Tyndal v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Tyndal v. State

563 So. 2d 213, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 4885, 1990 WL 95345

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 3, 1990

DocketNo. 89-1750

StatusPublished

This text of 563 So. 2d 213 (Tyndal v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tyndal v. State, 563 So. 2d 213, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 4885, 1990 WL 95345 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Tyndal guilty of being in actual physical control of a vehicle while he was under the influence of alcohol. The offense is a third degree felony under section 316.193(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), due to Tyndal’s three prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On appeal, Tyndal argues that his prior convictions could not support felony reclassification because the state failed to prove that he either had counsel or that he validly waived counsel at his prior DUI convictions. We disagree and affirm.

Tyndal neglected to raise the issue of uncounseled convictions at trial, thus making it unnecessary for the state to prove the existence or waiver of counsel. See State v. Troehler, 546 So.2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). We also reject Tyndal’s contention that the jury verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the conviction is AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, WENTWORTH and MINER, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

A jury found Tyndal guilty of being in actual physical control of a vehicle while he was under the influence of alcohol. The offense is a third degree felony under section 316.193(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), due to Tyndal’s three prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On appeal, Tyndal argues that his prior convictions could not support felony reclassification because the state failed to prove that he either had counsel or that he validly waived counsel at his prior DUI convictions. We disagree and affirm.

Tyndal neglected to raise the issue of uncounseled convictions at trial, thus making it unnecessary for the state to prove the existence or waiver of counsel. See State v. Troehler, 546 So.2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). We also reject Tyndal’s contention that the jury verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the conviction is AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, WENTWORTH and MINER, JJ., concur.

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563 So. 2d 213, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 4885, 1990 WL 95345, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tyndal-v-state-fladistctapp-1990.

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