Tyson v. . Frutchey

140 S.E. 718, 194 N.C. 750, 1927 N.C. LEXIS 205

Opinion

BeogdeN, J.

There was sufficient evidence of the negligent operation of defendant’s truck by the driver thereof to be submitted to the jury, but the real question in the case is whether or not the defendant is liable in damages for such negligent operation.

The undisputed testimony'discloses the following facts: The defendant is a farmer and a merchant. On 29 August, 1924, he owned a truck which he used in connection with his mercantile business. Bennett Eobinson was a tenant living upon the land of the defendant and paying for the use of the land a stipulated rental. Eobinson asked the defendant to loan him the truck for the purpose of going to church. The defendant told Eobinson that, as his sight was impaired, he would not lend him the truck for such purpose unless he should procure a competent driver. Eobinson then went off and thereafter returned and informed the defendant that he could get one Eobert Chambers to drive the truck. Whereupon the defendant consented that Eobinson could use the truck for the purpose requested. There is no evidence that Chambers was an incompetent driver. At the time the truck left defendant’s possession it was in good condition. Chambers did all the driving. In returning from church the evidence tended to show that defendant’s truck driven by Chambers collided with the plaintiff’s automobile, resulting in the injury complained of.

Upon these admitted facts the principle announced in Reich v. Cone, 180 N. C., 267, applies, and determines the rights of the parties. In that case Ciarle, G. J., said: “When a motor car is used by one to whom it is loaned for his own purposes, no liability attaches to the lender unless, possibly, when the lender knew that the borrower was incompetent, and that injury might occur.” The same principle was declared in Thorp v. Minor, 109 N. C., 152, and in Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C., 760.

The plaintiff relies upon Freeman v. Dalton, 183 N. C., 538, but this case was distinguished in Grier v. Grier, supra. We hold, therefore, that the motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of all the evidence should have been allowed.

Eeversed.