Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed October 1, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-1574 Lower Tribunal No. F21-20128 ________________
Ty-ree Dixon, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carmen Cabarga, Judge.
Rier Jordan, P.A., and Jonathan E. Jordan, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and BOKOR, JJ.
LOGUE, J. Ty-ree Dixon appeals his convictions and sentences for one count of
second-degree murder with a weapon, two counts of attempted second-
degree murder with a weapon, and one count of possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, arising from a drive-by shooting that occurred on January
2, 2021.1 Dixon bases his appeal on the fact that the jury was accidently
provided a document not in evidence indicating Dixon was a convicted felon.
We affirm because no contemporaneous objection or motion for new trial
was made below, and this admittedly grave error does not rise to the level of
being fundamental under the existing standard. In so ruling we do not
foreclosure other remedies that might be available to Dixon.
Background
This appeal arises from a January 2, 2021 drive-by shooting that
resulted in the death of Johnquaveis Davis and gunshot wounds to Ja’cari
Mullins and Troydarius Scott. In connection with the shooting, Dixon was
charged with one count of second-degree murder with a weapon as to Davis,
1 Dixon also appeals his conviction and sentence on a second count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. This additional count for possession was based on law enforcement recovering a firearm at an apartment where Dixon resided when executing a search warrant on May 17, 2021. This May 17, 2021 possession count was severed from the remaining counts and tried separately before a different judge and jury. Finding no reversible error in that proceeding, we affirm without further discussion.
2 two counts of attempted second-degree murder with a weapon as to Mullins
and Scott, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The firearm possession count was bifurcated from the charges for second-
degree murder and attempted second-degree murder but was scheduled to
be tried before the same judge and jury. Thus, in phase one of the trial, the
second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder charges
were tried, and in phase two, the firearm possession was tried.
Prior to the commencement of the bifurcated trial proceeding, Dixon
signed a stipulation intended to be used only in phase two of the trial relating
to the firearm possession charge. The stipulation stated he “had previously
been convicted of a felony.” He agreed to the stipulation to avoid further
evidence of the exact nature of his felony coming into evidence. As this
stipulation pertained only to phase two of the trial, it was never entered into
evidence or read to the jury during phase one of the trial.
Following the close of the evidence in phase one, the jury retired to
deliberate and returned with a guilty verdict on all three charges. After the
jury had reached its verdict, the trial court, the lawyers, and the parties
learned for the first time that the stipulation was accidentally given to the jury
in the jury room so that the jury had access to it when it reached the verdict
convicting Dixon on the second-degree murder and attempted second-
3 degree murder charges. Upon discovering this, the trial court advised it
would add a question to the verdict form submitted to the jury during the
second phase of the trial which asked:
SPECIAL INTERROGATORY
During your deliberations, did any of the jurors see a document called Joint Stipulation which referred to Ty’ree Dixon being a convicted felon.
Neither party objected to the use or wording of the special interrogatory.
The trial court proceeded to the second phase of the trial on the felon
in possession count. The jury found Dixon guilty, and it replied “yes” to the
special interrogatory. When reviewing the jury’s answer, however, the trial
court acknowledged the special interrogatory should have asked whether the
jury saw the convicted felon stipulation “during the first phase [of the trial on
the second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder
charges].” The trial court nevertheless concluded: “But, folks, they saw it. It
was also rumpled, which means it had been touched.”
Dixon was thereafter sentenced to concurrent terms of (1) life in prison
as a prison releasee reoffender and under the 10-20-Life statute as to the
second-degree murder count; (2) 30 years in prison as a prison releasee
reoffender and under the 10-20-Life statute as to the two attempted second-
degree murder counts; and (3) 15 years in prison with a three-year minimum
4 mandatory as a habitual felony offender as to the felon in possession of a
firearm count.
At no point did Dixon’s counsel object, move for a new trial based on
what had occurred, or ask that the jury be polled as to whether the stipulation
was considered during its deliberations on phase one of the trial.
This appeal followed.
Analysis
Dixon argues that fundamental error occurred when the jury was given
the stipulation, not in evidence, which advised the jury that he was a
convicted felon.
“Generally, in order to raise an issue on appeal, it must be presented
to the trial court, and the ‘specific legal argument or ground to be argued on
appeal must be part of that presentation.’” Chiu v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
242 So. 3d 461, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (quoting Holland v. Cheney Bros.,
Inc., 22 So. 3d 648, 649-50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)). However, “an unpreserved
error may be reviewed on appeal . . . if it rises to the level of fundamental
error.” Jaimes v. State, 51 So. 3d 445, 448 (Fla. 2010). The question of
whether an error is fundamental is reviewed de novo. State v. Smith, 241 So.
3d 53, 55 (Fla. 2018).
5 Evidence of collateral crimes is normally excluded from evidence for
good reason. “The reason we do not generally let a jury consider prior
offenses is out of fear that the information might improperly persuade the jury
that the defendant likely committed the offense for which he or she is
currently on trial.” Williamson v. State, 894 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. 5th DCA
2005). See also Young v. State, 641 So. 2d 401, 403 n.4 (Fla. 1994) (noting
“the trial court must also protect the defendant’s presumption of innocence
by withholding from the jury any allegations or facts about the alleged prior .
. . offenses”). In fact, the admission of collateral crimes is presumptively
harmful. See, e.g., Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990)
(“Erroneous admission of collateral crimes evidence is presumptively
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed October 1, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-1574 Lower Tribunal No. F21-20128 ________________
Ty-ree Dixon, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carmen Cabarga, Judge.
Rier Jordan, P.A., and Jonathan E. Jordan, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and BOKOR, JJ.
LOGUE, J. Ty-ree Dixon appeals his convictions and sentences for one count of
second-degree murder with a weapon, two counts of attempted second-
degree murder with a weapon, and one count of possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, arising from a drive-by shooting that occurred on January
2, 2021.1 Dixon bases his appeal on the fact that the jury was accidently
provided a document not in evidence indicating Dixon was a convicted felon.
We affirm because no contemporaneous objection or motion for new trial
was made below, and this admittedly grave error does not rise to the level of
being fundamental under the existing standard. In so ruling we do not
foreclosure other remedies that might be available to Dixon.
Background
This appeal arises from a January 2, 2021 drive-by shooting that
resulted in the death of Johnquaveis Davis and gunshot wounds to Ja’cari
Mullins and Troydarius Scott. In connection with the shooting, Dixon was
charged with one count of second-degree murder with a weapon as to Davis,
1 Dixon also appeals his conviction and sentence on a second count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. This additional count for possession was based on law enforcement recovering a firearm at an apartment where Dixon resided when executing a search warrant on May 17, 2021. This May 17, 2021 possession count was severed from the remaining counts and tried separately before a different judge and jury. Finding no reversible error in that proceeding, we affirm without further discussion.
2 two counts of attempted second-degree murder with a weapon as to Mullins
and Scott, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The firearm possession count was bifurcated from the charges for second-
degree murder and attempted second-degree murder but was scheduled to
be tried before the same judge and jury. Thus, in phase one of the trial, the
second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder charges
were tried, and in phase two, the firearm possession was tried.
Prior to the commencement of the bifurcated trial proceeding, Dixon
signed a stipulation intended to be used only in phase two of the trial relating
to the firearm possession charge. The stipulation stated he “had previously
been convicted of a felony.” He agreed to the stipulation to avoid further
evidence of the exact nature of his felony coming into evidence. As this
stipulation pertained only to phase two of the trial, it was never entered into
evidence or read to the jury during phase one of the trial.
Following the close of the evidence in phase one, the jury retired to
deliberate and returned with a guilty verdict on all three charges. After the
jury had reached its verdict, the trial court, the lawyers, and the parties
learned for the first time that the stipulation was accidentally given to the jury
in the jury room so that the jury had access to it when it reached the verdict
convicting Dixon on the second-degree murder and attempted second-
3 degree murder charges. Upon discovering this, the trial court advised it
would add a question to the verdict form submitted to the jury during the
second phase of the trial which asked:
SPECIAL INTERROGATORY
During your deliberations, did any of the jurors see a document called Joint Stipulation which referred to Ty’ree Dixon being a convicted felon.
Neither party objected to the use or wording of the special interrogatory.
The trial court proceeded to the second phase of the trial on the felon
in possession count. The jury found Dixon guilty, and it replied “yes” to the
special interrogatory. When reviewing the jury’s answer, however, the trial
court acknowledged the special interrogatory should have asked whether the
jury saw the convicted felon stipulation “during the first phase [of the trial on
the second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder
charges].” The trial court nevertheless concluded: “But, folks, they saw it. It
was also rumpled, which means it had been touched.”
Dixon was thereafter sentenced to concurrent terms of (1) life in prison
as a prison releasee reoffender and under the 10-20-Life statute as to the
second-degree murder count; (2) 30 years in prison as a prison releasee
reoffender and under the 10-20-Life statute as to the two attempted second-
degree murder counts; and (3) 15 years in prison with a three-year minimum
4 mandatory as a habitual felony offender as to the felon in possession of a
firearm count.
At no point did Dixon’s counsel object, move for a new trial based on
what had occurred, or ask that the jury be polled as to whether the stipulation
was considered during its deliberations on phase one of the trial.
This appeal followed.
Analysis
Dixon argues that fundamental error occurred when the jury was given
the stipulation, not in evidence, which advised the jury that he was a
convicted felon.
“Generally, in order to raise an issue on appeal, it must be presented
to the trial court, and the ‘specific legal argument or ground to be argued on
appeal must be part of that presentation.’” Chiu v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
242 So. 3d 461, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (quoting Holland v. Cheney Bros.,
Inc., 22 So. 3d 648, 649-50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)). However, “an unpreserved
error may be reviewed on appeal . . . if it rises to the level of fundamental
error.” Jaimes v. State, 51 So. 3d 445, 448 (Fla. 2010). The question of
whether an error is fundamental is reviewed de novo. State v. Smith, 241 So.
3d 53, 55 (Fla. 2018).
5 Evidence of collateral crimes is normally excluded from evidence for
good reason. “The reason we do not generally let a jury consider prior
offenses is out of fear that the information might improperly persuade the jury
that the defendant likely committed the offense for which he or she is
currently on trial.” Williamson v. State, 894 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. 5th DCA
2005). See also Young v. State, 641 So. 2d 401, 403 n.4 (Fla. 1994) (noting
“the trial court must also protect the defendant’s presumption of innocence
by withholding from the jury any allegations or facts about the alleged prior .
. . offenses”). In fact, the admission of collateral crimes is presumptively
harmful. See, e.g., Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990)
(“Erroneous admission of collateral crimes evidence is presumptively
harmful.”).
However, “not all harmful error is fundamental.” Reed v. State, 837 So.
2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002). And an appellate court should “exercise its
discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error very guardedly.” Sanford
v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970). “Fundamental error is error that
‘reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of
guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged
error.’” Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 41 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Simpson v.
State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1146 (Fla. 2009)). “[T]o establish fundamental error, it
6 would have to be shown that ‘the error of the trial judge necessarily and
inescapably produced the ultimate jury verdict’ and that the error
‘permeate[d] or saturate[d] the trial’ with ‘basic invalidity.’” Knight v. State,
286 So. 3d 147, 151 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481,
484 (Fla. 1960)).
Turning to the instant case, any unauthorized information that resulted
from the error of placing the stipulation in the jury room did not permeate the
trial. The fact that Dixon was a convicted felon was not featured,
emphasized, argued, or even mentioned at trial. Nor can it be said that “a
verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the
alleged error” in light of the evidence of Dixon’s guilt which, although not
otherwise detailed in this opinion, included a surveillance video of the
shooting; telephone records placing Dixon in the area of the shooting; proof
that the car used in the shooting had been rented by Dixon and contained
bullet casings from the weapons used in the shooting; photographs of Dixon
with the handgun used in the shooting; and various texts and monitored
telephone calls tying him to the shooting, among other evidence.
The two main cases relied upon by Dixon, furthermore, did not address
fundamental error where no objection was made below. In Banos v. State,
521 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), the jury while deliberating was exposed
7 to unauthorized material containing a reference to a severed count. The
defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied. We reversed referring to
the incident as “fundamentally improper.” But in Banos, an objection was
lodged and therefore the question of the existence of fundamental error, as
in the case before us, was not at issue in that case.
In Meixelsperger v. State, 423 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), where
the prosecutor’s trial brief was taken into the jury room and the bailiff
observed at least one juror examining it, the appellate court reversed a
conviction because subjecting the jury to such extraneous influence was
“fundamentally improper.” The opinion, however, did not address whether an
objection had been made below. As such, the opinion cannot be read as
addressing “fundamental error” in the sense at issue here.
Accordingly, because Dixon failed to demonstrate “fundamental error,”
we must affirm.
Affirmed.