Twin Spans Business Park, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedNovember 5, 2021
Docket1:19-cv-00476
StatusUnknown

This text of Twin Spans Business Park, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Company (Twin Spans Business Park, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Twin Spans Business Park, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, (D. Del. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE TWIN SPANS BUSINESS PARK, LLC, ) et al, . ) ) Plaintiffs, ) v. Civil Action No. 19-476-SB-SRF CINCINNATI INSURANCE CO., Defendant. MEMORANDUM ORDER At Wilmington this 5th day of November 2021, the court having considered the Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Michael B. Kinnard (“Mr. Kinnard”) as counsel for Plaintiffs (D.I. 73),' Plaintiffs’ letter submission (D.I. 75) in response to the court’s October 19, 2021 Oral Order, and the parties’ arguments at the November 1, 2021 hearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) The pro hac vice admission of Mr. Kinnard as counsel for Plaintiffs (D.I. 72) is REVOKED for good cause in accordance with D. Del. Local Rule 83.5(c); and (2) Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify (D.I. 73) is GRANTED. 1. Background. Attorney Daniel McAllister (“Mr. McAllister”) moved for the pro hac vice admission of Mr. Kinnard as counsel for Plaintiffs on October 5, 2021, and incorporated in that motion a certification of eligibility by counsel seeking admission. (D.I. 72) The court granted the Motion on October 6, 2021 2 On October 15, 2021, Defendant filed a Motion to Disqualify Mr. Kinnard as counsel for Plaintiffs (D.I. 73) based on both Mr. Kinnard’s

! The briefing for the pending Motion to Disqualify is as follows: Defendant’s Motion and opening brief (D.I. 73), Plaintiffs’ answering brief (D.I. 74), and Defendant’s reply brief (D.I. he court inadvertently granted the motion for the applicant who listed a Delaware business address in the motion and certification.

ineligibility for pro hac vice admission under Local Rule 83.5(c) and violation of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7(a). The parties filed answering and reply briefs on October 17, 2021 and October 25, 2021, respectively. (D.I. 74; D.I. 76) On October 19, 2021, the court ordered Plaintiffs to “submit a letter of no more than four pages explaining why it was not an error to submit a pro hac vice certification that the requirements for admission under Local Rule 83.5(c) were met and that counsel was familiar with this court's Local Rules.” On October 22, 2021, Plaintiffs submitted a letter in response. (D.I. 75) The court held a hearing on November 1, 2021 to hear argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion for pro hac vice admission (D.I. 72) and Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Mr. Kinnard as counsel for Plaintiffs (D.I. 73). 2. Pro Hac Vice Admission Legal Standard. D. Del. Local Rule 83.5(c) states: Admission Pro Hac Vice. Attorneys admitted, practicing, and in good standing in another jurisdiction, who are not admitted to practice by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, may be admitted pro hac vice to the Bar of this Court in the discretion of the Court, such admission to be at the pleasure of the Court. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, or authorized by the Constitution of the United States or acts of Congress, an applicant is not eligible for permission to practice pro hac vice if the applicant: (1) Resides in Delaware; or (2) Is regularly employed in Delaware; or (3) Is regularly engaged in business, professional, or other similar activities in Delaware. Any judge of the Court may revoke, upon hearing after notice and for good cause, a pro hac vice admission. D. Del. LR 83.5(c) (emphasis added).

The Third Circuit has held that, although a full scale hearing is not required in every case, “some type of notice and an opportunity to respond are necessary when a district court seeks to revoke an attorney’s pro hac vice status.” Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 1980). In addition, the Third Circuit has noted that “[a]t a minimum, a violation of any disciplinary standard applicable to members of the bar of the court would justify revocation of pro hac vice status.” /d. at 304. 3. Pro Hac Vice Analysis. Local Rule 83.5(c) allows the court to exercise its discretion in revoking pro hac vice admission for good cause. See D. Del. LR 83.5(c). Here, good cause exists to correct the mistake that the applicant, Mr. Kinnard, was not eligible for pro hac vice admission because he is regularly employed in Delaware and has a Delaware business address. In both the October 19, 2021 Oral Order and November 1, 2021 hearing, the court provided the applicant and moving counsel an opportunity to explain why they submitted a pro hac vice application with a Delaware business address. The only explanation Plaintiffs offered was that the “{uJjnless otherwise ordered by the court” language in Local Rule 83.5(c) should be broadly construed to allow the court to override the express ineligibility criteria. (See D.I. 75 at 2) However, no legal authority exists for Plaintiffs’ position nor did they show in the pro hac vice motion, certification, or at the hearing, any substantive basis for the court to suspend application of the criteria and admit Mr. Kinnard despite his ineligibility under Local Rule 83.5(c)(2). Therefore, good cause exists to revoke the pro hac vice admission. 4, “Lawyer As Witness” Legal Standard. Assuming, arguendo, that the pro hac vice admission was not improvidently granted by the court, good cause exists independently to disqualify Mr. Kinnard under the “lawyer as a witness” prohibition in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.7(a). “The Court has the inherent authority to supervise the

professional conduct of attorneys appearing before it, including the power to disqualify an attorney from representation.” Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 13- 239-LPS, 2017 WL 3573812, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 17, 2017) (citing United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980)). However, “[m]otions to disqualify are ‘generally disfavored’ and, therefore, require the moving party to show clearly that ‘continued representation would be impermissible.’” /d. (quoting Talecris Biotherapeutics, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (D. Del. 2007)). Whether to disqualify counsel is a fact-intensive inquiry that demands consideration of the facts of the case as well as the nature and stage of the litigation. See id. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association, which apply to attorneys admitted to this court per Local Rule 83.6(d), including attorneys admitted on motion, guide the court in supervising the professional conduct of attorneys authorized or admitted to practice before the court. See D. Del. LR 83.6(d). Applicable here is Model Rule 3.7(a), which states in relevant part: A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (2020). Thus, if the attorney is “likely to be a necessary witness,” he may not act as an advocate unless one of the three listed exceptions are met. 5. “Lawyer As Witness” Analysis. Defendant maintains that it intends to call Mr. Kinnard as a witness because he was involved in the day-to-day events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. (D.I. 76 at 3-4) Defendant also maintains that Mr. Kinnard’s role as trial counsel in a matter concerning events to which he was also a witness will confuse the jury in violation of

Model Rule 3.7(a). (/d. at 4-5) In response, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Kinnard does not offer, and Defendant does not point to, any unique factual testimony that other witnesses did not offer.° (D.I. 74 at ff 4, 16-22, 25) 6. Mr.

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Related

United States v. Miller, William G.
624 F.2d 1198 (Third Circuit, 1980)
Johnson v. Trueblood
629 F.2d 302 (Third Circuit, 1980)

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Twin Spans Business Park, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/twin-spans-business-park-llc-v-cincinnati-insurance-company-ded-2021.