Tyler v. Insurance Co. of North America

457 A.2d 95, 311 Pa. Super. 25, 1983 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2437
Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided January 21, 1983·No. 1400·Published·Cited by 47 cases

Opinion

WIEAND, Judge:

When an uninsured passenger is struck by a motorcycle upon disembarking from a bus and before reaching the shoulder, is the insurance carrier for the bus company a proper source of basic loss benefits under Section 204 of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act? 1 The *28 trial court held that it was not a proper source and directed that basic loss benefits be paid by Insurance Company of North America (hereinafter I.N.A.), the designated carrier under the assigned claims plan. I.N.A. appealed. We reverse.

On June 1, 1980, Carol Tyler was a passenger on a bus owned by Auch Inter-Boro Transit Company (hereinafter Auch) which had been chartered to transport a gospel choir from Germantown High School in Philadelphia to the site of a concert in New Jersey. On the return trip, the bus driver was asked by a trip chaperone to stop and discharge several passengers at the intersection of Limekiln Pike and Cheltenham Avenue in Philadelphia. Carol Tyler was one of those passengers. As she stepped from the bus, which had stopped approximately five feet from the shoulder of the road, she was struck by a motorcycle which was passing the bus on the right side.

On the date of the accident, neither Carol Tyler nor any member of her household owned an automobile or had applicable no-fault insurance coverage. Auch’s no-fault insurance carrier denied responsibility for no-fault benefits on grounds that Carol Tyler had been a pedestrian at the time she was struck. I.N.A. was thereafter designated as the servicing insurance company under the assigned claims plan, but it, too, denied responsibility. The instant action followed. 2 The trial court found that Carol Tyler had taken “three or four steps toward the nearest shoulder of the road” and concluded, therefore, that she was not alighting from the bus when struck but was, rather, a pedestrian.

That Carol Tyler was a “victim” entitled under Section 201 of the No-fault statute, 40 P.S. § 1009.201, to basic loss benefits is conceded. Clearly, she sustained injuries arising out of the “maintenance and use of a motor vehicle.” This phrase, by definition, includes “occupying, entering into, or alighting from” a motor vehicle. Pennsylvania *29 No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1974, id. at § 103, 40 P.S. § 1009.103. Not only was Carol Tyler struck by a motorcycle, 3 but at the time of the accident she was alighting from a bus, another motor vehicle. The present controversy concerns only the security applicable to pay the basic loss benefits which Carol Tyler is entitled to recover. Section 204 of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.204, establishes “categories and priorities as between insurers responsible for payment of benefits.” Schimmelbusch v. Royal-Globe Insurance Co., 247 Pa.Super. 28, 31, 371 A.2d 1021, 1023 (1977). This section, which in effect creates a hierarchy among potential sources of security (See: D. Shrager, The Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, § 1:15.3, 1979), provides:

(a) Applicable security.—The security for the payment of basic loss benefits applicable to an injury to:
(1) an employee, or to the spouse or other relative of any employee residing in the same household as the employee, if the accident resulting in injury occurs while the victim or deceased victim is driving or occupying a motor vehicle furnished by such employee’s employer, is the security for the payment of basic loss benefits covering such motor vehicle or, if none, any other security applicable to such victim;
(2) an insured is the security under which the victim or deceased victim is insured;
(3) the driver or other occupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury who is not an insured is the security covering such vehicle;
(4) an individual who is not an insured or the driver or other occupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury is the security covering any motor vehicle involved in such accident. For purposes *30 of this paragraph, a parked and unoccupied motor vehicle is not a motor vehicle involved in an accident, unless it was parked so as to cause unreasonable risk of injury; and
(5) any other individual is the applicable assigned claims plan.

Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1974, supra at § 204, 40 P.S. § 1009.204. In determining the applicable source of basic loss benefits under Section 204’s priority system, the pertinence of each subsection must be considered seriatim—that is, the applicability of each preceding subsection must be excluded before the next may be considered. The security provided by the assigned claims plan is applicable only as a last resort.

Instantly, the inapplicability of subsections (1) and (2) has been established beyond peradventure. Carol Tyler, the basic loss benefits applicant was, at the time of the accident, neither an employee in a vehicle provided by her employer nor an insured under any policy of insurance. Accordingly, we consider first the applicability of subsection (3). The applicability of the security established therein is dependent upon the status of Carol Tyler, the claimant. If she was an “occupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury” the applicable security under subsection (3) was that derived from the bus from which she had stepped when she was struck by the motorcycle.

The term “occupant” is not defined by the No-fault Act. We are guided, therefore, by the’ Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., and pertinent decisions in which the meaning of the term has been considered. The Statutory Construction Act provides that “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed ... according to their common and approved usage____” Id. at § 1903. See also: Dull v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 278 Pa.Super. 569, 571-572, 420 A.2d 688, 689 (1980). The Statutory Construction Act also directs that remedial legislation such as the No-fault Act “shall be liberally construed to effect [its] objects and to promote justice.” Id. at § 1928(c).

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Tyler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 457 A.2d 95, 311 Pa. Super. 25, 1983 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2437 (Pa. Ct. App. 1983).

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