Tyree Deshawn Mims v. City of Gloucester

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJune 25, 2024
DocketA-0068-23
StatusPublished

This text of Tyree Deshawn Mims v. City of Gloucester (Tyree Deshawn Mims v. City of Gloucester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tyree Deshawn Mims v. City of Gloucester, (N.J. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0068-23

TYREE DESHAWN MIMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

June 25, 2024 CITY OF GLOUCESTER, APPELLATE DIVISION GLOUCESTER CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND GLOUCESTER CITY CHIEF OF POLICE, BRIAN MORELL,

Defendants-Respondents. ___________________________

Submitted June 4, 2024 – Decided June 25, 2024

Before Judges Sumners, Smith and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-2054-23.

Tyree Deshawn Mims, appellant pro se.

Wade Long & Wood LLC, attorneys for respondents (Daniel Howard Long, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PEREZ FRISCIA, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned) This appeal concerns the threshold requirements for an applicant's waiver

of court fees based on indigency. Rule 1:13-2(a), governing proceedings by

indigents, was supplemented by the New Jersey Supreme Court's April 5, 2017

order, which established a standard fee waiver application process and criteria.

The Court's order authorized the Administrative Office of the Courts to

promulgate directives providing "uniform fee waiver request forms" and a

standard protocol. See generally Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #03-

17, Fee Waivers Based on Indigence (rev. Apr. 20, 2017).

Plaintiff Tyree Deshawn Mims appeals from a July 19, 2023 Law Division

order, which denied1 his motion to proceed as indigent. The court found the

required documentation was not provided. On appeal, plaintiff contends his

submitted documentation satisfied the eligibility requirements of Rule 1:13-2(a)

warranting a waiver of court fees in this action and all future litigation. Because

plaintiff did not complete the uniform fee waiver forms and failed to submit the

1 Although not raised by the parties, we recognize the July 19, 2023 order denying plaintiff's motion to proceed as indigent was effectively without prejudice. While an appeal as of right may be taken to the Appellate Division from "final judgments," R. 2:2-3(a)(1), we nevertheless sua sponte grant leave to appeal nunc pro tunc in the interest of providing expeditious guidance to the bench and Bar on future indigency fee waiver applications. See R. 2:4-4(b)(2); Grow Co. v. Chokshi, 403 N.J. Super. 443, 458 (App. Div. 2008) ("[T]he sole discretion to permit an interlocutory appeal has been lodged with the appellate courts.") (citing Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 599-600 (2008)). A-0068-23 2 required supporting documentation establishing indigency, the trial court

properly denied the motion. We affirm.

I.

It is well-established that self-represented litigants shall be provided "a

meaningful opportunity to be heard." See Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert,

437 N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014). It is also "fundamental that the court

system is obliged to protect the procedural rights of all litigants and to accord

procedural due process to all litigants." Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155,

159 (App. Div. 1982). Notwithstanding these principles, a self-represented

litigant is "not entitled to greater rights than [a] litigant[] . . . represented by

counsel." Ridge at Back Brook, LLC, 437 N.J. Super. at 99. Further, a

self-represented litigant is held to the same standards of compliance with our

Court Rules. Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106, 110 (App. Div. 1997).

Rule 1:13-2(a) provides, in relevant part:

[W]henever any person by reason of poverty seeks relief from the payment of any fees provided for by law which are payable to any court or clerk of court . . . , any court upon the verified application of such person, which application may be filed without fee, may in its discretion order the payment of such fees waived.

The Supreme Court's order established standard indigency criteria for

reviewing motions for a waiver of court fees "by reason of poverty." Admin.

A-0068-23 3 Directive #03-17, attach. (order). Our Court established that the minimum

threshold for indigency is met for applicants: "(a) whose household income does

not exceed 150% of the federal poverty level (with that level based on the

number of members of the individual's household) and (b) who have no more

than $2500 in liquid assets, subject to completion of a uniform fee waiver

request form." Ibid. (emphasis added). The order further provided if a "court

determines that the . . . [indigency] motion . . . is frivolous or malicious or

constitutes an abuse of process," then it "may deny such waiver of court filing

and copy fees." Ibid. Pursuant to the order, the Administrative Director of the

Courts promulgated Administrative Directive #03-17 (Directive) including "a

fee waiver packet" to ensure a "uniform fee waiver request form" for applicants.

Id. at 1 (main text of directive).2 Thus, a standard process and threshold criteria

for waivers of court fees was established.

A trial court's decision to waive the payment of filing fees pursuant to a

motion for indigency is within its sound discretion. R. 1:13-2(a). The court's

decision is afforded "substantial deference and will not be overturned absent an

2 We observe the Administrative Office of the Courts also promulgated a second Supplement to Administrative Directive #03-17, which clarified: "where an applicant makes a request for a fee waiver, that application must be granted or denied in full." Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #03-17 Supp., Partial Fee Waivers (Sept. 25, 2017). A-0068-23 4 abuse of discretion." DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 228 (2023) (quoting State

v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 593 (2016)). Appellate courts discern an abuse of

discretion "when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."

Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 302 (2020) (quoting Pitney Bowes Bank,

Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2014)).

We review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo. See Comprehensive

Neurosurgical, P.C. v. Valley Hosp., 257 N.J. 33, 79 (2024).

II.

We begin by reiterating the fundamental principle that a self-represented

litigant is entitled to a waiver of court fees if indigency is demonstrated. On

appeal, plaintiff argues he was entitled to an indigency waiver pursuant to

Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution 3 because he

sufficiently documented his "dire financial situation" in compliance with Rule

1:13-2(a) and the order. Further, he argues eligibility was sufficiently

established before the court in the underlying matter and that an "ongoing"

3 "The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts." N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3. A-0068-23 5 waiver "to ensure [future] equitable access to the legal system" should be

awarded. His contentions are unsupported.

Plaintiff acknowledges his motion was denied because he failed to submit

the necessary indigency documentation. While plaintiff argues he made an

"earnest attempt[] to provide" his financial documentation, he fell short of

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Related

Brundage v. Estate of Carambio
951 A.2d 947 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2008)
Rubin v. Rubin
457 A.2d 12 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1982)
Grow Company, Inc. v. Chokshi
959 A.2d 252 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2008)
The Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. W. Thomas Klenert
96 A.3d 310 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2014)
The Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. Abc Caging Fulfillment
113 A.3d 1217 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2015)
State v. Robert J. Stein(074466)
139 A.3d 1174 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2016)
Venner v. Allstate
703 A.2d 330 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1997)

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