Filed 6/11/26 Tye v. Tye CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MATTHEW TYE, E083021 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super.Ct.No. RIC1601882) v. ORDER MODIFYING JUSTIN TYE et al., CONCURRING OPINION
Defendants and Respondents. [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT
The concurring opinion filed May 12, 2026, is modified as follows.
Between the second and third paragraphs of the concurrence insert:
In his petition for rehearing, Tye argues that I am “rewarding” “bad behavior” because Empire opposed Tye’s request to amend his complaint “to eliminate Empire from [his] pleading,” and Tye claims that the amendments would have rendered Empire’s pending summary judgment motion moot. But Tye’s proposed amendments did not eliminate Empire from his pleading. Rather, Tye’s proposed amended pleading still sought to recover from Empire on an alter ego theory (“Justin Tye, Empire, Active, and GF are all alter egos of one another, and therefore all jointly and severally liable for all fraud claims”), and Empire’s motion for summary judgment addressed alter ego liability. Thus, even if Tye had been granted leave to file the amended pleading (with or without Empire’s consent), that would not have rendered Empire’s summary judgment motion moot.
1 The modification does not change the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
2 Filed 5/12/26 Tye v. Tye CA4/2 (unmodified opinion)
See concurring opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
MATTHEW TYE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E083021
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1601882)
JUSTIN TYE, et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Carol A. Greene, Judge.
Affirmed.
Matthew Tye, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Respondents.
Plaintiff and appellant Matthew Tye (Matthew)1 files this appeal regarding a
lawsuit involving a $100,000 loan that his grandparents Myron and Mary Jane Matika
1 We use first names for clarity due to shared last names.
1 (Grandparents) made to defendant and respondent Justin Tye (Justin), who is Matthew’s
brother. Justin was involved in flipping houses for profit. Christopher Bowen (Bowen)
owned GF Services, LLC (GF), and Justin owned Empire Financial Services, Inc.
(Empire); they purchased properties through these companies. They enlisted private
investors to loan money to purchase the properties promising that the loans would be
secured by second trust deeds on properties owned by GF. Justin borrowed $100,000
from Grandparents; he never paid them back and the loan was transferred to Matthew to
attempt to collect the money. Matthew also loaned money to GF secured by properties
owned by GF but was never paid back on his loan. Matthew filed a lawsuit against
Justin, Bowen, GF and other defendants, including Empire, seeking the return of his
money and the $100,000 loan made by Grandparents. Eventually, Matthew signed back
the loan to Grandparents, and they joined in the lawsuit against Justin and Empire as
intervenors.
This appeal involves the grant of a motion for summary judgment (MSJ) in favor
of Empire on Matthew’s loan, and the grant of Justin’s motion for summary adjudication
(MSA) as to some of the causes of action on Matthew’s loan. A subsequent trial was
held, which involved claims by Grandparents for the $100,000 loan payback and claims
of fraud by Matthew against Justin. The jury awarded Grandparents the $100,000 loan
plus interest. The jury rejected the claim of fraud brought by Matthew against Justin.
Matthew was awarded nothing by the jury.
On appeal, Matthew claims: (1) the trial court erred by granting the MSJ brought
by Empire and instead should have declared the MSJ moot; (2) the trial court erred by
2 granting Justin’s MSA on the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and
negligence; (3) the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence at trial of a
settlement between Matthew, GF, and Bowen; and (4) the trial court prejudicially erred
by excluding Matthew’s evidence at trial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Matthew has provided very few facts on the proceedings below. He simply
provides background that the dispute involved him, Justin, Empire and Grandparents over
Justin and Empire never paying back the $100,000 loan. There was also a dispute
between Justin and Matthew pertaining to notes on other properties. Matthew provides
that Justin and Empire filed an MSJ and an MSA (collectively, Motions), and he claims
they were erroneously granted by the trial court. He provides a brief summary of his
allegations in the opposition to the Motions but provides no other facts surrounding the
Motions. He provides no summary of facts about the jury trial. This is despite the
clerk’s transcript being almost 10,000 pages and the reporter’s transcript being more than
1,000 pages. Although he has not complied with California Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(2)(C), by providing a summary of the pertinent facts, we will exercise our
discretion not to strike the opening brief and proceed to address his claims.
A. THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
The relevant pleading in this case is the third amended complaint (TAC).
Matthew filed the TAC on December 9, 2020. He named Bowen, Justin, GF, and
3 Empire.2 He alleged that Empire and Justin were alter egos of each other. He alleged
that Bowen and Justin were owners and partners of GF.
As for the facts, he alleged that Grandparents loaned Justin $100,000 to invest in
his real estate business, which was to be paid back with 15 percent interest and was to be
secured by second trust deeds on four specific properties. The contract regarding the loan
was between Empire and Grandparents. The money was to be used to buy properties, fix
them up and then sell them. Justin signed for Empire. Matthew alleged Justin did not
intend to repay the money to Grandparents and never intended to use the money for its
intended purpose. Matthew alleged that Justin used the money to purchase his own
vacation home and boat. Justin did not pay back the $100,000 after one year. Justin sent
Grandparents false accountings that stated the money was used on six different
properties. Justin never paid back the loan. Grandparents transferred the loan to
Matthew.
Matthew alleged that on September 1, 2013, he invested $30,000 with GF in
exchange for a note secured by a deed of trust on a property located on Via Mazatlán in
Corona (Mazatlán). Justin and Bowen “fraudulently promised” to record the note but
never did. Matthew alleged the Mazatlán property was sold by Justin and Bowen without
notifying him. Matthew contacted Justin by telephone about the Mazatlán property and
was told it was sold for a “loss.” He would not be paid back the $30,000 on the property.
Matthew alleged that this was a lie because Justin and GF had the financial means to pay
2 Other named defendants are not relevant to this appeal.
4 him. Justin then advised Matthew he would be paid on another property, which was
located on Durham Drive in Riverside (Durham). Justin assured Matthew that the
Durham property would be sold and he would be paid back his money from the proceeds.
He was promised to be the second position deed on the Durham property. Matthew
alleged this was false because there were three other deeds on the Durham property.
Justin knew there was not enough equity in the Durham property to pay off Matthew’s
note. The security on the Durham property was worthless. Matthew was given a note
signed by Bowen in the amount of $30,000 at 15 percent interest dated August 2014, with
a one-year term. Matthew was never paid back.
Matthew’s first cause of action was fraud against all defendants. He claimed that
the aforementioned acts contained evidence of fraudulent concealment. Justin, Empire,
and GF were all alter egos of one another and were jointly and severally liable for all
fraud claims. His second cause of action was breach of fiduciary duty against all
defendants. He claimed that all defendants breached their fiduciary duty through their
aforementioned acts. Further, defendants aided and abetted each other in their breaches.
The third cause of action was for negligence against all defendants. Defendants had a
legal duty to use due care in respect to Matthew and breached that duty through the
aforementioned actions. All defendants aided and abetted each other. The fourth cause
of action was for breach of contract for the $100,000 loan made by Grandparents to
Justin, which was alleged against Justin and Empire. The fifth cause of action was for
breach of contract for the $30,000 loan attached to the Durham property; Justin, Empire
5 and GF were all liable through agency, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. No exhibits
are included in the record for the TAC.
Justin and Empire filed the MSJ on December 15, 2022, on the grounds that the
action had no merit and there were no triable issues of fact pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c. They also alleged, in the alternative, that summary adjudication
of the first cause of action (fraud), second cause of action (breach of fiduciary duty), third
cause of action (negligence) and fifth cause of action (breach of contract) should be
granted as they involved the Durham/Mazatlán notes.3 Justin and Empire provided
argument that there was no involvement by them in the Mazatlán and Durham properties
and that the matter had been settled, leaving no damages. Empire sought summary
judgment of the entire case as it had no involvement in the Mazatlán/Durham notes.
Justin argued that the second cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and the third
cause of action for negligence should be barred because Matthew could not establish a
fiduciary duty between Justin and Matthew. Justin had never been the lender, borrower,
guarantor, assignor or assignee of the Mazatlán promissory note, which was then
transferred to the Durham property. He had never been an agent for Matthew and he
noted that Matthew was the lender on the note. He never made any statements or
representations as to either the Mazatlán or Durham notes. Justin further alleged there
was a settlement between Matthew, GF and Bowen in which Matthew was to receive his
3 The fourth cause was for breach of contract on the $100,000 note brought against Justin and Empire, which had been returned to Grandparents, and they were parties as intervenors on the fourth cause of action.
6 original investment and interest back on the Mazatlán and Durham notes. There were no
further damages to pursue on these notes. Further, as to a claim of alter ego, all claims
against all parties had been settled in the settlement agreement. As for the negligence
cause of action, Justin played no role in either the Mazatlán or Durham notes. There was
no duty owed to Matthew. Further, Matthew was the lender on the notes.
The clerk’s transcript contains a declaration from the attorney representing Justin
and Empire in support of the Motions. It also includes the exhibits attached to the
Motions. One of the exhibits was a note secured by deed of trust in the amount of
$30,000 for the Mazatlán property signed by Bowen as the manager of GF. A second
note was also included that was secured by a deed of trust on the Durham property in the
amount of $30,000, which was signed by Bowen as manager of GF. One of the exhibits
was a settlement agreement between Matthew, Bowen and GF settling the loan on the
Durham property and Matthew agreeing to dismiss the lawsuit against them. A copy of
the dismissal of Bowen and GF is also in the record. Justin also provided a declaration in
support of the Motions insisting he had never been a lender, borrower, guarantor or
assignor of the Durham or Mazatlán notes. He never made any statements about the
notes. Justin also provided a declaration as president of Empire declaring there was no
involvement by Empire in the Mazatlán/Durham properties. Justin and Empire provided
a separate statement of facts in support of the Motions relying on the declaration of Justin
and the exhibits.
Matthew filed objections to the Motions asserting that the claims involving
Empire should be found to be moot rather than summary judgment being granted. He
7 also filed opposition to the claims in the Motions involving Justin as he was sued as an
alter ego of the corporations. Matthew claimed that Justin and Empire were purposefully
excluded from the settlement agreement. Matthew claimed there were further damages
on the Mazatlán/Durham notes that he was bringing against Justin. Matthew submitted a
declaration in which he stated that Justin assured him as his brother that he would look
out for Matthew’s interests with GF and that Matthew would be paid first. Justin
breached his fiduciary duty by lying to him. Justin was liable as the principal of GF.
Matthew filed his own separate statement of facts responding to the separate statement
filed by Justin and Empire. In his separate statement, Matthew admitted never alleging
that Justin, as president of Empire, had ever been a borrower or guarantor on the
Mazatlán/Durham notes. He also denied ever alleging that Justin was his agent. He
admitted that Empire had never been a party to the promissory notes. He only alleged
that as to Justin, he owed Matthew a fiduciary duty in relation to his role with GF.
Matthew objected to individual statements of fact filed by Justin and Empire.
Empire filed a reply in support of the Motions. Empire argued that Matthew had
failed to show that there were disputed material facts as to the claims against Empire and
the MSJ should be granted.
Justin filed a reply to Matthew’s opposition to the MSA. Justin alleged he had no
role in the Mazatlán/Durham notes and that he was only being sued because he was
Matthew’s brother. Justin had no liability to Matthew, and the dispute had already been
settled for $50,000 with GF. Matthew failed in his response to show that there were
disputed material facts as to the second and third causes of action. There was no
8 evidence presented that Justin made statements on behalf of GF or that he was acting as a
principal at GF. Matthew’s response was based on speculation and imagination and not
supported by substantial responsive evidence. Moreover, Matthew provided no evidence
supporting his claims that the settlement agreement did not settle all damages on the
Mazatlán/Durham notes.
Matthew filed an ex parte request to file a fourth amended complaint that
eliminated any allegations he had made against Empire. The only causes of action that
would remain would be those against Justin. He sought to have the trial court declare the
Motions filed by Empire as moot. Justin and Empire opposed the ex parte application.
The ex parte application was denied.
The trial court issued the tentative ruling on March 17, 2023. It denied the MSJ in
total as to Justin. It denied the MSA as to the first cause of action—the fraud cause of
action in relation to the Mazatlán/Durham notes for Justin—finding questions remained
as to misrepresentations and concealments by Justin. It granted summary adjudication as
to the breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and breach of contract causes of action related
to the Durham/Mazatlán notes. It found that there was no showing of “duty to support
the claims for breach of fiduciary duty or negligence.” Further, Justin was not a party to
the Durham/Mazatlán notes so there was no claim of breach of contract, and the claims
against GF and Bowen were settled so any claims of alter ego as to GF were settled. As
for Empire, the MSJ was granted in its entirety for Empire as there were no causes of
action alleged as to Empire with regard to the Mazatlán/Durham notes.
9 On March 17, 2023, the Motions were called for hearing. Matthew presented
argument in opposition to the Motions. At the end of argument, the trial court asked if
Empire objected to just denying the Motion as moot. Counsel for Empire objected. The
trial court advised Matthew he could have dismissed the claims against Empire. The trial
court adopted the tentative ruling granting the MSJ as to Empire, and the MSA as to the
second, third and fifth causes of action for Justin. Empire was to give notice of the
ruling. No judgment was entered at the time on grant of the Motions.
Trial commenced on July 17, 2023. The jury issued its verdict finding that
Grandparents and Empire entered into a contract wherein Grandparents loaned $100,000
to Empire. Grandparents performed all of the conditions of the contract and Empire
breached the contract. The jury awarded Grandparents $100,000 principal and $136,250
interest against Empire. As for Matthew’s claim of fraud against Justin, the jury found
there were no false representations made by Justin to Matthew, or fraud in regard to the
Mazatlán/ Durham loans, and there were no damages awarded to Matthew.
Judgment was entered on December 8, 2023. It included the ruling granting
Empire’s MSJ and the grant of the MSA on the second, third and fifth causes of action
related to the Mazatlán/Durham notes for Justin. Justin and Empire were the prevailing
parties on these claims. The judgment also included the findings by the jury and the
judgment in favor of Grandparents after jury trial.
10 Matthew filed his notice of appeal on January 12, 2024. He checked the box that
he was appealing from the December 8, 2023, “Judgment after jury trial.”4
DISCUSSION
A. THE MOTIONS
Matthew claims on appeal the trial court’s grant of the MSJ as to all of the claims
of Empire related to the Mazatlán/Durham notes should be reversed and the MSJ should
be found moot. He also claims the trial court improperly granted summary adjudication
as to the claims by Matthew against Justin of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.5
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “On such a motion,
the papers of the moving party must be strictly construed and those of the opposing party
liberally construed. Doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved
in favor of the opposing party.” (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 828, 842.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering
all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which
objections were made and sustained.” ’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in
4 We note that the entry of judgment on the Motions was not filed until the final judgment after jury trial. Matthew appeals from the December 8, 2023, judgment, which includes the summary adjudication and summary judgment orders, and the judgment after trial.
5 Matthew is not appealing the summary adjudication of the breach of contract claim against Justin.
11 support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.” ’ ” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th
340, 347; see also De Meo v. Cooley LLP (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 17, 28.)
Matthew claims that rather than granting the MSJ in favor of Empire, the trial
court should have found it was moot but provides no pertinent legal authority to support
his claim. Although he cites cases that provide the courts will not entertain an action that
is not founded on an actual controversy, and that such claims are considered moot, he
provides no authority for his claim that the trial court could not grant summary judgment
but rather had to find the MSJ moot. “[T]o demonstrate error, an appellant must supply
the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation
to the record.” (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.) “We
may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal
authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions
he wants us to adopt.’ ” (Id. at p. 277.) Matthew’s failure to provide adequate legal
authority and argument supporting his conclusionary argument that the trial court had to
find the MSJ moot, rather than granting the motion, forfeits his claim on appeal.
Matthew also contends the trial court erred by granting summary adjudication on
the second and third causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, which
he alleged against Justin. We note that Matthew has not provided a complete summary of
the facts surrounding the Motions brought by Empire and Justin but we find he has
provided sufficient facts in the brief to review the claims.
12 “ ‘The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence
of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused
by the breach.’ ” (Kaushansky v. Stonecraft Attorneys, APC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 788,
805.) Some examples of fiduciary relationships that give rise to fiduciary duties include
principal and agent, attorney and client, partners, guardian and ward, and trustee and trust
beneficiaries. (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
621, 632.) “Many of the cases rejecting breach of fiduciary duty claims have been based
(at least in part) upon the principle, as enunciated in Waverly Productions, Inc. v. RKO
General, Inc. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 721, 732, [], that ‘[a] mere contract or a debt does
not constitute a trust or create a fiduciary relationship.’ ” (Oakland Raiders, at pp. 633-
634.) “The mere placing of a trust in another person does not create a fiduciary
relationship.” (Zumbrun v. University of Southern California (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1,
13.) “Whether a fiduciary duty exists is generally a question of law.” (Amtower v.
Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1599.)
“ ‘To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that the
“defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was
the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ [Citation.] A legal duty of care is
the threshold requirement for recovery. [Citation.] The existence of a duty is a question
of law for the court.” (Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 675,
691; see also Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 70,
76.)
13 As for fiduciary duty, Matthew argues on appeal that Justin promised, as his
brother, that he would look out for Matthew’s interests in relation to the loan on the
Mazatlán property and would “have his back.” He also alleged that Justin promised
Matthew would be paid first; he insists this created a fiduciary and agency relationship.
Matthew also insists that he stated sufficient facts to show a common law confidential
relationship duty.
No evidence was presented in the TAC or the opposition to the Motions that
supported that Justin had any fiduciary relationship with Matthew. There was no dispute
that the promissory note on the Durham/Mazatlán properties was between Matthew and
GF. Bowen signed the notes. Matthew alleged only that Justin made promises to him,
but in no way alleged or presented evidence that Justin had a fiduciary duty. None of the
moving papers showed any fiduciary involvement by Justin in the Mazatlán/Durham
notes. Further, as noted by the trial court, GF had settled with Matthew so there was no
further involvement by GF as an alter ego. Matthew provides mere speculation as to the
fiduciary relationship and no evidence that Justin had any involvement in the note.
Matthew’s statements that Justin was involved with or owned GF were not shown by the
evidence. Further, even if Matthew trusted Justin to protect Matthew’s interests, this
alone did not create a fiduciary relationship. (Zumbrun v. University of Southern
California, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d at p. 13.) The trial court properly granted the MSA on
the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action.
Similarly, the negligence cause of action also fails. Matthew relies on Civil Code
section 1714 which provides, “(a) Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his
14 or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as
the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or
herself.” Matthew insists that Justin owed him a duty to act with reasonable care
regarding his false representations as to the terms of GF’s investment, that Justin would
record the notes, his claim that Mazatlán was a loss, that Matthew would be placed in
second position on the Durham property, and that there was no equity to cover his note.
Matthew assumes that this established a duty without an exception. Again, there were no
disputed material facts as to Justin not being involved in the Mazatlán/Durham notes.
Justin did not sign the notes or have any involvement in the notes. There was no contrary
evidence. Matthew did not present any evidence that Justin could act on GF’s behalf or
control GF’s actions in any of the transactions involving the Mazatlán/Durham notes.
The summary adjudication of the negligence cause of action was proper.
B. TRIAL
Matthew makes two claims as to the trial proceedings. He first claims that the trial
court erred by allowing Justin to admit the settlement agreement between Matthew and
GF and Bowen. He asserts that such admission was prejudicial. He also claims the trial
court erred by refusing to allow Matthew’s evidence, comprised of escrow documents
that revealed Justin’s fraud, to be admitted. He claims such refusal to admit the evidence
was prejudicial.
Even if we were to assume that the trial court erred by improperly admitting
settlement evidence and excluding Matthew’s evidence, Matthew has failed to show
15 prejudice. “A fundamental rule of appellate review is that the appellant must
affirmatively show prejudicial error.” (Scheenstra v. California Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 370, 403.) “ ‘A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the
judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of
evidence unless: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) The court which passes upon the effect of the error or
errors is of the opinion that the admitted evidence should have been excluded on the
ground stated and that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.’ ” (O'Hearn v. Hillcrest Gym & Fitness Center, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
491, 500.) The erroneous exclusion of evidence does not require reversal unless the error
caused a miscarriage of justice. (Ibid.)
“In civil cases, a miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the
reviewing court, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, is of the
opinion that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (O'Hearn v. Hillcrest Gym &
Fitness Center, Inc., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 500.)
Initially, Matthew provides no citation to legal authority as to the correct standard
of review for prejudice.6 He only makes a conclusion that the trial court’s admission of
the settlement agreement was prejudicial, without any reference to the standard of review.
“To meet this burden, the ‘appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to
6 Matthew cites to Evidence Code section 352 but that involves the admission of evidence, and not the standard of review that an appellate court utilizes in reviewing a claim of the prejudicial admission of evidence.
16 support [its] contentions. This burden requires more than a mere assertion that the
judgment is wrong. “Issues do not have a life of their own: If they are not raised or
supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . . waived.” ’ [Citation.]
Accordingly, an appellant waives contentions that are conclusory and not supported by
cognizable legal argument or analysis.” (E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1289.) Matthew fails to set forth the standard of prejudice and
provides no further argument other than conclusory statements that the exclusion of his
escrow documents was prejudicial, and that the admission of the settlement agreement
was prejudicial. His failure to provide proper legal authority forfeits the claim on appeal.
(See Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 884, 900 [appellant
“has also waived his claim by failing to cite and apply the standard of review for
prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence”].)
Moreover, Matthew has failed to provide a summary of the facts of the trial. It is
not this court’s job to review the records and provide the facts for him. Matthew does
provide citation to the record wherein the trial court admitted the settlement evidence but
provides no further facts as to the other evidence presented at trial. This court must
consider prejudice based on an examination of the entire cause, including all of the
evidence. However, it is not this court’s job to independently review the record for the
evidence. “It is not our place to comb the record seeking support for assertions parties
fail to substantiate.” (Howard v. American National Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 498, 534.) Matthew refers to argument by counsel for Justin and Empire
made prior to and after the evidence was presented but provides no summary of the facts
17 at trial. Matthew refers to the trial court admitting the settlement agreement with no
foundation but again provides no evidence to support that based on all the evidence
presented, the admission of the settlement agreement was prejudicial requiring reversal.
Matthew has failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice from the admission of the
settlement agreement. (Scheenstra v. California Dairies, Inc., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at
p. 403.)
In addition, Matthew fails to provide how the exclusion of his evidence of escrow
documents was prejudicial based on the entirety of the evidence in the case. Matthew
provides that he tried to admit escrow documents he obtained from the other lenders who
had security positions on the Durham property to show how he discovered Justin
committed fraud. Matthew refers to some of the evidence by citing to the reporter’s
transcript, but again he has failed to provide a summary of all the facts from the jury trial.
“Prejudice is not presumed from the erroneous admission of evidence.” (Bjoin v. J-M
Manufacturing Co., Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 900.) Matthew’s brief, quoting
portions of the reporter’s transcript with no context for these citations and without
providing a summary of all of the evidence, is not helpful to this court. Further, it is not
this court’s job to comb the record to find the relevant facts for Matthew. (Howard v.
American National Fire Ins. Co., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.) Matthew has failed
to meet his burden of showing prejudice.
18 DISPOSITION
The judgment entered on December 8, 2023, is affirmed in full. Appellant is to
bear his own costs on appeal.7
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
7 We do not award costs to respondents as they did not make an appearance in this appeal.
19 [Tye v. Tye, E083021]
MENETREZ, J., Concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to offer some additional
analysis in support of affirmance.
Plaintiff and appellant Matthew Tye argues that the trial court should not have
granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Empire Financial Services, Inc.
(Empire) and should instead have denied the motion as moot, because Tye no longer had
any claims against Empire after he assigned those claims back to his grandparents. The
argument is meritless because all five causes of action in Tye’s operative third amended
complaint were alleged against Empire. Tye’s admission that he assigned away his
claims against Empire was a concession that the motion for summary judgment was
meritorious, not an argument that it was moot. As the trial court pointed out, Tye could
have rendered the motion moot by voluntarily dismissing his claims against Empire, but
he failed to do so. Tye’s causes of action against Empire therefore remained pending, so
Empire’s motion for summary judgment was not moot. Tye’s only response to that point
is the following: “Appellant filing a dismissal was not the proper procedure, as there was
nothing to dismiss.” The argument is frivolous. Of course there was something to
dismiss, namely, the five causes of action that Tye alleged against Empire in his operative
third amended complaint.
1 Tye argues that the trial court erroneously admitted certain communications made
in connection with settlement negotiations. Defendants presented extensive arguments
on that point in their written opposition to motion in limine number 8. For example,
defendants pointed out that such communications are inadmissible only for certain
purposes but are admissible for others, and they argued that they would be introducing
the communications for a permissible purpose. Defendants also explained why the
evidence was relevant, including that it was relevant to Tye’s credibility. On appeal, Tye
does not address defendants’ arguments, so he fails to show that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the evidence.