Tyler Ray McNatt v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 11, 2024
• Docket: 13-23-00282-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-23-00282-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

TYLER RAY MCNATT, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT OF ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

A jury found appellant Tyler Ray McNatt guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b). McNatt

was placed on community supervision, which the trial court subsequently revoked. By a single issue, McNatt argues that his sentence of five years’ incarceration constitutes cruel

or unusual punishment. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

McNatt was indicted on charges of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, and

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony, alleged to have

occurred on or about March 20, 2018. Following a jury trial in 2021, wherein the jury

returned a not guilty and guilty verdict, respectively, McNatt was sentenced to five years’

confinement, probated for five years.

In June 2023, the State filed an amended motion to revoke McNatt’s community

supervision, alleging McNatt had failed to report to his probation officer October 2022

through May 2023, failed to submit to random urinalysis testing November 2022 through

May 2023, and was in arrears. McNatt pleaded true to the allegations, and the trial court

determined the allegations to be true, revoked McNatt’s community supervision, and

sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. This appeal ensued.

II. PUNISHMENT

An allegation of excessive or disproportionate punishment is a legal claim

embodied in state and federal constitutional bans on cruel or unusual punishment and

based on a “narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the crime

and the sentence.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13

2 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual

punishment inflicted.”). A successful challenge to proportionality is exceedingly rare and

requires a finding of “gross disproportionality.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23 (citing

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. ref’d).

However, to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly

disproportionate or cruel or unusual, a defendant must present to the trial court a “timely

request, objection, or motion” stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a); see Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“It is

well settled that almost every right, constitutional and statutory, may be waived by the

failure to object.”); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2017, pet. ref’d) (concluding defendant had failed to preserve disproportionate-

sentencing complaint); see also Adams v. State, No. 13-09-00334-CR, 2010 WL

2783745, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 15, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (concluding the same where appellant was sentenced to

forty years’ imprisonment for evading arrest, enhanced by his felony habitual offender

status). “To state the obvious, an unpreserved grossly disproportionate sentencing

argument cannot conceivably persuade this Court and is thus frivolous.” Trevino v. State,

676 S.W.3d 726, 732–33 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023, no pet.).

At no time prior to the appeal did McNatt argue that the sentence imposed was

disproportionate to the offense charged or in violation of his constitutional rights.

3 Accordingly, McNatt failed to preserve his complaint for review. See TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a); Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927–28. We overrule McNatt’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the 11th day of July, 2024.