IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-2061 Filed January 11, 2017
TYLER A. KIMPTON, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A.
Dalrymple, Judge.
Tyler Kimpton appeals the district court’s dismissal of his postconviction-
relief application. AFFIRMED
Jack E. Dusthimer, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ. 2
DOYLE, Judge.
Tyler Kimpton appeals the district court’s dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In March 2011, Tyler Kimpton pled guilty to second-degree robbery. He
was sentenced to ten years in prison and, pursuant to Iowa Code section
902.12(5) (2009), is required to serve at least seventy percent of that sentence
before he can be eligible for parole or work release. He did not appeal his
conviction.
Almost four years after entry of his guilty plea, Kimpton filed a pro-se PCR
application requesting reconsideration of the mandatory-minimum aspect of his
sentence. His application stated that the governor had “issued the courts to re-
look at ‘youthful’ offenders sentences with [seventy percent] mandatorys [sic] or
life. Those first to be looked at were those under [eighteen years old]. Questions
are now raised to age [twenty-four].” Because he “was under the age of [twenty-
four] . . . at the time of [his] conviction” and this was his “first felony and first time
in prison,” he sought to have the seventy-percent mandatory-minimum aspect of
his sentence lowered or dropped. He requested a hearing be set and PCR
counsel be appointed to represent him.
Thereafter, the State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting Kimpton’s PCR
application was time-barred pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.3 (2015),
divesting the court of jurisdiction. The State also argued State v. Lyle, 854
N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014), wherein the court held mandatory-minimum
sentences automatically imposed on defendants for crimes committed as 3
juveniles are “unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause in
article I, section 17 of [the Iowa] constitution,” was inapplicable to Kimpton’s
circumstances because Kimpton was twenty-two at the time he committed
second-degree robbery. In response, Kimpton argued that Lyle should be
extended to apply to “mentally challenged adult offenders” such as himself
because “[t]here is a movement towards limiting mandatory incarcerations both
for juvenile offenders and for those individuals who might be mentally challenged
as adult offenders as is in this case with [Kimpton].” Kimpton asserted that the
mandatory-minimum aspect of his sentence was unconstitutional on that basis
and his sentence therefore illegal, exempting his claim from the statute of
limitations set forth in Iowa Code chapter 822.
Following a hearing, the district court entered its order dismissing
Kimpton’s PCR application based upon both the statute of limitations and the
merits of Kimpton’s claim. The court recognized Kimpton’s attempt to “draw
analogous results from mental incapacity to juveniles” but found the position was
“currently not supported by Iowa law.” The court concluded that the exception to
the statute of limitations relating to grounds of fact or law that could not have
been raised within the relevant time period was inapplicable.
II. Discussion.
Kimpton now appeals, arguing the district court erred in dismissing his
PCR application on statute-of-limitations grounds, and he requests we reverse
and remand the matter back to the district court for further “developments of the
facts and legal basis.” Though we ordinarily review challenges to the trial court’s
jurisdiction, including illegal-sentence claims, for the correction of errors at law, 4
constitutional questions are reviewed de novo. See State v. Bruegger, 773
N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009).
A. Statute of Limitations.
Kimpton first contends his claim was not time-barred, relying upon Veal v.
State, 779 N.W.2d 63, 64-65 (Iowa 2010), wherein the court reiterated that a
claim of an illegal sentence may be raised at any time, and because a cruel-and-
unusual-punishment challenge amounts to a claim of an illegal sentence, “the
time restrictions in Iowa Code section 822.3 do not apply.” The State agrees, as
do we, so we proceed to the next issue.
B. Merits.
Kimpton argues that because the application was improperly dismissed on
statute-of-limitations grounds, we must reverse and remand the matter back to
the district court. However, the State notes that despite the statute-of-limitations
holding, the district court also analyzed Kimpton’s categorical challenge under
Lyle to determine whether Lyle gave him new grounds to challenge his sentence.
The State asserts the district court’s order of dismissal can be sustained on that
basis. We agree.
Here, Kimpton cites scientific and legal materials examining the cognitive
development of the adolescent brain for the proposition that the line between
childhood and adulthood should be expanded to young adults eighteen-years old
and older. He does not mention his alleged intellectual disabilities, urged in the
underlying proceedings by PCR counsel, which undoubtedly would further
support the use of the offender’s mental age instead of the chronological age in
distinguishing the line between childhood and adulthood. These arguments for 5
finding the mandatory-minimum aspect of his sentence unconstitutional
categorically and as applied to him have appeal. Nevertheless, there is no legal
basis for finding the mandatory-minimum aspect of the sentences imposed upon
young-adult offenders possessing lower-than-average intelligence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal or Iowa Constitution.
In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), the Supreme Court held
the death penalty cannot be imposed, irrespective of the crime, on a juvenile
offender. It recognized that the “qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do
not disappear when an individual turns eighteen” and, “[b]y the same token,
some under [eighteen] have already attained a level of maturity some adults will
never reach.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. Nevertheless, it accepted that “a line
must be drawn” somewhere between childhood and adulthood, and, because
eighteen “is the point where society draws the line for many purposes,” it was
“the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.” Id.; see also United
States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has
recognized that drawing lines based on chronological age is a not-entirely-
desirable but nonetheless necessary approach.”).
Like Roper, the Iowa Supreme Court limited its holding in Lyle to only
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-2061 Filed January 11, 2017
TYLER A. KIMPTON, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A.
Dalrymple, Judge.
Tyler Kimpton appeals the district court’s dismissal of his postconviction-
relief application. AFFIRMED
Jack E. Dusthimer, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ. 2
DOYLE, Judge.
Tyler Kimpton appeals the district court’s dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In March 2011, Tyler Kimpton pled guilty to second-degree robbery. He
was sentenced to ten years in prison and, pursuant to Iowa Code section
902.12(5) (2009), is required to serve at least seventy percent of that sentence
before he can be eligible for parole or work release. He did not appeal his
conviction.
Almost four years after entry of his guilty plea, Kimpton filed a pro-se PCR
application requesting reconsideration of the mandatory-minimum aspect of his
sentence. His application stated that the governor had “issued the courts to re-
look at ‘youthful’ offenders sentences with [seventy percent] mandatorys [sic] or
life. Those first to be looked at were those under [eighteen years old]. Questions
are now raised to age [twenty-four].” Because he “was under the age of [twenty-
four] . . . at the time of [his] conviction” and this was his “first felony and first time
in prison,” he sought to have the seventy-percent mandatory-minimum aspect of
his sentence lowered or dropped. He requested a hearing be set and PCR
counsel be appointed to represent him.
Thereafter, the State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting Kimpton’s PCR
application was time-barred pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.3 (2015),
divesting the court of jurisdiction. The State also argued State v. Lyle, 854
N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014), wherein the court held mandatory-minimum
sentences automatically imposed on defendants for crimes committed as 3
juveniles are “unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause in
article I, section 17 of [the Iowa] constitution,” was inapplicable to Kimpton’s
circumstances because Kimpton was twenty-two at the time he committed
second-degree robbery. In response, Kimpton argued that Lyle should be
extended to apply to “mentally challenged adult offenders” such as himself
because “[t]here is a movement towards limiting mandatory incarcerations both
for juvenile offenders and for those individuals who might be mentally challenged
as adult offenders as is in this case with [Kimpton].” Kimpton asserted that the
mandatory-minimum aspect of his sentence was unconstitutional on that basis
and his sentence therefore illegal, exempting his claim from the statute of
limitations set forth in Iowa Code chapter 822.
Following a hearing, the district court entered its order dismissing
Kimpton’s PCR application based upon both the statute of limitations and the
merits of Kimpton’s claim. The court recognized Kimpton’s attempt to “draw
analogous results from mental incapacity to juveniles” but found the position was
“currently not supported by Iowa law.” The court concluded that the exception to
the statute of limitations relating to grounds of fact or law that could not have
been raised within the relevant time period was inapplicable.
II. Discussion.
Kimpton now appeals, arguing the district court erred in dismissing his
PCR application on statute-of-limitations grounds, and he requests we reverse
and remand the matter back to the district court for further “developments of the
facts and legal basis.” Though we ordinarily review challenges to the trial court’s
jurisdiction, including illegal-sentence claims, for the correction of errors at law, 4
constitutional questions are reviewed de novo. See State v. Bruegger, 773
N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009).
A. Statute of Limitations.
Kimpton first contends his claim was not time-barred, relying upon Veal v.
State, 779 N.W.2d 63, 64-65 (Iowa 2010), wherein the court reiterated that a
claim of an illegal sentence may be raised at any time, and because a cruel-and-
unusual-punishment challenge amounts to a claim of an illegal sentence, “the
time restrictions in Iowa Code section 822.3 do not apply.” The State agrees, as
do we, so we proceed to the next issue.
B. Merits.
Kimpton argues that because the application was improperly dismissed on
statute-of-limitations grounds, we must reverse and remand the matter back to
the district court. However, the State notes that despite the statute-of-limitations
holding, the district court also analyzed Kimpton’s categorical challenge under
Lyle to determine whether Lyle gave him new grounds to challenge his sentence.
The State asserts the district court’s order of dismissal can be sustained on that
basis. We agree.
Here, Kimpton cites scientific and legal materials examining the cognitive
development of the adolescent brain for the proposition that the line between
childhood and adulthood should be expanded to young adults eighteen-years old
and older. He does not mention his alleged intellectual disabilities, urged in the
underlying proceedings by PCR counsel, which undoubtedly would further
support the use of the offender’s mental age instead of the chronological age in
distinguishing the line between childhood and adulthood. These arguments for 5
finding the mandatory-minimum aspect of his sentence unconstitutional
categorically and as applied to him have appeal. Nevertheless, there is no legal
basis for finding the mandatory-minimum aspect of the sentences imposed upon
young-adult offenders possessing lower-than-average intelligence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal or Iowa Constitution.
In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), the Supreme Court held
the death penalty cannot be imposed, irrespective of the crime, on a juvenile
offender. It recognized that the “qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do
not disappear when an individual turns eighteen” and, “[b]y the same token,
some under [eighteen] have already attained a level of maturity some adults will
never reach.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. Nevertheless, it accepted that “a line
must be drawn” somewhere between childhood and adulthood, and, because
eighteen “is the point where society draws the line for many purposes,” it was
“the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.” Id.; see also United
States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has
recognized that drawing lines based on chronological age is a not-entirely-
desirable but nonetheless necessary approach.”).
Like Roper, the Iowa Supreme Court limited its holding in Lyle to only
those “cases involving conduct committed by youthful offenders,” stating that
although “categorical rules can be imperfect, . . . one is necessary here.” Lyle,
854 N.W.2d at 402. The court explicitly stated its holding
ha[d] no application to sentencing laws affecting adult offenders. Lines are drawn in our law by necessity and are incorporated into the jurisprudence we have developed to usher the Iowa Constitution through time. This case does not move any of the lines that currently exist in the sentencing of adult offenders. 6
Id. at 403. If the supreme court’s pronouncements are to be changed, they are
best addressed by that court, as we are bound by its holdings. See State v.
Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 584 n.1 (Iowa 2014) (“Generally, it is the role of the
supreme court to decide if case precedent should no longer be followed.”); State
v. Hughes, 457 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v. Eichler, 83
N.W.2d 576, 578 (1957) (“If our previous holdings are to be overruled, we should
ordinarily prefer to do it ourselves.”)).
Our legislature has drawn the line between childhood and adulthood at
eighteen years of age. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 225C.51(1), 232.2(5),
237C.1(2), 692A.101(19), 726.22(2) (all defining “child” or “minor” as a person
“under eighteen years of age”). The legislature has had the opportunity to
change or qualify the legal age of adulthood since Lyle, and it has not done so,
signifying its tacit approval of Lyle. See Drahaus v. State, 584 N.W.2d 270, 276
(Iowa 1998) (holding that where the legislature has failed to amend a statute in
response to a particular interpretation of the statute announced by the court, it is
presumed that the “legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation”). It also has
had the opportunity to amend Iowa Code section 902.12 to remove or qualify the
minimum sentence it has proscribed for certain felonies. In fact, it just amended
section 902.12 without any such changes. See 2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1104 §§ 1-8.
“[L]egislative determinations of punishment are entitled to great
deference,” and “[s]trict proportionality in sentencing . . . is not required.”
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872-73. Furthermore, “[l]egislative judgments are
generally regarded as the most reliable objective indicators of community
standards for purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel and 7
unusual.” Id. at 873. The proper recourse to address Kimpton’s policy concerns
is through the legislature, not the court. See State v. Nicoletto, 845 N.W.2d 421,
432 (Iowa 2014) (stating that decision whether certain individuals “should be
drawn into” a statute “is a matter for the legislature”); see also King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (“In a democracy, the power to make the law rests
with those chosen by the people.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the mandatory-minimum aspect of Kimpton’s
sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal or
Iowa Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing
Kimpton’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.