IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
TYRON ELON WAGNER,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 25-3247-JWL
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because Plaintiff did not submit his complaint on the Court-approved form, a Notice of Deficiency (Doc. 4) was issued granting him until December 12, 2025, to submit his complaint on the Court-approved form provided to him. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctions (Doc. 3). Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims involving a disciplinary report he received for complying with alleged orders by LCF staff to “do something” about another inmate that was allegedly harassing staff. He also claims that he was subjected to excessive force by LCF staff on September 12, 2025. In his motion, Plaintiff seeks the following injunctions: 1) an order prohibiting the Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) and its employees from retaliatory behavior toward Plaintiff; 2) an order to preserve LCF’s DVR camera footage for various dates; 3) an order to preserve “all documents and records pertaining to the March 9, 2025 battery of inmate Michael Parker, including every report, finding, narrative, and statement subsequently produced by the investigation of this incident”; 4) an order to preserve documents and records pertaining to the September 12, 2025 Use of Force on Plaintiff; 5) an order to preserve all photographs taken of Plaintiff’s injuries on September 12, 13, and 15, 2025; 6) the suspension of Tyrell Godwin, Dalton Kinyun, and Jerry Barton; and 7) an order for the KDOC to produce the defendants’ addresses for service of process. (Doc. 3, at 1–3.) To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate four things: (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of the equities tip in the movant’s favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010). “[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A preliminary injunction is appropriate only when the movant’s right to relief is clear and unequivocal. Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427
F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005). Moreover, a federal court considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief affecting the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety” and on prison operation. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Finally, a mandatory preliminary injunction, such as the one sought by Plaintiff, which requires the non-moving party to take affirmative action, is disfavored and therefore requires the moving party to make a heightened showing of the four factors above. Little, 607 F.3d at 1251. Because preliminary injunctions and TRO’s are drastic remedies—“the exception rather than the rule—plaintiffs must show that they are clearly and unequivocally entitled to relief.” Adrian v. Westar Energy, Inc., No. 11-1265-KHV, 2011 WL 6026148, at *3 (D. Kan. 2011) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has not submitted his complaint on the Court-approved form. The Court is required to screen his complaint after he submits it on the Court-approved form. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Therefore, any request for discovery is premature at this stage of the
proceedings. Plaintiff also seeks addresses for defendants for the purpose of service of process. Again, this case has not passed screening and therefore any request for service is premature. The Court will proceed with service if any claims in this case survive screening. Plaintiff seeks an order prohibiting KDOC staff from retaliatory behavior toward Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not appear to raise a retaliation claim in his complaint, and he has not indicated why he believes he will be subjected to retaliation in the future. Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish that injury is certain and not theoretical, or more than merely feared as liable to occur in the future. “To constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual and not theoretical.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A preliminary injunction is only appropriate “to prevent existing or presently threatening injuries. One will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future.” State of Connecticut v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931). Plaintiff’s request to have KDOC staff suspended or terminated is not a proper remedy in this Court. To the extent Plaintiff seeks defendants’ termination, the Court is without authority to grant such relief. See Nicholas v. Hunter, 228 F. App’x 139, 141 (3rd Cir. 2007) (“The remaining relief requested is not available as the District Court lacks authority to order a federal investigation and prosecution of the defendants or the termination of their employment.”); Goulette v. Warren, No. 3:06CV235-1-MU, 2006 WL 1582386, at n.1 (W.D. N.C. June 1, 2006) (“The Court notes that even if Plaintiff’s claims prevailed in this case, this Court would not, based upon this law suit, have the authority to order the termination of the Defendant’s employment or to grant Plaintiff an immediate, early release from jail.”); Dockery v. Ferry, No. 08-277, 2008 WL 1995061, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2008) (finding that the court cannot issue an order which would direct a local
government to terminate a police officer’s employment) (citing In re Jones, 28 F. App’x 133, 134 (3rd Cir. 2002) (“Jones is not entitled to relief . . . [S]he asks this Court to prohibit the State of Delaware from filing charges against her. The federal courts, however, have no general power in mandamus action to compel action, or in this case inaction, by state officials.”)); Martin v. LeBlanc, No. 14-2743, 2014 WL 6674289, at n.1 (W.D. La. Nov. 24, 2014) (finding that where plaintiff requested an investigation, the termination of the defendants’ employment and the closure of the prison, “[s]uch relief is not available in this action”); Merrida v. California Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:06-CV-00502 OWW LJO P, 2006 WL 2926740, at n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) (finding that where plaintiff prays for the termination of defendant’s employment, “the court cannot award
this form of relief to plaintiff) (citing 18 U.S.C.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
TYRON ELON WAGNER,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 25-3247-JWL
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because Plaintiff did not submit his complaint on the Court-approved form, a Notice of Deficiency (Doc. 4) was issued granting him until December 12, 2025, to submit his complaint on the Court-approved form provided to him. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctions (Doc. 3). Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims involving a disciplinary report he received for complying with alleged orders by LCF staff to “do something” about another inmate that was allegedly harassing staff. He also claims that he was subjected to excessive force by LCF staff on September 12, 2025. In his motion, Plaintiff seeks the following injunctions: 1) an order prohibiting the Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) and its employees from retaliatory behavior toward Plaintiff; 2) an order to preserve LCF’s DVR camera footage for various dates; 3) an order to preserve “all documents and records pertaining to the March 9, 2025 battery of inmate Michael Parker, including every report, finding, narrative, and statement subsequently produced by the investigation of this incident”; 4) an order to preserve documents and records pertaining to the September 12, 2025 Use of Force on Plaintiff; 5) an order to preserve all photographs taken of Plaintiff’s injuries on September 12, 13, and 15, 2025; 6) the suspension of Tyrell Godwin, Dalton Kinyun, and Jerry Barton; and 7) an order for the KDOC to produce the defendants’ addresses for service of process. (Doc. 3, at 1–3.) To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate four things: (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of the equities tip in the movant’s favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010). “[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A preliminary injunction is appropriate only when the movant’s right to relief is clear and unequivocal. Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427
F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005). Moreover, a federal court considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief affecting the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety” and on prison operation. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Finally, a mandatory preliminary injunction, such as the one sought by Plaintiff, which requires the non-moving party to take affirmative action, is disfavored and therefore requires the moving party to make a heightened showing of the four factors above. Little, 607 F.3d at 1251. Because preliminary injunctions and TRO’s are drastic remedies—“the exception rather than the rule—plaintiffs must show that they are clearly and unequivocally entitled to relief.” Adrian v. Westar Energy, Inc., No. 11-1265-KHV, 2011 WL 6026148, at *3 (D. Kan. 2011) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has not submitted his complaint on the Court-approved form. The Court is required to screen his complaint after he submits it on the Court-approved form. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Therefore, any request for discovery is premature at this stage of the
proceedings. Plaintiff also seeks addresses for defendants for the purpose of service of process. Again, this case has not passed screening and therefore any request for service is premature. The Court will proceed with service if any claims in this case survive screening. Plaintiff seeks an order prohibiting KDOC staff from retaliatory behavior toward Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not appear to raise a retaliation claim in his complaint, and he has not indicated why he believes he will be subjected to retaliation in the future. Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish that injury is certain and not theoretical, or more than merely feared as liable to occur in the future. “To constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual and not theoretical.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A preliminary injunction is only appropriate “to prevent existing or presently threatening injuries. One will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future.” State of Connecticut v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931). Plaintiff’s request to have KDOC staff suspended or terminated is not a proper remedy in this Court. To the extent Plaintiff seeks defendants’ termination, the Court is without authority to grant such relief. See Nicholas v. Hunter, 228 F. App’x 139, 141 (3rd Cir. 2007) (“The remaining relief requested is not available as the District Court lacks authority to order a federal investigation and prosecution of the defendants or the termination of their employment.”); Goulette v. Warren, No. 3:06CV235-1-MU, 2006 WL 1582386, at n.1 (W.D. N.C. June 1, 2006) (“The Court notes that even if Plaintiff’s claims prevailed in this case, this Court would not, based upon this law suit, have the authority to order the termination of the Defendant’s employment or to grant Plaintiff an immediate, early release from jail.”); Dockery v. Ferry, No. 08-277, 2008 WL 1995061, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2008) (finding that the court cannot issue an order which would direct a local
government to terminate a police officer’s employment) (citing In re Jones, 28 F. App’x 133, 134 (3rd Cir. 2002) (“Jones is not entitled to relief . . . [S]he asks this Court to prohibit the State of Delaware from filing charges against her. The federal courts, however, have no general power in mandamus action to compel action, or in this case inaction, by state officials.”)); Martin v. LeBlanc, No. 14-2743, 2014 WL 6674289, at n.1 (W.D. La. Nov. 24, 2014) (finding that where plaintiff requested an investigation, the termination of the defendants’ employment and the closure of the prison, “[s]uch relief is not available in this action”); Merrida v. California Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:06-CV-00502 OWW LJO P, 2006 WL 2926740, at n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) (finding that where plaintiff prays for the termination of defendant’s employment, “the court cannot award
this form of relief to plaintiff) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to make a heightened showing that entry of a preliminary injunction is warranted; he has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits such that his right to relief is clear and unequivocal. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief is denied. Plaintiff should submit his complaint on the Court-approved form by the December 12, 2025 deadline set forth in the Court’s Notice of Deficiency. In submitting his complaint, Plaintiff should keep in mind that the KDOC is not a proper defendant. A party’s capacity to sue or be sued in federal court is determined by state law.” Sims v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr., 2019 WL 4450671, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 17, 2019) (citation omitted). “Under Kansas law, absent express statutory authority, legislatively-created government agencies lack the capacity to sue or be sued.” Id. (citation omitted). “The KDOC is a legislatively-created government agency, and Kansas law does not permit it to sue or be sued.” Id. (citing K.S.A. § 75-5203). Furthermore, as an agency of the State, the KDOC has absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to a suit for money
damages. See McGee v. Corizon, 831 F. App’x 381, (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 2020) (unpublished) (“As to the Kansas Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Amendment bars McGee’s claim. It is well- recognized that an action cannot be brought in federal court against a state or its agencies.”) (citation omitted); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a State, nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”). Section 1983 is not applicable to “challenges to punishments imposed as a result of prison disciplinary infractions,” unless the disciplinary conviction has already been invalidated. Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has made clear that “a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). This rule applies not only when the prisoner challenges his conviction but also when he challenges punishments imposed as a result of prison disciplinary infractions. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctions (Doc. 3) is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must submit his complaint on the Court- approved form by December 12, 2025. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated November 14, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas. S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE