Tway v. Commissioner

1993 T.C. Memo. 212, 65 T.C.M. 2655, 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 212
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMay 17, 1993
DocketDocket No. 4767-87
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1993 T.C. Memo. 212 (Tway v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tway v. Commissioner, 1993 T.C. Memo. 212, 65 T.C.M. 2655, 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 212 (tax 1993).

Opinion

JACK C. AND PHYLLIS TWAY, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Tway v. Commissioner
Docket No. 4767-87
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1993-212; 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 212; 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2655;
May 17, 1993, Filed; As Corrected May 18, 1993
*212 For petitioners: Eugene Chester and James H. Kenworthy.
For respondent: Osmun R. Latrobe.
WHALEN

WHALEN

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

WHALEN, Judge: Respondent determined the following deficiencies in petitioners' Federal income taxes:

Tax Year EndedDeficiency
December 31, 1979$ 393,009.06
December 31, 198025,043.13

The principal issue for decision is whether the pre-1981 losses realized by petitioners from certain transactions involving silver futures straddles are deductible under section 165. Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as in effect for the years in issue. This issue turns on whether the straddle transactions at issue are "transactions entered into for profit though not connected with a trade or business" within the meaning of section 108 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 630, as amended by section 1808(d) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2817 (herein referred to as DEFRA section 108).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Stipulation of Facts and Supplemental Stipulation of Facts filed by the parties and the exhibits attached thereto are incorporated herein*213 by this reference. Petitioners resided in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, when they filed the petition which commenced this case. Throughout this opinion we refer to Mr. Jack C. Tway as petitioner.

Petitioner is a college graduate with a degree in history. During the years in issue, he was president of R. Tway, Inc., a large highway contractor doing business in Oklahoma and in neighboring States. He was also a partner in Tway Construction Co., a partnership which was doing business as a highway contractor, and he served on the board of directors of Liberty National Bank of Oklahoma City.

Petitioner is a knowledgeable and sophisticated businessman who engages in the purchase and sale of commodity futures contracts. A commodity futures contract is an agreement to deliver or receive a specified quantity and grade of a commodity during a designated future month. A person who buys a commodity futures contract undertakes to receive, and pay for, the underlying commodity in the month specified. This is sometimes referred to as a "long" position. A person who sells a futures contract undertakes to deliver the commodity in the designated month. This is sometimes referred to as a "short" *214 position.

A single position calling for the purchase or sale of a designated commodity is described as an "open contract". Every futures position is matched by an exactly opposite position (or series of positions) held by one or more other persons. Thus, a price movement creating a gain or loss as to an open position (long or short) will produce an equal but opposite gain or loss to the other side of that position (short or long).

The holder of a futures contract may, and usually does, avoid the obligation to deliver or receive the commodity in the future month specified in the contract by purchasing or selling an offsetting futures contract. Thus, for example, a person whose futures contract obliges him to deliver a certain quantity of silver in the next April need not make that delivery if, before delivery is due, he acquires a contract to receive the same amount of silver in April. When a trader enters into an offsetting futures contract, he usually realizes a gain or loss, in the amount of the difference between the price of the commodity underlying each of the offsetting contracts.

In general, a long position will increase in value during a time of rising prices. When*215 prices are rising, the trader's right to purchase the commodity at the lower price becomes more valuable. Rising prices have the opposite effect upon a short position. The holder's obligation to deliver the commodity at the earlier lower price diminishes in value as the price of that commodity rises.

The reverse is true for falling prices. In that situation, a trader's obligation to purchase the commodity at the earlier higher price, a long position, loses value as the price of the commodity drops. Falling prices help a short position, however. The contract right to sell the commodity at the prior higher price gains in value as the price of the underlying commodity drops.

For many years prior to 1979, petitioner had actively traded commodity futures for his own account. Respondent's post-trial brief refers to petitioner as the "rarest of all commodities, a successful commodity futures trader". Prior to 1979, petitioner traded agricultural commodities such as pork bellies, live hogs, soybeans, wheat, and cocoa. He generally entered into a futures contract and allowed it to remain open for only a short period of time before closing the contract to realize a profit or minimize*216 a loss.

During the years at issue, petitioner traded through Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, now known as Prudential Bache (hereinafter Bache) and Conti-Commodity, Inc. Petitioner always used nondiscretionary accounts with his brokers -- that is, petitioner made his own investment decisions.

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Bluebook (online)
1993 T.C. Memo. 212, 65 T.C.M. 2655, 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tway-v-commissioner-tax-1993.