Uebel v. B.O.E., Edgewood City S. D., Unpublished Decision (3-4-2002)
This text of Uebel v. B.O.E., Edgewood City S. D., Unpublished Decision (3-4-2002) (Uebel v. B.O.E., Edgewood City S. D., Unpublished Decision (3-4-2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
On February 29, 2000, appellant, who had been dismissed from her position as Treasurer of the Edgewood Schools, filed an action in federal district court against appellees. Among the claims raised in this action, appellant asserted that appellees violated Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code by depriving her of her rights and privileges guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2000, appellant filed a second action against appellees in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas claiming, as she had done in her federal action, that her Due Process rights had been violated. Two weeks later, on June 20, appellant appealed the federal district court's June 9 ruling to the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On March 9, 2001, appellees moved for summary judgment in the state action, arguing that appellant's due process claims were barred by resjudicata as a result of the district court's earlier decision in appellant's federal action. On April 5, 2001, the trial court granted summary judgment to appellees on the basis of res judicata and appellant timely appealed.
While the matter sub judice was pending before this court, the federal court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the matter to the federal district court for further proceedings. See Uebelv. Board of Education of the Edgewood City School District (C.A.6, Aug. 7, 2001), No. 00-3813, unreported. Appellant then voluntarily dismissed her federal district court action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
As her sole assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in dismissing her civil rights claims on the basis of res judicata. Appellant asserts, and appellee readily concedes, that res judicata is inapplicable to the civil rights claims in appellant's state action as the result of the federal court of appeals' decision and appellant's subsequent voluntary dismissal of her federal action.1
Under the principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of a previous action. Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995),
The trial court did not have the benefit of the Sixth Circuit's decision which was still pending when it ruled on appellees' summary judgment motion. Where a previous judgment is still pending on appeal, there is no "existing final judgment" upon which res judicata could be invoked to bar a subsequent action. See Metropolis Night Club, Inc. v.Ertel (1995),
Cause reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
WALSH, P.J., and POWELL, J., concur.
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