Twum-Baah v. State

Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the

Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A1275 Yaw Twum-Baah

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Gwinnett County No. S25A100789

Decided: August 18, 2026

PETERSON, Chief Justice. Yaw Twum-Baah appeals the dismissal of his pretrial habeas petition. Charged with theft by conversion and released on bond, Twum-Baah filed a pretrial habeas petition complaining that he “remains under unconstitutional restraint” notwithstanding his release. Challenging the dismissal of his petition on appeal , Twum-Baah enumerates as error that the judge who presided over his habeas case should have recused herself because she is the same judge presiding over his criminal case. But given that the judge who dismissed the habeas petition is not the judge Twum-Baah argues should have recused herself, and because Twum-Baah’s enumerations of error present no other basis for reversal , we affirm.

It appears that Twum-Baah was arrested in March 2024 in Mississippi, extradited to Georgia, and thereafter released on bond. In April 2025, he was charged by accusation with theft by conversion, apparently over a dispute about an agreement for the sale of a tractor-trailer. He filed a pro se, pretrial habeas petition against the State of Georgia, asserting that, although he has been

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released on bond, he “remains under unconstitutional restraint arising from pretrial rulings, orders, and proceedings in the [] criminal matter.” He described his unconstitutional restraint as “continuing restrictions of bond and exposure to prosecution [.]”The petition lodged complaints about various aspects of his criminal case. In addition to other relief, the petition asked the habeas court to “[i]ssue a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing the State to show cause why Petitioner remains under restraint without probable cause or jurisdiction” and “[o]rder the trial court to conduct a prompt hearing on probable cause.” The State filed an Answer and Motion to Deny Writ of Habeas Corpus, raising various arguments as to why Twum-Baah’s petition lacked merit.

Twum-Baah made repeated efforts to have the habeas case assigned to a judge other than Judge Tracey Mason, the judge presiding over his criminal case. Twum-Baah’s original motion for recusal was premised on the allegation that “[t]he habeas petition raises issues concerning the legality and constitutionality of the Court’s prior decisions in the criminal matter” and “allowing the same judicial officer to preside creates a reasonable concern regarding the appearance of impartiality.” Judge Mason formally rejected all of Twum-Baah’s recusal requests in written orders, giving among other reasons that a judge’s rulings adverse to a party generally are not disqualifying. See Ballard v. State, 321 Ga. 352, 358–59 (2025).

In February 2026, the habeas court held a hearing. A different judge, Judge Kylene Armond, presided over the hearing, stating that she was “just sitting by designation this morning” but “[w]hile I am sitting by designation today, the decision would be mine and mine alone.” At the hearing, Twum-Baah announced that he was “not here to argue about the merits of the case” but

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wanted a judge other than Judge Mason to be assigned to his habeas case. Twum-Baah argued that he could not go forward on the habeas case because it “makes no sense” as long as Judge Mason was involved, as “the same stuff that we’re here to talk about is stuff that she has already denied in motions in a trial court.” He suggested that he would have liked to have subpoenaed or otherwise arranged for certain people to be present for the hearing but could not have asked for Judge Mason’s assistance in that because that would have waived his objection to her involvement. Judge Armond reminded Twum-Baah that he bore the burden to present evidence in support of his petition, noted that he had no evidence in support, and asked why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Twum-Baah stated that he was “not here to participate in anything with a habeas hearing” until a new judge was assigned and “would have evidence when there’s an actual hearing.”

At the close of the hearing, Judge Armond stated that she was required to deny the petition on account of Twum-Baah’s failure to present evidence in support. On February 9, 2026, Judge Armond dismissed (rather than denied) Twum-Baah’s habeas petition on the ground that Twum-Baah “presented no evidence at the hearing and failed to pursue his” petition. After Judge Armond dismissed his habeas petition, Twum-Baah filed one final recusal motion in the habeas case seeking Judge Mason’s recusal; this final motion was denied by Judge Mason, who reiterated that judicial rulings are not themselves a basis for recusal and noted that she had not “presid[ed] over the adjudication of [Twum- Baah]’s habeas petition.”

Twum-Baah appeals from the dismissal order. He filed in this Court an “Emergency Motion for Stay of Trial Court Proceedings ,” apparently seeking to stay proceedings in his criminal case,

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which this Court denied.

Twum-Baah enumerates several errors on appeal. All of those enumerations essentially argue that Judge Mason erred by failing to recuse herself and that therefore “the habeas dismissal and all related rulings must be vacated” as void. The State argues in response that because Twum-Baah declined to support or argue any of his habeas claims at the hearing, the habeas court correctly found that Twum-Baah abandoned his claims and dismissed the petition. Having failed to make any arguments concerning the basis for dismissal, the State argues, Twum-Baah has waived or abandoned any such arguments for purposes of appeal, such that this Court should affirm. The State also argues that Twum-Baah failed to obtain a ruling on the recusal issues that he does raise on appeal, and even if he did preserve those issues, he has failed to show that judicial disqualification was required or violated his rights. In a reply brief, Twum-Baah argues his recusal arguments were preserved. He also argues that his refusal to participate in the habeas hearing did not constitute abandonment of the petition, but “a continued preservation of his structural due-process objection concerning the impartiality of the tribunal.” He also appears to argue that the lack of advance notice that a different judge would preside over the habeas hearing prevented him from a meaningful opportunity to prepare for the hearing, because he believed that requesting assistance on subpoenas and other matters from the challenged judge would effectively waive or undermine his recusal arguments.

We can resolve this appeal without delving into the merits of Twum-Baah’s petition. The habeas court dismissed the petition on the narrow ground that Twum-Baah had failed to present evidence in support of the petition. Twum-Baah does not address that ground at all in his enumerations of error. “Grounds that are

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not attacked as erroneous will not be considered on appeal and are presumed to be binding and correct.” Brown v. Fokes Props. 2002, Inc., 283 Ga. 231, 233 (2008). Although Twum-Baah does attempt to address the ground for dismissal in his reply brief, “[r]eply briefs may not be used to expand the enumeration of errors .” Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 19(3). See also Tarver v. State, 319 Ga. 165, 173 n.8 (2024). It is not clear that dismissal, rather than denial, was the appropriate disposition for failure to establish entitlement to habeas relief. See Plocar v. Foster, 211 Ga. 153, 154 (1954) (no error to deny habeas relief on ground that petitioner did not meet his burden to establish his claim by proof). But Twum-Baah also fails to raise any issue about that.

The State is wrong that Twum-Baah did not preserve his arguments about recusal; he certainly raised, and received multiple rulings on, the question of recusal. But Twum-Baah’s arguments that Judge Mason should have recused herself are irrelevant to the order he is appealing. Twum-Baah’s amended notice of appeal identifies only the February 6, 2026, dismissal order as the order he is appealing. It is true that “an appellant need only include in the notice of appeal the single judgment that entitles the appellant to take an appeal, and an appellate court must review other orders raised on appeal that may affect the proceedings below regardless of whether or not those orders are expressly included in the notice of appeal.” Mateen v. Dixon, 281 Ga. 455, 456 (2006). But here the denial of Twum-Baah’s recusal requests did not affect the proceedings below, because the judge whose recusal he sought was not the judge who dismissed the petition. And the dismissal of the petition means there are no further proceedings for the denial of recusal to affect. The claimed errors that Twum-Baah raises — all of which are about recusal — present no basis for reversal.

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Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating.