Twin Town Homes, Inc. v. Molley
This text of Twin Town Homes, Inc. v. Molley (Twin Town Homes, Inc. v. Molley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-01-298 TWIN TOWN HOMES, INC., DONALD L. GARBRECHT Plaintiffs LAW LIBRARY NO 19 2p
v. ORDER
EDWARDS. MOLLEY & NANCY N. MOLLEY,
Defendants
Before this court is Edward S. Molley and Nancy N. Molley (Defendants)’ Motion to Amend their Counterclaim pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 15(a) as well as Twin Town Homes, Inc. (Plaintiff)’s Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
FACTS
On October 1, 2000, the Defendants d/b/a Carousel Wallpapers signed a contract to purchase a modular building from the Plaintiff. The Defendants intended to use the building as an office and showroom for their wallpaper business. The parties agreed upon a cash purchase price of $75,957.00, including delivery. After constructing the building, the Plaintiff delivered it to Alfred, Maine in January 2001. In turn, the Defendants made a series of payments totaling $68,765.00. On March 9, 2001, the Defendants occupied the building.
On May 23, 2001, the Plaintiffs, seeking the balance of the purchase price, brought suit against the Defendants averring breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, quantum meruit and promissory estoppel. The Defendants counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract, negligence, a violation of 10 M.RS.A. §1401 et seq. (Manufactured Housing Warranties) and 5 M.R.S.A. §206 et seq. (Unfair Trade Practices Act) and a breach of warranty under the previously mentioned statute. On May 24, 2001, this court entered a Scheduling Order stating that “TuJnless otherwise ordered by the court .. . motions to amend
the pleadings may not be filed later than 4 months from the date of this order.”
The court will first address the Defendants’ Motion to Amend their Counterclaim. M.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides that in the current case the Defendants may only amend their Counterclaim by leave of court, which “shall be freely
given when justice so requires.” In particular, the Defendants, who are already
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claiming attorney’s fees, are seeking to amet fees under 10 M.R.S.A. § 1118(4), which states that” [notwithstanding any contrary agreement, the substantially prevailing party in any proceeding to recover any payment within the scope of [the Construction Contracts’] chapter must be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined by the court or arbitrator, together with expenses.” While the Plaintiff argues that the amendment is untimely and good cause has not been shown for the delay, the motion to amend is denied because the statute in question, 10 M.R.S.A. §1111, et al, does not afford Defendants the remedy they seek. The statute operates for the benefit of contractors and subcontractors who do not receive prompt payment under a construction contract. It does not create a reciprocal remedy for a building owner claiming breach against a contractor.
The court will next address the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on the four counts in its Complaint. It should be noted that the granting of summary judgment is no longer an extreme remedy. Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME
158, (7, 784 A.2d 18, 21. Nevertheless, this court must view the evidence ina light most favorable to the Defendants, who are the non-moving party. Id. J6. This court must also consider that “Tw]hen facts or reasonable inferences are in dispute on a material point, summary judgment may not be entered.” Id. [9. At this stage the burden will be on the Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case for each element of its causes of action. Id. 18.
The Plaintiff is essentially seeking the difference between $75,957.00, the agreed upon price for constructing and then delivering a modular building to the Defendants, and $68,765.00, the amount the Defendants actually tendered to the Plaintiff. In other words, the Defendants owe the Plaintiff $7,192.00 amongst
other things. More specifically, the Plaintiff’s complaint alleges
eges two breaches o
contract, a claim for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit and a claim based on promissory estoppel. A breach of contract claim consists of the following elements: (1) a meeting of the minds; (2) consideration, and (3) mutuality of
obligations. See Dom |. Moreau & Son, Inc. v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 378 A.2d 151,
153 (Me. 1977). An unjust enrichment claim consists of the following elements: (1) conferring of a benefit, (2) an appreciation or knowledge of that benefit, and
(3) inequitable retention of the benefit without payment. See Bowden v. Grindle,
675 A.2d 968, 972-73 n.2 (Me. 1996). A claim for quantum meruit consists of the following elements: (1) services rendered, (2) with the recipient knowing about and consenting to the services, and (3) the provider reasonably expecting
payment. Paffhausen v. Balano, 1998 ME 47, 18, 708 A.2d 269, 271 (quoting
Bowden v. Grindle, 651 A.2d 347, 351 (Me. 1994)). A promissory estoppel claim
consists of the following elements: (1) a promisor making a promise that it should reasonably realize will cause the promisee to act or to forbear (2) the promise actually inducing the promisee to act or to forebear (3) an injustice
resulting if the promisor is not bound by its promise. See Struck v. Hackett, 668
A.2d 411, 420 (Me. 1995),
All of the abovementioned causes of action are based on the premise that the Defendants owed something to the Plaintiff. Both parties agree that the Defendants have received a building from the Plaintiff. Similarly, both parties agree that the Plaintiff received $68,765.00 for its efforts. However, the parties disagree as to the extent of the Plaintiff’s efforts to comply with the contract or in the alternative to meet the expectations of the Defendants.
The following examples illustrate some of the disputes pertaining to the contract. The Defendants claim that there was a hole in the first floor for a stairway going down to the basement that was not supposed to be part of the building plan, which the Plaintiff disputes. The Plaintiff claims that the building needed a fire sprinkler system, which the Defendants dispute. The Defendants claim that the Plaintiff broke its promise to fix any defects in the house, which the Plaintiff disputes. When this court considers these matters in a light most favorable to the Defendants, summary judgment is not appropriate.
The court will finally address the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Defendants’ counterclaim. The burden is now on the Defendants to establish a prima facie case for each element in their causes of
action. See Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, 98, 784 A.2d 18, 22. Pursuant to the
above examples, the Defendants have demonstrated that genuine factual
disputes exist on the contract claims. However, the Defendants’ negligence claim
is barred by the economic loss doctrine. See Oceanside at Pine Point PLAINTIFF:
Condominium Owners Ass’n_v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 A.2d 267, 270 n.4 (Me.
1995). Moreover, the Defendants counterclaim for a violation of 10 M.R.5.A. §1401 et seq., which deals with manufactured housing warranties, does not apply to a modular building being used for commercial purposes. The statute defines manufactured housing as having the same meaning set forth in 10 M.R.S.A.
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