Tyler Meade, as Administrator of the Estate of Barbara Works v. William Siefert, M.D.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 2024-CA-1039
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: APRIL 24, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1039-MR

TYLER MEADE, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF BARBARA WORKS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-00704 & 22-CI-01160

WILLIAM SIEFERT, M.D.; NORTHERN KENTUCKY CENTER FOR PAIN RELIEF, LLC; AND TIMOTHY EHN, D.C. APPELLEES

OPINION REVERSING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Tyler Meade, as Administrator of his mother’s estate, appeals

from a Boone Circuit Court order dismissing his complaint as time-barred.

Finding his complaint timely because the statute of limitations was tolled, we

reverse. BACKGROUND

Appellant Tyler Meade’s mother, Barbara Works (decedent), died in

May 2017 while under the care and treatment of Appellee Dr. William Siefert at

Northern Kentucky Center for Pain Relief. At the time of her death, Meade knew

Works to struggle with addiction issues and knew she received prescription

painkillers. Her cause of death, according to the Kenton County Coroner’s office,

was “Drug Intoxication” and “Hydrocodone.”

Dr. Siefert and Appellee Dr. Ehn later became the subject of a joint

DEA, FBI, and Kentucky Medicaid Fraud and Abuse investigation and indictment

in February 2021. The indictment alleged Dr. Siefert had engaged in an “illegal

opioid prescribing conspiracy” that was a “contributing factor” in the deaths of

Works and several others. (Appellant Appx. 3). As alleged, Dr. Siefert sought to

profit from the conspiracy by billing Medicaid for millions of dollars in medically

unnecessary urinalysis testing.

Law enforcement contacted Meade in April 2021 in connection with

this matter. Roughly sixteen months later, Meade was appointed administrator of

Works’ estate. He subsequently commenced this action, which the Boone Circuit

Court dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Meade now appeals.

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

-2- ANALYSIS

Whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations is a question

of law we review de novo. Cuppy v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 378

S.W.2d, 629, 631 (Ky. 1964).

We begin by setting out the chronology critical to our review.

- In May 2017, Works died.

- In June 2017, Works’ Death Certificate was issued, stating cause of death was “Drug Intoxication” and “Hydrocodone.” - In February 2021, Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn were indicted. - In April 2021, a DEA Investigator contacted Meade to discuss the indictment.

- In July 2022, Meade was appointed administrator of Works’ estate. - In August 2022, Meade unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in another wrongful death action against Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn.

- In October 2022, Meade filed this original action against Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn.

Meade brought this wrongful death action pursuant to KRS1 411.130, which we

have long held is subject to the statute of limitations established in KRS 413.180.

The statute provides:

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-3- (1) If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 dies before the expiration of the time limited for its commencement and the cause of action survives, the action may be brought by his personal representative after the expiration of that time, if commenced within one (1) year after the qualification of the representative. (2) If a person dies before the time at which the right to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 would have accrued to him if he had continued alive, and there is an interval of more than one (1) year between his death and the qualification of his personal representative, that representative, for purposes of this chapter, shall be deemed to have qualified on the last day of the one-year period.

Under this statute, a wrongful death claim commences upon the appointment of a

personal representative or no longer than two years from the date of death. Estate

of Wittich By and Through Wittich v. Flick, 519 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Ky. 2017)

(citing Gaither v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Ky. App. 2004)).

In Wittich, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated “if Wittich were able

to argue successfully that [defendant] was absconding, concealing, or obstructing

the prosecution of the Estate’s claim until conviction, then the statute of limitations

would be tolled until the condition has abated.” Id. at 778.

In recognizing a plaintiff’s duty to exercise reasonable care and

diligence to uncover any potential legal claims, the court determined that the

defendant being immediately apprehended at the scene of the murder, arrested and

charged for the crime, and eventually indicted within a matter of months did not

-4- constitute absconding or concealing in such a way that would trigger tolling under

KRS 413.190. Instead of adopting a rule tolling the running of the limitations

period in murder cases until the defendant’s conviction, the circumstances

presented to Wittich’s estate meant Wittich’s estate knew or should have known of

the injury and potential claim “by the date of [the defendant’s] public indictment.”

Id. at 778. Despite Flick being apprehended at the scene, the triggering event

establishing a cause of action for purposes of KRS 413.180 was the indictment

date. By the time the estate filed its complaint, it had been 39 months since the

defendant killed Wittich and 37 months since his public indictment.

Reading both sections of KRS 413.180 in tandem, where, as here, a

cause of action accrues after a decedent’s death, and a personal representative is

appointed more than one (1) year after the date of death, the personal

representative qualifies as of the last day of the one-year period and has one (1)

year from the date of qualification to bring an action. To wit, a personal

representative has two (2) years from the date of death to bring a claim if the

elements of KRS 413.180 are met. This calculation is well understood in our

jurisprudence. See Conner v. George W. Whitesides Co., 834 S.W.2d 652, 655

(Ky. 1992) (“The net effect of this statute in this case is to provide two years from

the date of death to appoint a personal representative and commence a cause of

action for wrongful death.”).

-5- Meade falls in the two-year category. Although Works died in May

2017, he was not appointed as personal representative until July 2022. Ehn

advocates for an interpretation that would require this Court to ignore KRS

413.180(1) and focus solely on KRS 413.180(2). While we agree with Dr. Ehn

that KRS 413.180(2) qualified Meade on the last day of the one-year anniversary

of Works’ death, May 2018, KRS 413.180(1) provided Meade with one year from

the date of qualification to bring a claim, which would be May 2019.

Having determined Meade had two (2) years from the date of accrual

to bring a claim, we are next tasked with determining whether the time was tolled.

KRS 413.190 permits the tolling of the statute of limitations in certain

circumstances. Specifically,

When a cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 accrues against a resident of this state, and he by absconding or concealing himself or by any other indirect means obstructs the prosecution of the action, the time of the continuance of the absence from the state or obstruction shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action shall be commenced. But this saving shall not prevent the limitation from operating in favor of any other person not so acting, whether he is a necessary party to the action or not.

KRS 413.190(2) (emphasis added). Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn engaged in active

health care fraud which concealed their illegal opioid prescribing conspiracy.

They were indicted, convicted, and are currently serving sentences for health care

fraud. There is little room, if any, to debate Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn’s concealment

-6- and obstruction of prosecution; we find the absconding, concealing, or obstruction

of prosecution element to be met. The question is when Meade ought to have

known of the potential cause of action against them.

The cause of action did not accrue on the date of Works’ death in May

2017. Discovery has established that Meade knew Dr. Siefert provided treatment,

including medications, for his mother. Meade testified at Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn’s

criminal trial that he found prescription bottles printed with Dr. Siefert’s name

within a matter of days following Works’ death. Meade also knew his mother

picked up a prescription on the day she died.

If we were to adopt the reasoning proposed by Appellees, these facts

would be sufficient to provide Meade with a reason to know a cause of action

existed against them. We disagree. This conclusion ignores the critical fact that

Meade knew his mother to struggle with addiction. We cannot say Meade

reasonably should have known that Dr. Siefert was engaged in an illegal opioid

prescribing conspiracy without considering all facts known to Meade at the time,

namely that he knew Works abused drugs.

At Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn’s criminal trial, Meade testified he made

the decision to move in with his grandparents at the age of twelve, motivated by

his mother’s addiction. He nevertheless maintained a relationship with his mother

by “tr[ying his] best” to talk to her every day and, when he turned sixteen, by

-7- driving to visit her. (Record (R.) at 570-71). He noticed when she was still using

heavily by slurred speech or impaired thinking, estimating there “may have been a

day or two” when Meade perceived her to be lucid or clear-minded. (R. at 575).

Meade testified that on the day of Works’ death, they spoke on the

phone, and she told him she needed to “go get some prescriptions.” (R. at 572).

His mother did not divulge, and he did not ask where she obtained her pills; she did

not specify whether she would be picking up the prescription from a non-doctor

“person-on-the-street” as he had seen her do before, or whether she would receive

them from a pain clinic.

With respect to Dr. Siefert, Meade stated he knew Dr. Siefert was

treating Works for pain relief following a 2007 work accident which caused a gate

to fall on her.

We cannot say the mere presence of prescription bottles with Siefert’s

name in Works’ home at the time of death conclusively gave Meade reason to

know his mother was subjected to an illegal opioid prescribing regimen. This is

unlike the murder in Wittich, wherein the defendant was apprehended on the scene

for his acts against Wittich.2 Meade was presented with a scenario that reasonably

left doubt as to the cause of her death. That Meade knew Dr. Siefert was treating

2 Even so, the Wittich court found the date at which Wittich’s parents had reason to know of the potential cause of action against Flick was the date of indictment. Despite Flick’s on-site arrest, this was not sufficient to conclusively establish knowledge.

-8- Works for pain management and the presence of his prescriptions in Works’ home

is insufficient to conclusively establish Meade’s claims as time-barred.

Meade had personal knowledge that his mother was an addict and

obtained prescriptions from non-doctors. He did not have personal knowledge—or

constructive knowledge—that Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn were engaged in an illegal

opioid prescribing scheme. We find it unlikely Meade would have any reason to

know of the full magnitude of Appellees’ misconduct and its impact on Works. To

the contrary, discovery has established that Appellees went to lengths to ensure

others would not become aware of their scheme.

Similarly, the cause of action did not accrue on the date Works’ death

certificate was issued in June 2017. The death certificate listed “Drug

Intoxication” and “Hydrocodone” as the causes of death with no reference to

“Acute Polypharmacy Intoxication” as was the case for another plaintiff in this

matter below. Instead, the certificate was consistent with what Meade knew of his

mother’s longtime struggle with addiction. It did not conclusively give him reason

to believe his mother’s death may have been proximately caused by a third party.

We find the date of accrual for Meade’s wrongful death claim was

February 2021, when Dr. Siefert and Dr. Ehn were publicly indicted for their

crimes associated with Works’ care. “[B]y the date of [defendant’s] public

-9- indictment, [the] estate knew or should have known of the injury . . . and that it

was likely caused by [defendant’s] conduct.” Wittich, 519 S.W.3d at 769.

The trial court reached the same conclusion concerning its analysis of

KRS 413.190(2). “[R]esolving all doubts in [Meade’s] favor, the facts of liability

were only made clear to him as of the February 2021 indictment.”3 (Order at 11).

We agree. However, where the trial court fell short is in its incorrect calculation of

the time Meade was afforded to bring his claim after the tolling expired.

Therefore, we find KRS 413.190(2) tolled the date of accrual to the date Dr. Siefert

was publicly indicted for crimes associated with his care of Works—February

2021. With the date of accrual being February 2021, and with Meade being

appointed as personal representative over one year from that date, KRS 413.180

provides Meade with two (2) years to bring a claim against Siefert. That date is

February 2023. Meade filed his original action in October 2022, well before the

point at which his claim would be time-barred. We must conclude the trial court

erred in dismissing Meade’s complaint due to its misapplication of KRS 413.180.

We reject the Appellees’ argument that KRS 413.180 must be strictly

construed such that the date of death is the only plausible date of accrual and KRS

3 In its order, the trial court engaged in some analysis regarding a more “generous” application of KRS 413.190(2) which would set the accrual date at April 2021 when Meade was contacted by a DEA Investigator. Meade advocates for the same calculation on appeal. However, for reasons set forth herein, we find the correct accrual date to be February 2021 pursuant to Wittich and therefore reject the argument in favor of the “most generous” application.

-10- 413.190(2) cannot be applied to toll the date of death to the actual date of accrual.

This interpretation undermines the intent of equitable tolling. Our tolling statute

“has been on our books for many years” and “is essentially a recognition in law of

an equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais to prevent a fraudulent or inequitable

resort to a plea of limitations.” Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Ky. 1952).

The purpose of tolling the statute of limitations in situations such as the one before

us is to “prevent a defendant from concealing the plaintiff’s cause of action.”

Sneed v. Univ. of Louisville Hosp., 600 S.W.3d 221, 229 (Ky. 2020). Moreover,

Wittich, a case to which Siefert directs us, explicitly supports our calculation: If

Wittich were able to demonstrate absconding, concealing, or obstructing the

prosecution, then the tolling effect of KRS 413.190(2) would apply—before a two-

year statute of limitations under KRS 413.180(2) would begin to run. Wittich, 519

S.W.3d at 778.

To decline the application of KRS 413.190 in this case would enable

Appellees to effectively have concealed Works’ cause of action through their

health care fraud scheme; this outcome is precisely the result our tolling statute

seeks to avoid. There is no other option than to toll the statute of limitations and

give effect to our longstanding precedent.

We make no judgment as to the merits of Meade’s claims and instead

speak solely to the issue of whether Meade’s claim is time-barred, which it is not.

-11- Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the Boone Circuit Court and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WILLIAM SIEFERT, M.D.: Kenneth C. Human Lexington, Kentucky Aaron A. VanderLaan Covington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE TIMOTHY EHN, D.C.:

Charles J. Davis Cincinnati, Ohio

Nathan A. Lennon Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky

-12-