Rel: March 20, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0674 and CL-2025-0675 _________________________
T.W.
v.
Morgan County Department of Human Resources
Appeals from Morgan Juvenile Court (JU-22-1032.02 and JU-22-1034.02)
BOWDEN, Judge.
T.W. ("the mother") appeals from judgments of the Morgan Juvenile
Court ("the juvenile court") terminating her parental rights to R.L.W. and
L.N.W. ("the children"). The judgments also terminated the parental
rights of R.W. ("the father"). The father has not appealed. CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
The mother argues on appeal that the juvenile court exceeded its
discretion by denying her motion to continue the June 25, 2025,
termination-of-parental-rights trial and that there was insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that there are no viable
alternatives to the termination of her parental rights. However, we need
not reach the merits of the mother's arguments; the record does not
contain sufficient evidence from which this court can determine whether
the juvenile court acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over the
underlying actions under Alabama's version of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), codified at
Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq. Therefore, we reverse the judgments
of the juvenile court and remand the causes for the juvenile court to
determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction under Alabama's
version of the UCCJEA.
Background
The children were born in Indiana.1 The children lived there with
the mother until an Indiana court awarded custody of the children to the
father on January 28, 2021. A copy of that judgment is not included in
1R.L.W. was born on September 1, 2015. L.N.W. was born on August
12, 2016. 2 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
the record. The children thereafter moved to Alabama with the father,
but the mother continued to live in Indiana.
Testimony indicated that an Indiana court had ordered phone
visitation between the mother and the children in March 2021. A copy of
that judgment is not included in the record.
The father testified that the mother had not physically been in the
children's presence since the Indiana court entered the January 28, 2021,
judgment awarding him custody of the children. The father also testified
that the mother had not spoken to the children since February 2022. The
father testified that he had been unable to facilitate the mother's phone
visitation with the children because of his work schedule. The father also
testified that the mother did not call him and did not answer when he
tried calling her.
In August 2022, the Morgan County Department of Human
Resources ("DHR") received a report that the children were living in
deplorable conditions. At that time, the father and the children were
living in Decatur with K.C. (the father's then-paramour), three other
children, K.C.'s stepmother, K.C.'s stepmother's boyfriend, and K.C.'s
grandmother. The children remained in the home while DHR provided
3 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
in-home services to the father and K.C. The children were placed in the
custody and care of DHR on June 9, 2023, following a shelter-care
hearing.
DHR filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother
and the father on August 12, 2024.2 DHR alleged in its petition that the
mother's current address was unknown and that it had had no contact
with the mother since becoming involved with the children in August
2022.
Around September 2024, the father sent the mother a picture of
R.L.W. that had been posted on the social-media site Facebook. The
picture had the name of the children's foster mother. The mother
contacted the foster mother who in turn directed the mother to contact
DHR. Up to that point, DHR had been unable to locate the mother based
on the records that it had obtained from Indiana, and the father had
previously told DHR that he did not know how to find the mother. One of
DHR's caseworkers testified that the mother had told her that the mother
2The record reflects that the same petition and documents filed in
the matter regarding R.L.W. were filed in the separate matter regarding L.N.W. For simplicity, we refer to the same documents filed in the respective matters in the singular tense when practicable.
4 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
did not know that the children had been removed from the father's
custody and wanted to reestablish phone visitation with the children.
On June 18, 2025, the mother filed a motion to continue the
termination-of-parental-rights trial that had been reset for June 25,
2025. DHR objected to the mother's motion to continue. The juvenile
court entered an order on June 24, 2025, denying the mother's motion.
The next day, June 25, 2025, the juvenile court held the
termination-of-parental-rights trial. The mother did not appear but was
represented by appointed counsel. The juvenile court noted at the outset
of the trial that the trial had been continued on multiple occasions and
that "[the mother]'s reasoning in her motion [to continue] was that she
didn't have a ride down here [from Indiana], and I just feel like it needs
to be more substantial than that." The mother's appointed counsel
renewed the motion to continue after DHR rested its case. The juvenile
court denied the mother's renewed motion to continue and allowed the
trial to proceed.
On July 31, 2025, the juvenile court entered judgments terminating
the parental rights of the mother and the father. The mother filed a
timely postjudgment "motion for new trial" on August 12, 2025. The
5 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
juvenile court entered an order on August 25, 2025, denying the mother's
postjudgment motion. The mother timely filed a notice of appeal from the
judgments to this court.3
Analysis
Although neither the mother nor DHR have addressed whether the
juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate the mother's
parental rights, " ' " '[defects in] subject-matter jurisdiction may not be
waived; a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction … may even be raised
by a court ex mero motu.' " ' " M.A.B. v. D.S., 364 So. 3d 994, 996 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2022) (quoting C.H. v. Lamar Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 324 So. 3d
391, 394 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), quoting in turn J.T. v. A.C., 892 So. 2d
928, 931 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), quoting in turn C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So.
2d 451, 453 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)). Furthermore, this court may not
3The mother filed a notice of appeal to this court on August 21, 2025,
or 21 days after the juvenile court entered the judgments. However, under Rule 4(a), Ala. R. App.
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Rel: March 20, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0674 and CL-2025-0675 _________________________
T.W.
v.
Morgan County Department of Human Resources
Appeals from Morgan Juvenile Court (JU-22-1032.02 and JU-22-1034.02)
BOWDEN, Judge.
T.W. ("the mother") appeals from judgments of the Morgan Juvenile
Court ("the juvenile court") terminating her parental rights to R.L.W. and
L.N.W. ("the children"). The judgments also terminated the parental
rights of R.W. ("the father"). The father has not appealed. CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
The mother argues on appeal that the juvenile court exceeded its
discretion by denying her motion to continue the June 25, 2025,
termination-of-parental-rights trial and that there was insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that there are no viable
alternatives to the termination of her parental rights. However, we need
not reach the merits of the mother's arguments; the record does not
contain sufficient evidence from which this court can determine whether
the juvenile court acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over the
underlying actions under Alabama's version of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), codified at
Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq. Therefore, we reverse the judgments
of the juvenile court and remand the causes for the juvenile court to
determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction under Alabama's
version of the UCCJEA.
Background
The children were born in Indiana.1 The children lived there with
the mother until an Indiana court awarded custody of the children to the
father on January 28, 2021. A copy of that judgment is not included in
1R.L.W. was born on September 1, 2015. L.N.W. was born on August
12, 2016. 2 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
the record. The children thereafter moved to Alabama with the father,
but the mother continued to live in Indiana.
Testimony indicated that an Indiana court had ordered phone
visitation between the mother and the children in March 2021. A copy of
that judgment is not included in the record.
The father testified that the mother had not physically been in the
children's presence since the Indiana court entered the January 28, 2021,
judgment awarding him custody of the children. The father also testified
that the mother had not spoken to the children since February 2022. The
father testified that he had been unable to facilitate the mother's phone
visitation with the children because of his work schedule. The father also
testified that the mother did not call him and did not answer when he
tried calling her.
In August 2022, the Morgan County Department of Human
Resources ("DHR") received a report that the children were living in
deplorable conditions. At that time, the father and the children were
living in Decatur with K.C. (the father's then-paramour), three other
children, K.C.'s stepmother, K.C.'s stepmother's boyfriend, and K.C.'s
grandmother. The children remained in the home while DHR provided
3 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
in-home services to the father and K.C. The children were placed in the
custody and care of DHR on June 9, 2023, following a shelter-care
hearing.
DHR filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother
and the father on August 12, 2024.2 DHR alleged in its petition that the
mother's current address was unknown and that it had had no contact
with the mother since becoming involved with the children in August
2022.
Around September 2024, the father sent the mother a picture of
R.L.W. that had been posted on the social-media site Facebook. The
picture had the name of the children's foster mother. The mother
contacted the foster mother who in turn directed the mother to contact
DHR. Up to that point, DHR had been unable to locate the mother based
on the records that it had obtained from Indiana, and the father had
previously told DHR that he did not know how to find the mother. One of
DHR's caseworkers testified that the mother had told her that the mother
2The record reflects that the same petition and documents filed in
the matter regarding R.L.W. were filed in the separate matter regarding L.N.W. For simplicity, we refer to the same documents filed in the respective matters in the singular tense when practicable.
4 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
did not know that the children had been removed from the father's
custody and wanted to reestablish phone visitation with the children.
On June 18, 2025, the mother filed a motion to continue the
termination-of-parental-rights trial that had been reset for June 25,
2025. DHR objected to the mother's motion to continue. The juvenile
court entered an order on June 24, 2025, denying the mother's motion.
The next day, June 25, 2025, the juvenile court held the
termination-of-parental-rights trial. The mother did not appear but was
represented by appointed counsel. The juvenile court noted at the outset
of the trial that the trial had been continued on multiple occasions and
that "[the mother]'s reasoning in her motion [to continue] was that she
didn't have a ride down here [from Indiana], and I just feel like it needs
to be more substantial than that." The mother's appointed counsel
renewed the motion to continue after DHR rested its case. The juvenile
court denied the mother's renewed motion to continue and allowed the
trial to proceed.
On July 31, 2025, the juvenile court entered judgments terminating
the parental rights of the mother and the father. The mother filed a
timely postjudgment "motion for new trial" on August 12, 2025. The
5 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
juvenile court entered an order on August 25, 2025, denying the mother's
postjudgment motion. The mother timely filed a notice of appeal from the
judgments to this court.3
Analysis
Although neither the mother nor DHR have addressed whether the
juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate the mother's
parental rights, " ' " '[defects in] subject-matter jurisdiction may not be
waived; a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction … may even be raised
by a court ex mero motu.' " ' " M.A.B. v. D.S., 364 So. 3d 994, 996 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2022) (quoting C.H. v. Lamar Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 324 So. 3d
391, 394 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), quoting in turn J.T. v. A.C., 892 So. 2d
928, 931 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), quoting in turn C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So.
2d 451, 453 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)). Furthermore, this court may not
3The mother filed a notice of appeal to this court on August 21, 2025,
or 21 days after the juvenile court entered the judgments. However, under Rule 4(a), Ala. R. App. P., the mother's postjudgment motion, which had been timely filed on August 12, 2025, suspended the 14-day period within which she was required to file a notice of appeal of the judgments.
The mother's notice of appeal was held in abeyance while her postjudgment motion was pending and became effective on August 25, 2025, when the juvenile court entered an order denying her postjudgment motion. Rule 4(a)(5). 6 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
presume that a statutorily created court of limited jurisdiction, such as
the juvenile court, has subject-matter jurisdiction over a matter. Id.
Our trial courts are required to recognize and enforce an out-of-
state court's child-custody determination if that out-of-state court has
exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with Alabama's version
of the UCCJEA. Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-303(a); but see M.A.B., 364 So.
3d at 998-99 (recognizing and applying Texas's version of the UCCJEA
to determine whether a Texas court had made a child-custody
determination and had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
determination). Thus, if an Indiana court has made a child-custody
determination regarding the children in substantial conformity with
Alabama's version of the UCCJEA, the Indiana court has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over the determination, see Ala. Code 1975, § 30-
3B-202, and the juvenile court may terminate the mother's parental
rights only if it has subject-matter jurisdiction under Ala. Code 1975, §
30-3B-203, to modify the Indiana court's child-custody determination.
M.A.B., 364 So. 3d at 998-99 ("[T]he juvenile court could properly modify
the Texas judgment, i.e., rule on the petitioners' petition to terminate
7 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
parental rights, only pursuant to the requirements [of] § 30-3B-203[, Ala.
Code 1975,] of Alabama's version of the UCCJEA.").
Alabama's version of the UCCJEA defines the term "child custody
determination" as "[a] judgment, decree, or other order of a court
providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with
respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and
modification order." Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-102(3). The evidence in the
record indicates that an Indiana court entered a judgment on January
28, 2021, awarding custody of the children to the father. The evidence in
the record also indicates that an Indiana court entered a judgment in
March 2021, awarding phone visitation with the children to the mother.
If the January 28, 2021, and March 2021 judgments of the Indiana
court constitute a child-custody determination under Alabama's version
of the UCCJEA, the juvenile court could have properly terminated the
mother's parental rights only if it had subject-matter jurisdiction to
modify the Indiana court's determination under § 30-3B-203.4 Under §
4We recognize that the juvenile court may have intended to exercise
temporary emergency jurisdiction over the matters pursuant to § 30-3B- 204, Ala. Code 1975. Alabama's version of the UCCJEA provides for temporary emergency jurisdiction if a child is present in Alabama and has been abandoned or there is an emergent situation that necessitates protecting the child from mistreatment or abuse. § 30-3B-204(a). 8 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
30-3B-203, the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to modify
the Indiana court's determination only if:
(1) the juvenile court had jurisdiction to make an initial child-
custody determination under Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-201; and
(2) either:
(a) the Indiana court has determined that:
However, the judgments of the juvenile court were not temporary orders that complied with the requirements of § 30-3B-204. The judgments did not specify an amount of time for DHR to obtain an order regarding the child-custody determination from the Indiana court. § 30-3B-204(c). Nor is there any evidence in the record indicating that the juvenile court "immediately communicate[d]" with the Indiana court upon being informed that the Indiana court had made a child-custody determination regarding the children. § 30-3B-204(d). Moreover, Alabama's version of the UCCJEA does not permit a child-custody determination made under temporary emergency jurisdiction to become final when a determination has been made by another state. § 30-3B-204(b). See M.W. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 369 So. 3d 164, 167 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (" 'Unlike a judgment divesting a parent of custody, a judgment terminating parental rights is immediate, permanent, and irrevocable.' " (citation omitted)). Thus, if the juvenile court intended to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over the matters, it lacked jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204 to enter the judgments terminating the mother's parental rights. See T.R. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 419 So. 3d 558, 564 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (dismissing appeal with instructions for the juvenile court to vacate its judgment awarding permanent custody of a minor child and to revise its earlier orders to a definite and appropriate period for the father to obtain an order from a Florida court that had made a previous child-custody determination because the juvenile court had failed to comply with the procedures set forth in § 30-3B-204 when it entered its judgment). 9 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
(i) it no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
under § 30-3B-202, or
(ii) Alabama would be a more convenient forum under
Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-207; or
(b) the juvenile court or the Indiana court has determined that
the children, the father, and the mother do not presently live
in Indiana.
See § 30-3B-203.
It appears that the January 28, 2021, and March 2021 orders of the
Indiana court constitute a child-custody determination under Alabama's
version of the UCCJEA. Accordingly, the juvenile court could have
properly terminated the mother's parental rights only if it had subject-
matter jurisdiction to modify the Indiana court's child-custody
determination pursuant to § 30-3B-203. Under the particular
circumstances of these matters, the juvenile court could have acquired
subject-matter jurisdiction under § 30-3B-203 only if the Indiana court
had determined that it either no longer has continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over the determination or that Alabama would be a more
10 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
convenient forum for the determination.5 However, there is no evidence
indicating that that the Indiana court has ever made either of those
determinations. Therefore, based on the evidence in the record, we
cannot ascertain whether the juvenile court properly terminated the
mother's parental rights. We conclude that there is insufficient evidence
to establish that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to
modify the Indiana court's child-custody determination regarding the
children by terminating the mother's parental rights.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the juvenile
court and remand the causes to the juvenile court to determine, based on
the receipt of additional evidence, if necessary, whether it has subject-
matter jurisdiction to modify the Indiana court's child-custody
determination by terminating the mother's parental rights pursuant to §
30-3B-203. M.A.B., 364 So. 3d at 999. If the juvenile court determines
that it does not have jurisdiction to modify the Indiana court's child-
5The juvenile court could have also acquired subject-matter jurisdiction under Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-203, if it had determined that the children, the father, and the mother do not presently live in Indiana. However, we note that there is significant, undisputed evidence in the record indicating that the mother presently lives in Indiana. 11 CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675
custody determination pursuant to § 30-3B-203, we direct the juvenile
court to dismiss the matters.
CL-2025-0674 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2025-0675 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.