Tywon W. Briscoe v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Court of Appeals of Virginia

Tywon W. Briscoe v. Commonwealth of Virginia

494 S.E.2d 898, 26 Va. App. 415, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 31

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia

DecidedJanuary 27, 1998

Docket1963964

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 494 S.E.2d 898 (Tywon W. Briscoe v. Commonwealth of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tywon W. Briscoe v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 494 S.E.2d 898, 26 Va. App. 415, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 31 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

WILLIS, Judge.

On appeal from his conviction for aggravated malicious wounding and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, Tywon W. Briscoe contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that he would be ineligible for parole. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On August 7, 1995, Briscoe shot Luis Glaize. A jury convicted Briscoe of aggravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The trial court instructed the jury that the penalty range for aggravated malicious wounding is twenty years to “imprisonment for life.”

Dining deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note asking:

(1) Please provide definition (in number of years) of “Imprisonment for life”?

(2) When is the eligibility of parole for a 20 year sentence?

In response to the first question, the trial court replied: “ ‘Imprisonment for life’ means the plain, common definition of those words.” As to the second question, the trial court replied:

You should impose such punishment as you think is just under the evidence and within the instructions of the Court. *417 You are not to concern yourselves with what may happen afterwards.

The jury fixed Briscoe’s punishment at thirty-two years in prison for aggravated malicious wounding and three years for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. By final order, the trial court imposed these sentences.

Our decision in this case is controlled by Mosby v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 284, 482 S.E.2d 72 (1997). In Mosby, we held that a trial court is not required to instruct the jury on a defendant’s eligibility for parole in non-capital cases. Id. at 286, 482 S.E.2d at 72. “Parole ineligibility” is not based upon a defendant’s character, culpability, or the nature of the offense, and is not, therefore, relevant to punishment. Walker v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 50, 66, 486 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1997).

The trial court instructed the jurors that “imprisonment for life” is self-explanatory and that they should not concern themselves with what might occur in the future. These responses to the jury’s inquiries were proper. See Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 94, 472 S.E.2d 263, 272 (1996); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 214, 257 S.E.2d 784, 792 (1979); Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 247 S.E.2d 704 (1978).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

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WILLIS, Judge.

On appeal from his conviction for aggravated malicious wounding and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, Tywon W. Briscoe contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that he would be ineligible for parole. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On August 7, 1995, Briscoe shot Luis Glaize. A jury convicted Briscoe of aggravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The trial court instructed the jury that the penalty range for aggravated malicious wounding is twenty years to “imprisonment for life.”

Dining deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note asking:

(1) Please provide definition (in number of years) of “Imprisonment for life”?

(2) When is the eligibility of parole for a 20 year sentence?

In response to the first question, the trial court replied: “ ‘Imprisonment for life’ means the plain, common definition of those words.” As to the second question, the trial court replied:

You should impose such punishment as you think is just under the evidence and within the instructions of the Court. *417 You are not to concern yourselves with what may happen afterwards.

The jury fixed Briscoe’s punishment at thirty-two years in prison for aggravated malicious wounding and three years for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. By final order, the trial court imposed these sentences.

Our decision in this case is controlled by Mosby v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 284, 482 S.E.2d 72 (1997). In Mosby, we held that a trial court is not required to instruct the jury on a defendant’s eligibility for parole in non-capital cases. Id. at 286, 482 S.E.2d at 72. “Parole ineligibility” is not based upon a defendant’s character, culpability, or the nature of the offense, and is not, therefore, relevant to punishment. Walker v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 50, 66, 486 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1997).

The trial court instructed the jurors that “imprisonment for life” is self-explanatory and that they should not concern themselves with what might occur in the future. These responses to the jury’s inquiries were proper. See Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 94, 472 S.E.2d 263, 272 (1996); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 214, 257 S.E.2d 784, 792 (1979); Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 247 S.E.2d 704 (1978).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

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494 S.E.2d 898, 26 Va. App. 415, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 31, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tywon-w-briscoe-v-commonwealth-of-virginia-vactapp-1998.

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