court included the language
"beyond a reasonable doubt" in the January 2, 2014 Judgment Entry based upon
Appellant's objections to the Magistrate's Decision. We find the Magistrate's failure to Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2014 AP 01 0001 9
cite the burden of proof of no consequence given the magistrate's recommended finding
of guilty, and the trial court's clear recognition of the applicable burden of proof.
{¶48} The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶49} Appellant's convictions in the Tuscarawas County Court are affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Farmer, J. and
Wise, J. concur