Tyndall v. Tyndall

153 S.E.2d 819, 270 N.C. 106, 1967 N.C. LEXIS 1301
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedApril 12, 1967
Docket358
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 153 S.E.2d 819 (Tyndall v. Tyndall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tyndall v. Tyndall, 153 S.E.2d 819, 270 N.C. 106, 1967 N.C. LEXIS 1301 (N.C. 1967).

Opinion

*108 Per Curiam.

Plaintiff knew his children would not “go hungry” if the two hundred dollars per month he paid in compliance with the consent judgment were used for their support. Moreover, he knew his children would “go lacking” in some respects if he did not make additional payments for their support. Whatever the status of defendant’s personal financial affairs the gravamen of the complaint is that defendant failed to use money paid to her for the support of the children for that purpose, but used part of it for her sole benefit and now has the balance in a savings account.

Conceding plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to establish $2,880.00 was paid by plaintiff to defendant for use solely for the support of the two children, her failure to use the money for that purpose would give rise to a cause of action for the benefit of the children, to be prosecuted in their behalf, not to the cause of action plaintiff has attempted to allege, namely, a cause of action to recover for his own benefit a judgment against defendant in the amount of $2,880.00.

It would seem plaintiff’s allegations affirmatively disclose the cause of action he attempts to allege is fatally defective. If so, this was sufficient ground for sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action. Parrish v. Brantley, 256 N.C. 541, 124 S.E. 2d 533. Be that as it may, plaintiff’s present allegations, particularly with reference to fraud, are fatally defective; and it was proper to sustain the demurrer on this ground. Moreover, since the court, in its discretion, denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint, a dismissal of the action was proper. There is nothing in the record tending to support plaintiff’s assertion that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave to amend.

Under these circumstances, independent of considerations relating to the sufficiency of the affidavit for attachment, the order of attachment was properly dissolved. Knight v. Hatfield, 129 N.C. 191, 39 S.E. 807. Hence, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gilliard v. Kirk
633 F. Supp. 1529 (W.D. North Carolina, 1986)
Trunzler v. Trunzler
431 So. 2d 1115 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1983)
Glenn v. Glenn
281 S.E.2d 83 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1981)
Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v. Juno Construction Corp.
273 S.E.2d 504 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1981)
BURKE CTY. PUBLIC SCH., ETC. v. Juno Const.
273 S.E.2d 504 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1981)
Zande v. Zande
164 S.E.2d 523 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1968)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
153 S.E.2d 819, 270 N.C. 106, 1967 N.C. LEXIS 1301, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tyndall-v-tyndall-nc-1967.