U. S. Slicing Mach. Co. v. G. S. Blakeslee & Co.

227 F. 442, 142 C.C.A. 138, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 2320
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 13, 1915
DocketNo. 2231
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 227 F. 442 (U. S. Slicing Mach. Co. v. G. S. Blakeslee & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
U. S. Slicing Mach. Co. v. G. S. Blakeslee & Co., 227 F. 442, 142 C.C.A. 138, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 2320 (7th Cir. 1915).

Opinion

KOHLSAAT, Circuit Judge.

The patent in suit, No. 897,018, was held invalid by the District Court for want of patentable novelty. It was granted August 25, 1908, for a knife guard for .meat-slicing machines, to one Roest, and afterwards acquired by appellant. There are seven claimá, of which only 1 and 2 are in suit. They read as follows :

[443]*4431. A guard for that part of the rotary circular knives of moat-slicing machines where the actual cutting is effected, comprising a bar which is so shaped as to follow the contour of the knife edge and is arranged a little behind and in advance of the edge of the blade and means for holding the bar in position.
2. A guard for that part of the rotary circular knives of meat-slicing machines where the actual cutting is effected, comprising a bar which is so shaped as to follow the contour of the knife edge and is arranged a little behind and in advance of the edge of the blade and adjustable means for holding the bar in position.

The defense rests upon alleged invalidity.

It was not new to guard circular saws and cutting knives at all dangerous points, except the necessary cutting edge, which of necessity must be exposed sufficiently to admit of contact with the material to be sawed or cut. The patent applies only to protection of the cutting edge, particularly that of a revolving knife or blade. This protection consists of a bar or rod mounted rigidly upon or adjacent to the frame of the cutter, but made adjustable with reference to the edge of the knife. It is located slightly in advance of the knife and far enough back thereof and toward the operator to admit the passage of the slice to be cut off from the bulk onto the receiving table or the operator’s hand. It is curved to follow the periphery of the circular knife, but not in the same plane therewith. This in substance constitutes the claimed invention. The device as a whole is durable and simple.

Appellant claims that there had long been a demand for such a guard; that engineers and others skilled in the art had sought in vain for protection from the cutting edge without interfering with the cutting facilities of the slicer. The evidence hardly justifies the assertion, though it will readily be seen that such protection was desirable. That any device which could accomplish that end must be, in substance, like that of the patent, seems to be conceded, since the two things necessary were (1) a guard out of alignment with the blade, and (2) near enough to the forward edge of the knife to prevent the operator from feeding his fingers to the cutting edge, and yet secure the advantages aimed at.

The novelty, if any, in the device, consisted in paralleling the knife with the guard at a desired distance laterally therefrom and in advance thereof; the former being spaced according to the thickness of the slice desired. It will he seen that the guard might easily be adjusted to act both as guard and gauge, protecting the operator while regulating the thickness of the slice. Some point is made by appellant as to this double function in commenting upon the prior art. It is well settled that the results attained, and not the names given to the parts, determine the question of equivalency. Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S. 120, 125, 24 L. Ed. 935. It will he understood that the patent calls for the protecting bar and means for applying and hold • ing same in position. It is necessary, therefore, to consider only those elements which it is claimed differentiate the slicer from the prior art, and those are, as above stated, the curved bar a little in advance and behind the cutting wheel, made adjustable with reference to the wheel and resting upon the frame or upon brackets supported independently [444]*444of the knife. Otherwise the device of the patent is conceded to be that of the prior art.

We confess our inability to see invention in supplying the protecting bar. It will not protect unless it is in advance of the cutter, and it will not operate unless placed behind the cutter. The evil and its. remedy seem so obvious that we fail to see how the device could escape the attention of one possessed of ordinary skill, the need of it being urgent. But assuming that, all things considered, some slight degree of invention apart from the prior art is shown, carrying the art from an unprotected to a fairly well guarded cutting arc of a cutting edge, was it new with appellant? Some 25 prior patents are set up in the answer. It will suffice if any of them show the protecting guard, so arranged at or near the cutting edge as to substantially anticipate or plainly suggest the guard of the patent in suit.

The German patent, No. 5,019, issued to Clement, shows a knife guard set a little behind and in advance of the cutting portion of this knife, conforming in contour to the knife edge and protecting tire so-called delivery side. True, it is not stationary, because the knife is not. It presents itself in a protecting capacity along the whole edge of the swinging blade. While the form and operation of the cutting device are different from those of the patent in suit, the latter being swinging blades, the concept is the same. It protects the operator from the cutting edge; it does not interfere with the efficiency of the blade in accomplishing what it was designed for. As an element of the combination, the guard of the patent in suit would be the equivalent of that of Clement. We do not consider the presence of an independent gauging device as of moment. Neither do we regard the difference between the forms of guarding devices, as to whether they are round or square or flat, as constituting any patentable distinction.

Patent No. 811,452, to E. F. Smith, dated January 30, 1906, and patents' Nos. 731,516 and 830,935, granted to same patentee, show what in the patent is called a,laterally adjustable gauge plate secured to the forward end of a reciprocating carriage or frame. This gauge plate is stationed, when the device is in operation, a little in advance of the cutter to the extent desired. This latter is a rotary knife disk. This gauge is only claimed as a spacer for slicing, operating in conjunction with a stop, plate. Its edge is curved to correspond to the contour of the cutting edge of the rotary knife. The space between the cutter edge and the concave edge of the gauge is shown in the drawings to be somewhat wide, evidently devised with the intention of using it only as a spacer or gauge. Nevertheless, it measurably acts as a guard. In the model shown, it seems to serve all the purposes of the device of the patent in suit. It is not adjustable longitudinally with reference to the cutting edge of the rotary blade, but travels with the-bodily movement of the blade. At line 71, page 1, in Smith’s patent, No. 830,935, the specification describes a transversely adjustable gauge-plate as extending in a plane parallel with the cutting face of the revoluble cutter- and located at a point in advance of the cutter and adapted to be adjusted transversely in relation to the cutter for varying the thickness of the slices to be cut. The gauge or guard is in. the form of a plate and not, as in Roest, a bar or.rod.

[445]*445Appellee insists that by cutting away the back portion of the plate there would remain a bar or rod substantially like that of the patent. There seetns to be no function of the gauge attributable to the use of a bar in preference to a plate, and no reason is perceived why the one is not the equivalent of the other as a guard.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co.
80 F.2d 912 (Fourth Circuit, 1936)
Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Baltimore & OR Co.
78 F.2d 312 (Fourth Circuit, 1935)
Frick Co. v. Lindsay
27 F.2d 59 (Fourth Circuit, 1928)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
227 F. 442, 142 C.C.A. 138, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 2320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/u-s-slicing-mach-co-v-g-s-blakeslee-co-ca7-1915.