Tyrell v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Tyrell v. City of New York

79 A.D.3d 596, 912 N.Y.S.2d 880

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 21, 2010

StatusPublished

This text of 79 A.D.3d 596 (Tyrell v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tyrell v. City of New York, 79 A.D.3d 596, 912 N.Y.S.2d 880 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Douglas E. McKeon, J.), entered January 22, 2009, which denied defendant New York City Health and Hospital Corporation’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 (e) for failure to prosecute, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs delay in serving and filing the note of issue was minimal, his explanation for it was adequate, i.e., that there was a misunderstanding between counsel regarding whether defendant would be satisfied with a bill of particulars if it was provided within the 90-day period, and no prejudice to defendant was alleged to have resulted from the delay. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the motion court that plaintiff should be permitted to proceed (see Espinoza v 373-381 Park Ave. S., LLC, 68 AD3d 532 [2009]; Davis v Good-sell, 6 AD3d 382 [2004]). Concur — Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Moskowitz, Acosta and Freedman, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Douglas E. McKeon, J.), entered January 22, 2009, which denied defendant New York City Health and Hospital Corporation’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 (e) for failure to prosecute, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs delay in serving and filing the note of issue was minimal, his explanation for it was adequate, i.e., that there was a misunderstanding between counsel regarding whether defendant would be satisfied with a bill of particulars if it was provided within the 90-day period, and no prejudice to defendant was alleged to have resulted from the delay. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the motion court that plaintiff should be permitted to proceed (see Espinoza v 373-381 Park Ave. S., LLC, 68 AD3d 532 [2009]; Davis v Good-sell, 6 AD3d 382 [2004]). Concur — Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Moskowitz, Acosta and Freedman, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

79 A.D.3d 596, 912 N.Y.S.2d 880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tyrell-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-2010.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack