Tyerre Rickelle Robinson v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: May 5, 2026
• Docket: 2141242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 2141-24-2

TYERRE RICKELLE ROBINSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Beales, O’Brien and Ortiz Argued at Richmond, Virginia Opinion Issued May 5, 2026*

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY Richard Strouse Wallerstein, Jr., Judge

John W. Parsons (John W. Parsons, Attorney at Law, on brief), for appellant.

Andrew T. Hull, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ

A jury convicted Tyerre Rickelle Robinson of possession of a firearm while illegally

possessing a Schedule II controlled substance in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(C), and with

possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to sell, give, or distribute

the cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C). The trial court sentenced Robinson to a total of 30

years of incarceration, with 15 years suspended. Robinson contends that the evidence seized in the

search of his car violated the Fourth Amendment and should have been suppressed. He also asserts

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. that the cocaine he possessed was for personal use rather than for distribution. Finding no error, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.2

BACKGROUND3

On June 27, 2023, Officer Ebel of the Henrico County Police Department conducted

surveillance and crime reduction efforts in the Audubon Village apartment complex. Officer Ebel

noticed Robinson walking out to a vehicle with various items and observed him for ten minutes. At

first, the officer did not see a firearm on Robinson’s person. Then, Robinson entered a vehicle and

emerged with a firearm tucked into the waistband on his right hip, and Officer Ebel, using

binoculars, could see “the entire grip of the firearm, the magazine well, and the back of the slide.”

Upon running the license plate through the DMV database, Officer Ebel learned that the vehicle was

registered to Robinson. He also searched “Darwin,” an internal police database which revealed that

Robinson was a felon and had previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter and possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon.

After, Officer Ebel radioed for assistance in detaining Robinson. He advised the other

officers that he had determined that Robinson was a convicted felon and that he had observed

Robinson in possession of a firearm. He then saw Robinson return to the vehicle and, after sitting in

the car for some time, reemerge without the firearm on his person. This led Officer Ebel to suspect

that Robinson left the firearm in the vehicle. This time, when Robinson began to walk away from

2 Robinson withdrew his third assignment of error. 3 On appeal, this Court “review[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.” Newsome v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. App. 43, 50-51 (2024). “That principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’” Diaz v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App. 286, 295 (2024) (quoting Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc)). -2- the vehicle, the additional officers arrived and detained him. Officer Murray placed Robinson in

handcuffs and conducted a pat down which failed to turn up a firearm.

Officer Hines, read Robinson his Miranda4 rights, asked him whether there was a firearm in

the vehicle, and informed Robinson that he would be subject to arrest if he had any contraband in

the vehicle. Officer Hines then retrieved the keys to the vehicle from Robinson. Officer McCarthy

arrived and conducted a search of the vehicle’s passenger compartment. He performed this

“protective sweep . . . to confirm or deny” the presence of a firearm in the vehicle. As he later

testified, he decided to conduct the protective sweep “[g]iven the nature of the area we’re in, it’s

a high crime area, high volume area; there were multiple shootings in the area in weeks prior to

our interaction there, as well as the suspect’s history that was given to us over the radio.”

Officer McCarthy then recovered a handgun from the center console of the vehicle.

According to Officer Hines, Robinson stated that while he knew the firearm was present in the

vehicle, it did not belong to him. The police also recovered a digital scale bearing cocaine residue

and a large sandwich bag containing 17.7 grams of cocaine from the vehicle. Robinson told Officer

Hines that he believed the white powder in the baggie to be a stool softener. Robinson was then

arrested. At the time of the arrest, Robinson had two cellphones. Officer Hines obtained a search

warrant for the cellphones and provided them to the forensics unit.

Robinson moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers violated his Fourth

Amendment rights by searching the vehicle after he had been detained and placed in handcuffs.

Robinson alleged that because he and the vehicle were secure there were no exigent circumstances

permitting the police to search the vehicle without a warrant. The Commonwealth responded that

given the totality of the circumstances it was proper to detain Robinson and perform a protective

sweep of the defendant’s vehicle for the officer’s safety. At the suppression hearing, the court

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -3- denied the motion to suppress finding that the protective sweep did not violate the Fourth

Amendment. The court concluded that Robinson “was not under arrest at the time of the search of

the passenger compartment of the vehicle, notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle was locked, and

the keys were removed from Mr. Robinson’s person,” instead he was “being detained.” And “if the

vehicle were not searched based upon the history of Mr. Robinson, coupled with the area, the Court

would find that the safety to the officers and potentially the community was at risk.”

At trial, Officers Ebel, Hines, and McCarthy testified as to the facts set forth above. Officer

McCarthy testified that in addition to discovering a firearm, he also found a plastic baggie

containing white powder and a digital scale with white powder residue on it. Testing confirmed that

the white powder in the baggie was 17.78 grams of cocaine and that there was cocaine residue on

the digital scale. The parties stipulated that the nine-millimeter handgun was loaded and would

have been operable and in good mechanical condition capable of firing the ammunition it contained.

Detective Winter of the Henrico County Police Department testified as an expert witness,

stating that there were numerous factors indicating that Robinson possessed the cocaine for

distribution rather than personal use. Specifically, he testified that the quantity of cocaine found in

the vehicle had a street value of around $750 to $800. According to Detective Winter, possession of

such a large amount of cocaine would be inconsistent with personal use, even for a heavy user.

Rather, the detective believed the amount to be more consistent with a “stash bag” from which a

dealer could repackage and distribute cocaine to buyers. In addition, Detective Winter explained

that cocaine distributors sometimes add certain cutting agents, like Miralax and other stool

softeners, to increase the weight of the cocaine. However, according to Detective Winter, in his 16

years of experience, he has not seen an individual in possession of a baggie full solely of laxatives in

powder form.

-4- Next, Detective Winter reviewed the text messages recovered from Robinson’s cellphones.

One text message discussed “a pool,” typically a reference to a “pool ball” or “eight ball.”

Detective Winter explained that this is usually a way of describing an eighth of an ounce, or 3.5

grams, of a substance. Another set of messages referred to “halftime software.” This, according to

Detective Winter, was in reference to half a gram of cocaine, as the word “soft” typically applies to

powder cocaine in these contexts. Additional messages showed a conversation about arranging

payment for drugs. Another individual texted Robinson asking for a “teenager,” meaning

one-sixteenth of an ounce, or 1.7 grams.

Following Detective Winter’s testimony, the Commonwealth rested, and Robinson moved

to strike the evidence. The trial court denied Robinson’s motion to strike based on the quantity of

the cocaine, the cellphone messages, the expert testimony, and the presence of a digital scale with

cocaine residue and a firearm. Robinson did not call any witnesses and did not testify. The jury

returned guilty verdicts on all charges. Robinson timely noticed his appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we “consider the facts in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68

Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)).

“It is the appellant’s burden to show that when viewing the evidence in such a manner, the trial

court committed reversible error.” Id.; see Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 358, 361 (2003)

(explaining that while the Commonwealth has the burden of proving the legitimacy of a

warrantless search and seizure in the trial court, on appeal the defendant must show that the trial

court’s denial of his suppression motion constituted reversible error).

“We review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the particular facts of the

case.” Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 478, 490 (2024) (quoting Branham v.

-5- Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 279 (2012)). “When considering whether to affirm the denial of a

pretrial suppression motion, an appellate court reviews not only the evidence presented at the

pretrial hearing but also the evidence later presented at trial.” Id. at 491 (quoting Commonwealth

v. White, 293 Va. 411, 414 (2017)). An appellate court is “bound by the trial court’s findings of

historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and we give due

weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement

officers.” Id. at 490-91 (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198 (1997) (en

banc)).

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is, upon

review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512).

ANALYSIS

I. The Trial Court Correctly Held that the Officers Did Not Violate Robinson’s Fourth Amendment Rights by Performing a Protective Sweep of His Vehicle

The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons

. . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the

Fourth Amendment, a person in lawful possession of an automobile has a right to privacy in that

vehicle. Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 13 (2021). Nevertheless, a vehicle sweep “is -6- permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable

facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the

officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of

weapons.” Bazemore, 82 Va. App. at 492 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049

(1983)). The sole justification for a protective sweep is “the protection of police officers and

others nearby.” Bagley, 73 Va. App. at 13. “To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must

be able to articulate more than an unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ that criminal activity is

afoot.” Bazemore, 82 Va. App. at 492 (quoting McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552

(2008)). The officer must “supply a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal

activity on the part of the particular person stopped.” Id.

Here, Robinson argues that, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress.

We disagree. As the trial court recognized, the protective sweep was justified because the police

possessed a reasonable belief based on “specific and articulable facts” that Robinson had access

to a firearm either on his person or in his vehicle. The record reflects that Officer Ebel observed

Robinson, a convicted felon, enter his car with a firearm at his hip and exit without the gun.

When a pat down of Robinson failed to reveal a firearm, the officers “rational[ly] infer[red],”

Bazemore, 82 Va. App. at 492, that the firearm was in the vehicle and Robinson would be able to

access the weapon upon release. Other factors further supported the protective sweep. Officer

Ebel testified that he was only present at the apartment complex as part of a crime reduction unit

in the wake of multiple shootings. And Officer Hines indicated that during the stop, other

residents came outside and were “slowly building what appeared to be a scene.” Given the

totality of circumstances, Robinson failed to demonstrate that the police lacked the reasonable

suspicion necessary to justify a protective sweep of his vehicle.

-7- Next, Robinson argues that he could not have represented a danger to the officers at the

time of the search because he was “legally detained and not free to leave.” This argument misses

the mark. “A vehicle sweep justified by officer safety concerns is permissible if it occurs during

an investigatory detention that falls short of an arrest.” Bagley, 73 Va. App. at 14 (emphasis

omitted). “Such a protective search is authorized even if the suspect is under police restraint at

the time the search is conducted, because the suspect may be able to escape such restraint.”

Bazemore, 82 Va. App. at 492 (quoting Gross v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. App. 530, 537 (2024)).

Indeed, “the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not

been effected.” Bagley, 73 Va. App. at 15 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1052).

And a suspect “may later regain access to the vehicle if he is not arrested.” Bazemore, 82

Va. App. at 492.

Although the police had placed Robinson in handcuffs prior to the sweep of his vehicle,

the trial court did not err characterizing the stop as a detention rather than an arrest. Officer

Hines informed Robinson that he would only be arrested if the police found contraband in the

vehicle. That Robinson complied with police instructions during the stop is irrelevant. The

justification for a protective sweep is the officers’ safety once the suspect is released. In this

case, once the stop ended, Robinson would have access to his car and any weapons inside. Thus,

we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Robinson’s motion to suppress.

II. The Trial Court Was Not Plainly Wrong in Finding that the Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove that Robinson Possessed Cocaine with Intent to Distribute

“The quantum of evidence necessary to prove an intent to distribute depends on the facts

and circumstances of each case.” Askew v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 104, 110 (2003).

Absent a direct admission by the defendant, “intent to distribute must necessarily be proved by

circumstantial evidence.” Cole v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 342, 361 (2017) (quoting Williams v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 194 (2009)). Circumstantial evidence that may be probative of -8- intent includes: “‘the quantity of the drugs seized, [how the drugs] are packaged, . . . the presence

of an unusual amount of cash, [the presence of] equipment related to drug distribution, or

firearms,’ and whether the quantity of drugs [is] ‘inconsistent with personal use.’” Cole v.

Commonwealth, 294 Va. 342, 361 (2017) (quoting McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 493

(2001)). The Commonwealth “may introduce opinion testimony from law enforcement officers

familiar with the habits and propensities of local drug users as to what amounts are inconsistent

with personal use.” Askew, 40 Va. App. at 110 (affirming the judgment of the trial court where

defendant was in possession of over 7 grams of cocaine and an expert testified that such amount

was inconsistent with personal use).

Here, the trial court’s decision denying Robinson’s motion to strike was not “plainly

wrong or without evidence to support it.” Perkins, 295 Va. at 327. The Commonwealth

presented evidence that Officer McCarthy recovered 17.78 grams of cocaine from Robinson’s

car. Detective Winter opined that such a large amount of cocaine is inconsistent with personal

use. He also testified that Robinson’s burner phone contained messages consistent with drug

sale transactions. One message referenced payment for “a pool” or an eighth of an ounce of

cocaine, and another asked Robinson for a “teenager,” or one-sixteenth of an ounce. Based on

the admitted evidence, a rational fact finder could conclude that Robinson possessed the requisite

intent to distribute. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Robinson’s motion to strike.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

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