Turoka Hudson v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 27, 2026
DocketAT-3443-24-0537-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Turoka Hudson v. Department of the Army (Turoka Hudson v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turoka Hudson v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TUROKA BELL HUDSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-3443-24-0537-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: May 27, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jean Hansen , Fort Novosel, Alabama, for the appellant.

Kristine Hale Bell , Esquire, Fort Eustis, Virginia, for the agency.

Christopher Mark Kaminski , Esquire, Fort Rucker, Alabama, for the agency.

David V. Natvig , Esquire, Fort Novosel, Alabama, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her employment practices appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On petition for review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge did not consider as

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

an employment practice the agency’s failure to consider whether the selectee met time in grade requirements, the agency committed harmful error, and she is entitled to a hearing. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to address the appellant’s assertion regarding time in grade requirements, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW An applicant for employment who believes that an employment practice applied to her by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) violates a basic requirement in 5 C.F.R. § 300.103 is entitled to appeal to the Board. Sauser v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶ 6 (2010); 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a). The Board has jurisdiction over an employment practices appeal when two conditions are met: (1) the appeal must concern an employment practice that OPM is involved in administering 2 ; and (2) the appellant must make a nonfrivolous allegation that the employment practice violated one of the “basic

2 OPM need not be immediately involved in the practice in question; rather, an agency’s misapplication of a valid OPM requirement may constitute an employment practice. Sauser, 113 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶ 7. 3

requirements” for employment practices set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 300.103. Sauser, 113 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶ 6. Those requirements consist of a job analysis (to identify the basic duties and responsibilities, the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform the duties and responsibilities, and the factors that are important in evaluating candidates), a rational relationship between performance in the position and the employment practice used, and equal employment opportunity with no prohibited forms of discrimination. 5 C.F.R. § 300.103(a)-(c). On petition for review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge failed to address her assertion that the selectee, who was also her GS-9 coworker, did not have the requisite time in grade, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 300.604, 3 when she was selected for the GS-12 position at issue. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-7 (discussing Dowd v. United States, 713 F.2d 720 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). She contends that the agency’s employment practice in this regard did not constitute a proper job analysis and denied her fair and equitable treatment. Id. at 7-8. The appellant made similar assertions in her initial appeal regarding time in grade requirements, which the administrative judge did not address in the initial decision. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 10, Tab 12 at 5. Any error by the administrative judge in failing to address these specific assertions in the initial decision is not prejudicial to the appellant and does not warrant a different outcome. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has determined that an agency’s alleged misapplication of a valid OPM requirement, like time in grade restrictions under 5 C.F.R. §§ 300.601-300.605, constitutes an employment practice. Dowd, 713 F.2d at 724; Maule v. Office of Personnel Management, 40 M.S.P.R. 388, 393 (1989). Here, however, the appellant has not nonfrivolously alleged that any employment practice was misapplied to her. To

3 The regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 300.604(a) states that “[c]andidates for advancement to a position at GS-12 and above must have completed a minimum of 52 weeks in positions no more than one grade lower (or equivalent) than the position to be filled.” 4

the contrary, she asserts that the time in grade requirements should have been applied to the selectee. Therefore, her assertion is not persuasive. See Dow v. General Services Administration, 590 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that for the Board to have jurisdiction over an employment practices appeal, it was “necessary that the challenged employment practice have been applied to the applicant as the basis for the adverse hiring decision”); 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a) (stating that an applicant is entitled to relief from an unlawful employment practice that “was applied to . . . her”). The appellant’s allegation in this regard is nearly identical to the allegation in Brady v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-3443-12- 0017-I-1, Final Order at 3 (Sept. 18, 2012). There, Mr.

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Related

Dow v. General Services Administration
590 F.3d 1338 (Federal Circuit, 2010)
James B. Dowd, Jr. v. The United States
713 F.2d 720 (Federal Circuit, 1983)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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