Tuttle v. Harris

Supreme Court

Tuttle v. Harris

297 U.S. 225, 56 S. Ct. 416, 80 L. Ed. 654, 1936 U.S. LEXIS 1028

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedFebruary 3, 1936

Docket428

StatusPublished

Cited by19 cases

This text of 297 U.S. 225 (Tuttle v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tuttle v. Harris, 297 U.S. 225, 56 S. Ct. 416, 80 L. Ed. 654, 1936 U.S. LEXIS 1028 (1936).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice Cardozo

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The controversy here, as in Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, decided at the same time, ante, p. 216, is one as to the meaning of the words “equity receiverships” in the statute for the reorganization of debtor corporations. Bankruptcy Act, § 77 B (a); 11 U. S. C., § 207 (a).

A mortgagee brought suit against Granada Hotel Corporation in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, to foreclose a second mortgage upon real property of the corporation located in that state. A receiver was appointed to collect the rents and profits. Thereafter a-prior mortgagee, the trustee under a deed of trust' to *226 secure an issue of bonds, brought suit to foreclose the prior mortgage, and in accordance with the law of Illinois laid claim to the possession of the property as owner after condition broken. In response to.,that claim the state-court made an order discharging the receiver, and directing that the prior mortgagee be let into possession.

While possession was so hele], respondents brought a proceeding under Bankruptcy -Act, § 77 B, contending that the possession of the mortgagee was that of an equity receiver or' at least equivalent thereto. The District Court upheld that contention, denying a motion by petitioners, who had intervened in the proceeding, to dismiss the application, 9 F. Supp. 909; and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 78 F. (2d) 409. A writ of certiorari issued from this court.

An equity receivership within the meaning of the statute does not result from the appointment of a receiver for the .collection of the rents in a suit to foreclose a mortgage. Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, supra. But here there was no receiver either for the collection of rents or for any other purpose. A mortgagee after.condition broken under the law of Illinois is the owner of a legal estate, and as such entitled as of right to the possession of-the mortgaged premises. Wolkenstein v. Slonim, 355 Ill. 306; 189 N. E. 312. The grantee under the deed .of trust was in possession not as receiver, but as owner.

The decree should be reversed, and it is so ordered.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Van Devanter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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Mr. Justice Cardozo

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The controversy here, as in Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, decided at the same time, ante, p. 216, is one as to the meaning of the words “equity receiverships” in the statute for the reorganization of debtor corporations. Bankruptcy Act, § 77 B (a); 11 U. S. C., § 207 (a).

A mortgagee brought suit against Granada Hotel Corporation in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, to foreclose a second mortgage upon real property of the corporation located in that state. A receiver was appointed to collect the rents and profits. Thereafter a-prior mortgagee, the trustee under a deed of trust' to *226 secure an issue of bonds, brought suit to foreclose the prior mortgage, and in accordance with the law of Illinois laid claim to the possession of the property as owner after condition broken. In response to.,that claim the state-court made an order discharging the receiver, and directing that the prior mortgagee be let into possession.

While possession was so hele], respondents brought a proceeding under Bankruptcy -Act, § 77 B, contending that the possession of the mortgagee was that of an equity receiver or' at least equivalent thereto. The District Court upheld that contention, denying a motion by petitioners, who had intervened in the proceeding, to dismiss the application, 9 F. Supp. 909; and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 78 F. (2d) 409. A writ of certiorari issued from this court.

An equity receivership within the meaning of the statute does not result from the appointment of a receiver for the .collection of the rents in a suit to foreclose a mortgage. Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, supra. But here there was no receiver either for the collection of rents or for any other purpose. A mortgagee after.condition broken under the law of Illinois is the owner of a legal estate, and as such entitled as of right to the possession of-the mortgaged premises. Wolkenstein v. Slonim, 355 Ill. 306; 189 N. E. 312. The grantee under the deed .of trust was in possession not as receiver, but as owner.

The decree should be reversed, and it is so ordered.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Van Devanter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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297 U.S. 225, 56 S. Ct. 416, 80 L. Ed. 654, 1936 U.S. LEXIS 1028, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tuttle-v-harris-scotus-1936.

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