IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Tyrone Stokes, Jan 30 2026, 9:51 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
January 30, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1740 Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Matthew Raper, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 71D02-2407-CM-002023
Opinion by Judge Felix Judges Brown and Scheele concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 1 of 15 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] Law enforcement officers discovered Tyrone Stokes intoxicated at the scene of
a late-night car accident, and an ensuing blood draw revealed Stokes had an
alcohol concentration equivalent (“ACE”) to 0.20 grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood. Stokes was charged with multiple offenses, including
operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and operating a
vehicle with an ACE to at least 0.15 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood (“ACE count”). The trial court only entered a conviction on the ACE
count. Stokes appeals and raises one issue: Whether the State presented
sufficient evidence to support Stokes’s conviction.
[2] We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In the early morning hours of April 4, 2024, at some point that is unclear from
the record, Stokes contacted law enforcement and reported that he had been in
a car accident in South Bend near the Michigan border. Michigan law
enforcement officers were the first to arrive, although the time of their arrival is
also unclear from the record. After determining the accident was “an Indiana
jurisdiction call,” the Michigan officers contacted Indiana law enforcement. Tr.
Vol. IV at 18.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 2 of 15 [4] St. Joseph County Sheriff’s Department Officer Jax Ohda arrived at the scene
around 2:00 a.m. Officer Ohda observed that a vehicle had crashed into a tree.
Stokes was standing next to the vehicle smoking a cigarette. As Officer Ohda
approached Stokes, he “could smell the odor of alcoholic beverages emanating
from [Stokes]” and “noticed [Stokes’s] eyes were red and glossy” and that
Stokes’s “speech was slurred.” Tr. Vol. IV at 19.
[5] Stokes seemingly admitted to driving when he told Officer Ohda that the
accident occurred because Stokes “saw ‘em coming in a row,[1] and [he] pulled
off the road.” 2 State’s Ex. 1 at 1:45. Stokes, however, denied driving and
drinking alcohol that day and refused to participate in a field sobriety test or a
breathalyzer test.
[6] Officer Ohda placed Stokes under arrest and investigated the scene. Officer
Ohda discovered blood on the dashboard and steering wheel as well as injuries
to Stokes’s knuckles. Officer Ohda also discovered that only the airbags in front
of the driver’s seat had deployed, brush around the vehicle had been “stomped
down” only by the driver’s side door, Tr. Vol. IV at 23, there were no footprints
other than by the driver’s side door, and Stokes had the keys to the vehicle in
his pocket. This information led Officer Ohda to believe that Stokes was the
1 Stokes did not explain who or what he saw, but we presume he meant other vehicles. 2 Throughout the night, Stokes changed his story several times about who was driving, who owned the car, and whether he had been drinking. After admitting being the driver, he later told Officer Ohda that he had been seated in the backseat of the vehicle, he did not know who the driver was or who owned the car, and the driver “ran off into the woods” after the accident. State’s Ex. 1 at 28:35, 32:30.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 3 of 15 driver of the vehicle. Inside the vehicle, Officer Ohda found a cup with an ice
cube in it and some liquid spilled on the floorboard. While Officer Ohda
presumed the liquid was alcohol, he conceded that it was simply a liquid. 3
Officer Ohda did not find any alcohol bottles in the car or near the scene. Id. at
94.
[7] Officer Ohda applied for a warrant to draw blood for testing, which was granted
at around 3 a.m., and Stokes was taken to a nearby hospital. The blood draw
was performed at 3:21 a.m., and the results indicated Stokes had an ACE to
approximately 0.20 grams per 100 milliliters of blood.
[8] The State charged Stokes with Count I, the ACE count, a Class A
misdemeanor 4; Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a
person, a Class A misdemeanor 5; and Count III, operating a vehicle while
intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor 6. During the ensuing bench trial, Officer
Ohda testified regarding his investigation, although he admitted that he did not
know the time the accident occurred.
3 At trial, Officer Ohda did not explain why he believed the liquid on the floorboard was alcohol. In the bodycam footage, Officer Ohda stated that the liquid on the floorboard was “probably alcohol” because Stokes had “ice all over” the floorboard. State’s Ex. 1 at 11:45. 4 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b). 5 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b). 6 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 4 of 15 [9] Stokes represented himself and testified in his own defense. Stokes’s version of
the events contradicted his multiple stories to Officer Ohda. According to
Stokes, he was working with individuals in another vehicle to deliver orders for
DoorDash. After finishing the deliveries, he and the others stopped at a liquor
store, although Stokes could not remember the name of the store. They placed
all the liquor in the other vehicle; Stokes “hadn’t had anything to drink” yet.
Tr. Vol. IV at 71. As Stokes was driving toward South Bend, he “looked
down” to turn off a notification on his cellphone from DoorDash, and when he
“looked back up, the tree was right there.” Id. at 61.
[10] After Stokes realized he totaled the vehicle, which at trial, he admitted belonged
to his wife, he asked someone from the other vehicle to give him the liquor, and
Stokes started “drinking it and drinking it.” Tr. Vol. IV at 61. Stokes did not
recall what liquor he drank, but “[i]t could have been a fifth of Hennessy.” Id.
at 75. Stokes continued drinking as he waited approximately one and a half to
two hours on the phone with a tow truck company. Meanwhile, the other
vehicle left. Sometime after calling for the tow truck, Stokes contacted law
enforcement to report the accident; Stokes did not testify regarding the time of
either call. Nor did the State present any evidence of the time of dispatch.
Stokes “wanted to drink [the] liquor before the police came, and [he] was
drinking fast.” Id. at 66. Stokes admitted that he lied to law enforcement
officers “a lot of times” on the night of the accident, including his statement
that he did not drive the vehicle. Id. at 77.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 5 of 15 [11] The trial court found the State “prove[d] its case beyond a reasonable doubt,”
Tr. Vol. IV at 129, but only entered a conviction on the ACE count. According
to the record, Counts II and III were “dismissed” pursuant to double jeopardy
concerns. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 61. Stokes was sentenced to 60 days in
jail. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision 1. The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence to Support Stokes’s Conviction for the ACE Count
[12] Stokes argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his
conviction for the ACE count. Our standard of review for such a claim is as
follows:
“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Hancz- Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].
Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the
evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 6 of 15 [13] In order to prove Stokes operated a vehicle with an ACE to at least 0.15 grams
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, the State had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Stokes “operate[d]” the vehicle with the requisite ACE.
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b). Stokes does not dispute that he operated the vehicle
and that his ACE exceeded 0.15 grams when measured. Rather, Stokes argues
that the State failed to prove that his ACE exceeded 0.15 grams when he
operated the vehicle because the blood draw was administered “some
indeterminate time after he last operated the vehicle.” Appellant’s Br. at 7.
[14] The State directs us to the rebuttable presumption provided under Indiana Code
section 9-30-6-15(b). The statute provides for a rebuttable presumption that (1)
when a blood draw or other “chemical test” is administered “within the period
of time allowed for testing under” Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2, and (2) the
test reveals “an [ACE] to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per . .
. one hundred (100) milliliters of the person’s blood at the time the test sample
was taken”, then (3) “the person charged with the offense had an [ACE] to at
least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters
of the person’s blood . . . at the time the person operated the vehicle.” 7 In other
words, the presumption allows the factfinder to “relate the driver’s blood
7 Although Indiana Code section 9-30-6-15(b) refers to an ACE to at least 0.08 grams per one hundred milliliters of blood, and the conviction here required proof of an ACE to 0.15, we have held that the statute “applies in situations concerning higher blood alcohol levels because ‘the parallel use of the phrase “at least” indicates that a timely [ACE] test result permits a presumption that the defendant had an identical [ACE] at the time he or she was driving.’” Jackson v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1166, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)) (quotation marks modified).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 7 of 15 alcohol content at the time of a chemical test back to the blood alcohol at the
time of the accident.” Allman v. State, 728 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(citing Finney v. State, 686 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied)
(footnote omitted).
[15] The period of time allowed for testing under Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2 is
“within three (3) hours after the law enforcement officer had probable cause to
believe the person committed an offense under IC 9-30-5.” I.C. 9-30-6-2(c).
Although the statute references “probable cause,” this court has previously held
that the State must prove that the chemical test was performed within three
hours of the defendant’s last illegal operation of the vehicle. See, e.g., Ramirez-
Vera v. State, 144 N.E.3d 735, 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that the
availability of the presumption depended on whether the State proved “the
blood test was administered within three hours of [the defendant] operating the
vehicle”).
[16] This interpretation of the statute traces back to Mordacq v. State, 585 N.E.2d 22,
26 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). In Mordacq, at approximately 2:30 a.m., an officer
observed a parked vehicle with its engine running. Id. at 23. An hour later, the
officer returned to find the vehicle still there. Id. The officer investigated the
vehicle and found the defendant asleep in the driver’s seat. Id. Suspecting the
defendant had consumed alcohol, the officer administered a breath test at 3:55
a.m. Id. The defendant was charged with and convicted of operating a vehicle
with a blood alcohol content of at least 0.10%. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 8 of 15 [17] On appeal, the Mordacq court reversed the defendant’s conviction. 585 N.E.2d
at 26. The court held that “the three-hour limit expressed in I.C. 9-30-6-2(c)
begins not from the moment an officer ideates probable cause, but rather from
the moment at which the vehicle was operated in violation of I.C. 9-30-5.” Id.
at 26. The court reached this interpretation because it reasoned that, “in a case
where the officer did not observe the defendant operating the vehicle”—such as
cases where the defendant “stop[s] of their own accord, or by accident”— “the
statutes could be read to impose no limit on the relation back of the test,
provided the test was performed within three hours of the time an officer
investigated the defendant,” and such an interpretation “could lead to absurd
and illogical results unintended by the legislature.” 8 Id. at 27. The State, thus,
was required to “prove the time [the defendant] operated her vehicle, to a
degree precise enough to trigger a statutory presumption.” Id. The State failed
to do so because the defendant was not operating the parked vehicle, and the
State failed to prove when the car was last operated. Id.
[18] Here, as in Mordacq, the State did not present any evidence regarding the timing
of Stokes’s last operation of the vehicle; Officer Ohda testified that he did not
know when the accident occurred. In fact, the only evidence regarding the
8 Indeed, in Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d 361, 367 (Ind. 2016), the Indiana Supreme Court discussed the presumption under Indiana Code section 9-30-6-15(b) and stated in dicta that the chemical test must be performed “within three hours of the stop.” (Emphasis modified). This suggests the court read the statute as primarily intended for situations where a drunk driver is pulled over by law enforcement. In such situations, the defendant’s operation of the vehicle and the officer’s development of probable cause “occur in close proximity to one another,” Warthen v. State, 588 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), which was unlike the case in Mordacq.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 9 of 15 timing of the accident was Stokes’s testimony. Stokes claimed that he was on
the phone with the tow truck company for “like an hour and 30, maybe two
hours” after the accident, he then contacted law enforcement, and Officer Ohda
arrived “about 20 to 30 minutes” after the Michigan law enforcement officers
initially responded. Tr. Vol. IV at 72. Missing from this timeline is the amount
of time that passed (1) after the accident and before Stokes called the tow truck
company, (2) after completing the call with the tow truck company and before
contacting law enforcement, and (3) before the Michigan officers arrived at the
scene after Stokes contacted them. The State concedes that, under Stokes’s
timeline and assuming all the aforementioned missing-time events occurred
almost immediately, the blood draw would have been completed slightly
outside the three-hour time limit. Because the State failed to prove that the
blood draw was administered within three hours of Stokes’s last operation of
the vehicle, the State was not entitled to rely on the presumption provided
under Indiana Code section 9-30-6-15(b).
[19] The unavailability of the presumption, however, does not end our analysis.
Even though the blood draw was administered outside the three-hour time
limit, that only “impacts ‘the rebuttable presumption, not the admissibility of
the chemical test.’” Hall v. State, 252 N.E.3d 455, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)
(quoting Mannix v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1002, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Stokes
makes no argument that the blood draw was inadmissible, so we consider that
evidence properly admitted. The issue then is whether the blood draw results
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 10 of 15 and the remaining evidence are sufficient to support Stokes’s conviction for the
ACE count without the statutory presumption.
[20] We conclude the evidence is not sufficient. The blood draw alone is not
sufficient to establish the ACE Stokes had when he last operated the vehicle
because “[i]t is commonly understood that the drinker’s [blood alcohol content]
varies over time, as the physiological processes of absorption and oxidation run
their course.” Mordacq, 585 N.E.2d at 24 (citing Tyner v. State, 503 N.E.2d 444,
445–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)). In fact, before the statutory presumption was
enacted, the State typically relied on “live testimony explaining retrograde
extrapolation as a method to estimate [a defendant’s] ACE at the time of
driving.” Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d 361, 367 (Ind. 2016). There was no such
evidence here.
[21] To be sure, based on Officer Ohda’s observations of Stokes at the scene, one
could reasonably conclude that Stokes drank alcohol before or while driving.
But Stokes was specifically convicted of the ACE count. The “question” for
this offense “is not whether a person was physically or mentally impaired by
alcohol. Rather, to convict the defendant, the fact-finder must instead
determine how much alcohol—down to hundredths of a gram—was in 100
milliliters of a person’s blood when that person operated a vehicle.” Artigas v.
State, 122 N.E.3d 1003, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Evidence of Stokes’s
“visible intoxication” was “not probative of [this] particular scientific
measurement.” Id. For these reasons, the State failed to present sufficient
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 11 of 15 evidence to support Stokes’s conviction for the ACE count, and we reverse that
conviction.
2. We Remand with Instructions That the Trial Court Determine Whether to Enter a Conviction for Another Count
[22] Prepared for the eventuality of a reversal of the ACE count, the State argues
that we should remand with instructions that the trial court enter a conviction
for one of the other offenses with which Stokes was charged but on which the
trial court did not enter a conviction. We agree and remand with instructions
for the trial court to determine whether to enter a conviction for either (1)
operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A
misdemeanor, as alleged in Count II, or (2) operating while intoxicated, a Class
C misdemeanor, as alleged in Count III. We do so for the following reasons.
[23] Appellate Rule 66(C) permits this court to “order correction of a judgment or
order” and “order findings or a judgment be modified under Ind. Trial Rule
52(B).” Ind. App. R. 66(C)(7), (8); see Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind.
1992) (citing predecessor to Appellate Rule 66(C) as authority to order entry of
conviction on lesser included offense when evidence to support greater offense
was insufficient). 9 Trial Rule 52(B) permits the trial court, in cases without a
9 This court has typically cited Appellate Rule 66(C) and its predecessors as authority to remand for entry of conviction on a lesser included offense when a conviction on the greater offense is reversed due to insufficient evidence. See, e.g, Nunn, 601 N.E.2d at 339; Trotter v. State, 838 N.E.2d 553, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Nonetheless, Appellate Rule 66 provides us the authority to order entry of conviction for (1) operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, or (2) operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor, under the facts of this case. The language of Appellate Rule 66 is not limited solely to lesser included offenses. Moreover, we note that Stokes was explicitly charged with both (1)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 12 of 15 jury, to “open the judgment, if one has been entered” and “enter a new
judgment” when “the judgment or findings are either against the weight of the
evidence, or are not supported by or contrary to the evidence.” T.R. 52(B)(1).
We therefore may order correction of the judgment here.
[24] Additionally, sufficient evidence would support a conviction for (1) operating a
vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, or (2)
operating while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor. See I.C. 9-30-5-2(a), (b).
Officer Ohda’s testimony that Stokes had an odor of alcohol, red eyes, slurred
speech, and was the driver of a vehicle that had crashed into a tree was
sufficient to prove that Stokes was intoxicated when the accident occurred. See
Outlaw v. State, 929 N.E.2d 196, 196 (Ind. 2010) (per curiam). The trial court
was not required to believe Stokes’s testimony that he only began drinking after
the accident or that the accident occurred hours before Officer Ohda arrived.
See Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ind. 1995). Indeed, the absence of any
alcohol bottles at the scene discredits Stokes testimony that he began drinking
“a fifth of Hennessy,” Tr. Vol. IV at 75, after the accident. As such, the trial
judge stated to Stokes, “I simply can’t find that your testimony [is] reasonable.”
Id. at 129. Lastly, regarding the element of endangerment, the circumstances
operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and (2) operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and the trial court found the State “prove[d] its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tr. Vol. II at 129. The trial judge simply chose not to enter a conviction on either of these offenses due to double jeopardy concerns. Stokes, however, had full “notice that he could be convicted” of either offense. See Padilla v. State, 259 N.E.3d 356, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 13 of 15 of the accident—crashing into a tree—show that Stokes endangered at least his
own life, which is sufficient. See Tin Thang v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1256, 1260 (Ind.
2014). For these reasons, we remand with instructions for the trial court to
determine whether to enter a conviction for another count.
Conclusion [25] Insufficient evidence supports Stokes’s conviction for the ACE count because
the State did not present evidence regarding the time of the car accident.
Accordingly, we reverse Stokes’s conviction. However, sufficient evidence
would support a conviction for (1) operating a vehicle while intoxicated
endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, or (2) operating while
intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor. We accordingly remand with instructions
that the trial court determine whether to enter a conviction for one of these
offenses. 10
[26] Reversed and remanded.
Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Geoffrey L. Blazi Blazi Law Office South Bend, Indiana
10 If the trial court elects to enter the conviction for the Class C misdemeanor offense, a new sentencing hearing should be held, as this is a different level misdemeanor than the Class A misdemeanor ACE count on which Stokes’s conviction was originally entered.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 14 of 15 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1740 | January 30, 2026 Page 15 of 15