Twin City Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Dreger

199 F.2d 197, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 3310
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedOctober 23, 1952
Docket14606_1
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 199 F.2d 197 (Twin City Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Dreger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Twin City Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Dreger, 199 F.2d 197, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 3310 (8th Cir. 1952).

Opinion

THOMAS, Circuit Judge,

The appellees, plaintiffs in the trial court, reside at the City of Tomahawk, Wisconsin, *198 where they are engaged in the business of manufacturing row boats, motor boats and skiffs. The appellant, defendant, is a Minnesota corporation. Its principal place of business is located in the City of St. Paul, Minnesota, where it is engaged in the business of drying lumber for others for compensation. Jurisdiction of the federal court is predicated upon diversity of citizenship and the- amount involved, namely, a claim for damages in the sum of $7057.22.

The complaint alleged that in May, 1950, plaintiffs entered into a contract with the defendant by the terms of which they delivered on May 26, 1950, to defendant at its plant a carload of Western Cedar lumber which defendant agreed to dry to a 14% of moisture contents and to dry and process the lumber so that it would be suitable and fit for use in their business. It is then alleged that the defendant in the process of drying failed to exercise the ordinary care required for that purpose, and that by its negligence, carelessness and want of ordinary care the lumber was burned, charred and collapsed so that it was entirely worthless, to plaintiffs’ damage in the amount of $7057 22

_ r ... , So far as material on this appeal the de- . . ^ .. , ,. , fendant admits that it entered into a con- , , , , . , - , , x tract to kiln dry a carload of lumber for , -1 1, , • ., • ... plamtiffs; and it alleged m its answer that f . „ ’ , . . r ,, it fully performed all the terms of the contract, and denied liability for any damages.

The case was tried to the court and jury, and a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiffs for $6,700 upon which the judgment was entered from which this appeal was taken

The defendant contends here that

1. The court erred in denying its separate motions:

(a) for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence; (b) for a directed verdiet at the close of all the evidence; (c) for judgment notwithstanding the verdict;

2. In giving a certain instruction; and

3. In denying its motion for a new trial,

In considering these questions we must be governed by the substantive law of the state of Minnesota, where the contract was made and executed and where the court tried the case. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188. But procedural questions are governed by the federal law applicable.

These contentions present in brief- but twQ questions: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to S!ipport a verdict and judgment for thg plaintiffs> and (2) the objection to the courfs instruction on the burden of proof

The first contention requires this court to review the evidence for the purpose °f determining whether or not there was substantial evidence to go to the jury on the issues presented as a matter of law, or whether all reasonable men must reach the conclusion that there was not such evidence, “Issues that dePend 011 the credibility of witnesses, and the effect or weight of evidence, are to be decided by the jury. And in determining a motion of either party for a peremptory instruction, the court assumes that the evidence for the opposing party P^ves all that it reasonably may be found sufficient to establish, and that from such facts there should be drawn in favor of the latter all the inferences that fairly are de- . , _ . „ „ . J „ , ducible from them. Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94, 50 S.Ct. 231, 233, 74 L.Ed. 720; Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Williamson, 8 Cir., 191 F.2d 887; Stephenson v. Steinhauer, 8 Cir., 188 F.2d 432; Danaher v. United States, 8 Cir., 184 F.2d 673.

its plant and place of business in St. Paul toe defendant buys, stores and sells hardwood lumber. It has a complete plan-an<^ operates custom dry kilns where it dries lumber for other people. It Fas £our modern dry kjins 0f tbe box or room type. Lumber to be dried is so placed in one of the large rooms that air heated to any desired temperature can be forced through the stack of lumber by large fans driven by electric power. Thermometers are located in the room to indicate both the temperature and the humidity of the air passing through. An operator is or should £n charge aq times to observe and regulate the temperature and the humidity,

A schedule for regulating the. heat and humidity is adopted for drying each pa-r *199 ticular type of lumber to be dried, depending upon the kind of wood, such as oak, pine, cedar, etc., and the degree of dampness to be removed. Some woods may be dried in a few days whereas others may require a few weeks. Cedar and oak require longer treatment than most woods.

The carload of lumber involved in this controversy was purchased by the plaintiffs from Don B. Wallace on May 13, 1950. It consisted of 24,900 feet of green red cedar lumber shipped from the west coast. It was worth $215 a thousand feet. The frieght bill paid by plaintiffs was $1591.89. The car first stopped at the city of Tomahawk before it was kiln dried. The plaintiffs opened the car on both sides and examined the lumber and found that it was green and should be dried. The car of lumber was then sent to the defendant at St. Paul for drying. On May 17, 1950, Mr. Wallace wrote the defendant a letter saying, * * * we want this car carefully and evenly dried to approximately 14% moisture content,” with instructions to send it when dried to the plaintiffs at Tomahawk, Wis-TT • 1 • t> i i consin. Upon arrival in St. Paul the de- , , t , , .. . , . ... , .. fendant placed it m a drying kiln where it 1 It m j x, , . , ., was kept for 22 days after which it was , . , , . , ,, . . . .T, , , shipped back to the plaintiffs at Tomahawk. • ., , -1 ., , , , While m the kiln the atmosphere was kept . . , • , ,, c , . e, at a temperature ranging from 115 up to 154 , degrees.

Upon its return to Tomahawk the car was opened by plaintiff Winter who testified that he found it entirely worthless. He testified that “We picked out some of it that looked like it might be usable. We ran it through our mill room and it was so hard and brittle that when it came out of that machinery it fell apart. You would take it and attempt to bend it the life was gone. It just broke as it came out of the machine. We couldn’t use it for anything.” Three samples of the lumber were introduced in evidence. They were apparently worthless. Winter testified: “My opinion is the condition existing in these exhibits was caused by improper kiln drying. * * * It is just something that happened in the kiln.” He further testified that “The exhibits are fairly representative of * * * 20,000 feet” of the lumber that came out of the car and that about 5,000 feet was damaged to a lesser degree.

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Bluebook (online)
199 F.2d 197, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 3310, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/twin-city-hardwood-lumber-co-v-dreger-ca8-1952.