THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 TYSON FOODS, INC., CASE NO. C22-0192-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, 13 Defendant. 14
15 This matter comes before the Court on Tyson Foods, Inc.’s (“Tyson”) (a) motion for a 16 preliminary injunction (Dkt. Nos. 3, 5) and (b) motion to expedite a declaratory judgment 17 hearing and to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits (Dkt. No. 18 23), as well as both parties’ motions to seal (Dkt. Nos. 2, 34, 46). Having thoroughly considered 19 the briefing and the relevant record, and finding oral argument unnecessary, the Court DENIES 20 Tyson’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. Nos. 3, 5), GRANTS Tyson’s motion to 21 expedite and to consolidate (Dkt. No. 23), GRANTS the parties’ motions to seal (Dkt. Nos. 2, 22 34, 46), and DISMISSES with prejudice Tyson’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) for the reasons 23 explained herein. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Costco has purchased poultry from Tyson for some number of years. (See generally Dkt. 26 No. 1.) More recently, Poultry consumers and the United States Government assert that Tyson 1 and other poultry producers collude and engage in generally anticompetitive conduct, resulting in 2 inflated poultry prices. (Id.) Various parties have since brought suit against Tyson and other 3 poultry producers in class-based litigation. See In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, Case 4 No. C16-08637 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (the “Broiler suit”). Costco has elected out of this litigation, 5 preferring to pursue direct action. (See Dkt. No. 6-8 at 22.) This is taking the form of binding 6 arbitration for producers, like Tyson, whom Costco believes are subject to an arbitration 7 agreement with Costco. (Id.) For the remainder, Costco is pursuing its claims in court. See 8 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Koch Foods, Inc., et al., Case No. C21-04611 (N.D. Ill. 2021). 9 The case before this Court involves Costco’s arbitration demand against Tyson. (See 10 generally Dkt. No. 1.) Costco filed its arbitration demand in December 2021 with the American 11 Arbitration Association (“AAA”). (Dkt. Nos. 6-1, 6-2.) In it, Costco seeks arbitration pursuant to 12 its current standard terms. (See Dkt. No. 6-2 at 8.) Tyson takes issue with Costco’s demand, 13 arguing that any arbitration proceeding between it and Costco must be governed not by Costco’s 14 current standard terms, but Costco’s standard terms in place at the time the parties entered into 15 their current agreement. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 5.)1 Tyson seeks a declaratory judgment 16 that any agreement between Costco and Tyson does not incorporate Costco’s current standard 17 terms. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 12–13.) Tyson also seeks an injunction prohibiting Costco from 18 arbitrating claims against Tyson under those same terms. (Id.) 19 Because the parties present no disputed facts to the Court and arbitration preparation is 20 ongoing, Tyson asks for an expedited consolidated hearing on the merits pursuant to Federal 21 Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 65(a)(2). (See generally Dkt. No. 23.) Costco does not oppose 22 Tyson’s request to expedite and consolidate. (See Dkt. No. 35 at 24). And given the urgency of 23 their dispute, the parties have indicated to the Court that they will accept a ruling “on the 24
25 1 Tyson views Costco’s earlier standard terms as more favorable to its interests. (Id.) For example, Tyson contends that the 180-day limitation period contained in the earlier, but not the 26 current, terms act as an “absolute bar to Costco’s [c]laim[s].” (See Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) 1 papers.” (Dkt. No. 45 at 1.) 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 A. Declaratory Judgment 4 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its 5 jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations 6 of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 7 sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “Congress created this remedy, in part, to allow [a] potential 8 [party] to file preemptive litigation to determine whether they have any legal obligation[] to their 9 potential adversar[y].” Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc., 771 F.3d 10 632, 635 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 11 1996)). The Court has discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief. Countrywide Home Loans, 12 Inc. v. Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp., 642 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2011). 13 Here, it is undisputed that Tyson and Costco entered into a vendor agreement in 1995. 14 (See Dkt. Nos. 3 at 6, 35 at 7.) That agreement incorporated Costco’s “XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 15 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” (Dkt. No. 6-3 at 2.) Those terms (the “1994 Terms”) 16 require that XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 17 XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.” 18 (Dkt. No. 6-7 at 4.) Costco has regularly updated its standard terms since then, most recently 19 doing so in 2019 (the “2019 Terms”). (Dkt. No. 35 at 15.) The 2019 Terms, like the 1994 Terms, 20 require parties to arbitrate XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (Dkt. No. 6- 21 4 at 12.) 22 Tyson argues that the 2019 Terms cannot govern Costco’s arbitration demand because 23 Tyson never affirmatively assented to them, and both the vendor agreement and Costco’s 1994 24 Terms require written consent before any changes can be made. (Dkt. No. 1 at 12–13; see Dkt. 25 Nos. 6-3 at 3, 6-7 at 2).) Tyson seeks a declaratory judgment confirming this position, along with 26 an injunction barring an arbitration proceeding that might otherwise be held pursuant to the 2019 1 terms. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) 2 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the Court’s review is limited to deciding 3 whether an arbitration clause (1) is valid and (2) covers the dispute at issue. See Nguyen v. 4 Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014).) If an agreement exists, the FAA 5 “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion . . . , but instead mandates that district courts shall 6 direct the parties to proceed to arbitration.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 7 218 (1985) (emphasis original). 8 The 2019 Terms contain a delegation provision, requiring that “[a]ny issues about the 9 arbitrability of a [c]laim or [d]ispute will be determined by the arbitrator.” (Dkt. No. 6-4 at 12.) 10 While the 1994 Terms lack this provision, this is of no import. So long as they provide that 11 arbitration is governed by AAA rules, and the 1994 Terms clearly provide this, then the 12 arbitrator is the one to determine his or her jurisdictional limits—not the Court. See Schmidt v. 13 Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2017 WL 2289035, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash. 2017). “[I]ncorporation 14 of the AAA rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to 15 delegate the arbitrability question to an arbitrator.” Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 16 (9th Cir. 2015). 17 Tyson argues that it could not have possibly agreed to delegate this issue to the arbitrator 18 when it entered into its 1995 agreement with Costco because the AAA did not amend its rules to 19 consider the import of delegation provisions until 2000. (Dkt. No.
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THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 TYSON FOODS, INC., CASE NO. C22-0192-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, 13 Defendant. 14
15 This matter comes before the Court on Tyson Foods, Inc.’s (“Tyson”) (a) motion for a 16 preliminary injunction (Dkt. Nos. 3, 5) and (b) motion to expedite a declaratory judgment 17 hearing and to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits (Dkt. No. 18 23), as well as both parties’ motions to seal (Dkt. Nos. 2, 34, 46). Having thoroughly considered 19 the briefing and the relevant record, and finding oral argument unnecessary, the Court DENIES 20 Tyson’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. Nos. 3, 5), GRANTS Tyson’s motion to 21 expedite and to consolidate (Dkt. No. 23), GRANTS the parties’ motions to seal (Dkt. Nos. 2, 22 34, 46), and DISMISSES with prejudice Tyson’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) for the reasons 23 explained herein. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Costco has purchased poultry from Tyson for some number of years. (See generally Dkt. 26 No. 1.) More recently, Poultry consumers and the United States Government assert that Tyson 1 and other poultry producers collude and engage in generally anticompetitive conduct, resulting in 2 inflated poultry prices. (Id.) Various parties have since brought suit against Tyson and other 3 poultry producers in class-based litigation. See In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, Case 4 No. C16-08637 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (the “Broiler suit”). Costco has elected out of this litigation, 5 preferring to pursue direct action. (See Dkt. No. 6-8 at 22.) This is taking the form of binding 6 arbitration for producers, like Tyson, whom Costco believes are subject to an arbitration 7 agreement with Costco. (Id.) For the remainder, Costco is pursuing its claims in court. See 8 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Koch Foods, Inc., et al., Case No. C21-04611 (N.D. Ill. 2021). 9 The case before this Court involves Costco’s arbitration demand against Tyson. (See 10 generally Dkt. No. 1.) Costco filed its arbitration demand in December 2021 with the American 11 Arbitration Association (“AAA”). (Dkt. Nos. 6-1, 6-2.) In it, Costco seeks arbitration pursuant to 12 its current standard terms. (See Dkt. No. 6-2 at 8.) Tyson takes issue with Costco’s demand, 13 arguing that any arbitration proceeding between it and Costco must be governed not by Costco’s 14 current standard terms, but Costco’s standard terms in place at the time the parties entered into 15 their current agreement. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 5.)1 Tyson seeks a declaratory judgment 16 that any agreement between Costco and Tyson does not incorporate Costco’s current standard 17 terms. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 12–13.) Tyson also seeks an injunction prohibiting Costco from 18 arbitrating claims against Tyson under those same terms. (Id.) 19 Because the parties present no disputed facts to the Court and arbitration preparation is 20 ongoing, Tyson asks for an expedited consolidated hearing on the merits pursuant to Federal 21 Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 65(a)(2). (See generally Dkt. No. 23.) Costco does not oppose 22 Tyson’s request to expedite and consolidate. (See Dkt. No. 35 at 24). And given the urgency of 23 their dispute, the parties have indicated to the Court that they will accept a ruling “on the 24
25 1 Tyson views Costco’s earlier standard terms as more favorable to its interests. (Id.) For example, Tyson contends that the 180-day limitation period contained in the earlier, but not the 26 current, terms act as an “absolute bar to Costco’s [c]laim[s].” (See Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) 1 papers.” (Dkt. No. 45 at 1.) 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 A. Declaratory Judgment 4 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its 5 jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations 6 of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 7 sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “Congress created this remedy, in part, to allow [a] potential 8 [party] to file preemptive litigation to determine whether they have any legal obligation[] to their 9 potential adversar[y].” Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc., 771 F.3d 10 632, 635 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 11 1996)). The Court has discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief. Countrywide Home Loans, 12 Inc. v. Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp., 642 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2011). 13 Here, it is undisputed that Tyson and Costco entered into a vendor agreement in 1995. 14 (See Dkt. Nos. 3 at 6, 35 at 7.) That agreement incorporated Costco’s “XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 15 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” (Dkt. No. 6-3 at 2.) Those terms (the “1994 Terms”) 16 require that XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 17 XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.” 18 (Dkt. No. 6-7 at 4.) Costco has regularly updated its standard terms since then, most recently 19 doing so in 2019 (the “2019 Terms”). (Dkt. No. 35 at 15.) The 2019 Terms, like the 1994 Terms, 20 require parties to arbitrate XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (Dkt. No. 6- 21 4 at 12.) 22 Tyson argues that the 2019 Terms cannot govern Costco’s arbitration demand because 23 Tyson never affirmatively assented to them, and both the vendor agreement and Costco’s 1994 24 Terms require written consent before any changes can be made. (Dkt. No. 1 at 12–13; see Dkt. 25 Nos. 6-3 at 3, 6-7 at 2).) Tyson seeks a declaratory judgment confirming this position, along with 26 an injunction barring an arbitration proceeding that might otherwise be held pursuant to the 2019 1 terms. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) 2 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the Court’s review is limited to deciding 3 whether an arbitration clause (1) is valid and (2) covers the dispute at issue. See Nguyen v. 4 Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014).) If an agreement exists, the FAA 5 “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion . . . , but instead mandates that district courts shall 6 direct the parties to proceed to arbitration.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 7 218 (1985) (emphasis original). 8 The 2019 Terms contain a delegation provision, requiring that “[a]ny issues about the 9 arbitrability of a [c]laim or [d]ispute will be determined by the arbitrator.” (Dkt. No. 6-4 at 12.) 10 While the 1994 Terms lack this provision, this is of no import. So long as they provide that 11 arbitration is governed by AAA rules, and the 1994 Terms clearly provide this, then the 12 arbitrator is the one to determine his or her jurisdictional limits—not the Court. See Schmidt v. 13 Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2017 WL 2289035, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash. 2017). “[I]ncorporation 14 of the AAA rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to 15 delegate the arbitrability question to an arbitrator.” Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 16 (9th Cir. 2015). 17 Tyson argues that it could not have possibly agreed to delegate this issue to the arbitrator 18 when it entered into its 1995 agreement with Costco because the AAA did not amend its rules to 19 consider the import of delegation provisions until 2000. (Dkt. No. 47 at 12.) But the AAA’s rules 20 in effect at the time provided that “any amendment [of the AAA rules] shall apply in the form 21 obtaining at the time the demand for arbitration . . . is received by the AAA.” McKellar v. Mithril 22 Capital Mgt. LLC, 2020 WL 1233855, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2020) (citing AAA 23 Rule 1.) Meaning, absent a clear indication otherwise,2 the AAA rules in effect at the time a 24 party initiates arbitration apply to that proceeding, not the rules in effect at the time a party 25 agrees to arbitrate future claims. See, e.g., Lucas v. Gund, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D.
26 2 And here there is no such indication. (See Dkt. No. 6-3, 6-7.) 1 Cal. 2006); Cmmw. Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1976). 2 Therefore, it would appear that the issue Tyson seeks a declaratory judgment on is 3 reserved for the arbitrator rather than the Court. 4 B. Motions to Seal 5 “There is a strong presumption of public access to the court’s files.” W.D. Wash. Local 6 Civ. R. 5(g). To overcome that presumption, a party must show “good cause” for sealing a 7 document attached to a non-dispositive motion and “compelling reasons” to seal a document 8 attached to a dispositive motion. Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178– 9 81 (9th Cir. 2006). 10 The parties move to maintain under seal (Dkt. Nos. 2, 34, 46) certain documents attached 11 to declarations supporting their briefing (Dkt. Nos. 6, 6-1–6-9, 38, 38-1–38-6, 40, 40-1, 49), 12 along with unredacted versions of their briefing containing substantive references to those 13 documents (Dkt Nos. 5, 36, 36-1). The documents, some of which are subject to a sealing order 14 in the Broiler suit, represent contracts and communications between the parties, arbitration- 15 related documents, and other confidential information. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 6, 38, 40, 49.) 16 Because Tyson has asked for a consolidated hearing on the merits, and this order disposes 17 of Tyson’s case, the Court applies the compelling reason standard. And, given the confidential 18 nature of the documents, and the possibility that their disclosure will harm the parties’ 19 competitive standing, the Court finds a compelling reason to seal the documents and that reason 20 outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure. 21 III. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Tyson’s motion for a preliminary 23 injunction (Dkt. Nos. 3, 5), GRANTS Tyson’s motion to expedite and to consolidate (Dkt. No. 24 23), GRANTS the parties’ motions to seal (Dkt. Nos. 2, 34, 46), and DISMISSES with prejudice 25 Tyson’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1). The Clerk is DIRECTED to maintain Docket Numbers 6, 6-1–6- 26 9, 36, 36-1 38, 38-1–38-6, 40, 40-1, and 49 under seal. 1 2 DATED this 16th day of March 2022. A 3 4 5 John C. Coughenour 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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