IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY
VERNON LAMONT TURNER, CASE NO. 2026-T-0012
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
CITY OF WARREN, et al., Trial Court No. 2025 CV 02369 Defendants-Appellees.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: August 24, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Vernon Lamont Turner, pro se, 1495 Hollywood Street, N.E., Warren, OH 44483 (Plaintiff-Appellant).
John D. Pinzone, Edmond Z. Jaber, Katheryn E. Hach, and Frank H. Scialdone, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., 100 Franklin’s Row, 34305 Solon Road, Cleveland, OH 44139 (For Defendant-Appellee, City of Warren, Ohio).
Zachariah S. Germaniuk, Douglass & Associates, Co., L.P.A., 4725 Grayton Road, Cleveland, OH 44135 (For Defendant-Appellee, Trumbull County Land Reutilization Corporation).
Anthony M. Narog, pro se, 1312 Meadowbrook Avenue, Warren, OH 44484 (Defendant- Appellee).
SCOTT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Vernon Turner, appeals from the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the lower court.
{¶2} On September 22, 2025, Turner filed a complaint against the City of Warren, the Trumbull County Land Bank/Trumbull County Land Reutilization Corporation, and Anthony Narog. The complaint stated that Turner purchased a property in 2014 and lawfully owned it, he was cited on August 26, 20161 for a sanitation ordinance violation, he was “incarcerated for a civil matter, in violation of Ohio Constitution Article I, Section 15,” the sanitation case was dismissed in June 2016, the property was demolished in April 2017, the acquisition of the property by the Land Bank was recorded in November 2017, and the property was transferred to Anthony Narog for $0 in May 2018. The complaint set forth the following as the “Claims for Relief”:
a. Violation of Fifth Amendment/Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 19.
b. Violation of Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 1 and 19.
c. Unlawful Incarceration/Abuse of Process.
d. Procedural Due Process Violation – Fourteenth Amendment/Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16.
e. Civil Rights Claim – 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
f. Fraudulent Concealment/Fraud on the Court.
g. Fraudulent Conveyance – R.C. 1336.04.
h. Property Damage/Forcible Entry.
i. Quiet Title/Declaratory Judgment.
The complaint requested monetary damages and other relief including ordering title turned over to the Turner Family Trust, quiet title, injunctive relief, and tolling of the statutes of limitations due to fraudulent concealment.
1. Although Turner’s complaint states that he was cited on August 26, 2016, the records he attached show he was cited on August 26, 2015, which is consistent with the matter being dismissed in June 2016.
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{¶3} Narog filed a pro se answer on October 22, 2025, indicating that he had paid $500 and has the deed to the property.
{¶4} On November 19, 2025, Warren and the Land Reutilization Corporation filed a motion to dismiss complaint. They argued that the complaint failed to satisfy Civ.R. 8(A) because it did not explain his claims for relief and required speculation as to the grounds for the causes of action. They further argued that the complaint alleged several unrecognized causes of action. Finally, they contended that all of the claims are time barred based on the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Turner filed a memorandum in opposition on December 15, 2025, arguing that his claims were properly pled but alternatively seeking to amend his complaint.
{¶5} Turner filed a December 29, 2025 motion for leave to file first amended complaint. Warren and the Land Corporation opposed this on the grounds that it was futile due to the statute of limitations and was prejudicial. On January 15, 2026, the court denied the motion for leave.
{¶6} On February 10, 2026, the court filed a judgment entry granting the motion to dismiss. It found that the complaint failed to satisfy Civ.R. 8(A), there were unrecognized causes of action, and the claims are outside of the statute of limitations.
{¶7} Turner timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error:
{¶8} “[1.] The trial court erred in granting Defendants’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint failed to satisfy Civ.R. 8(A).
{¶9} “[2.] The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s claims as ‘unrecognized causes of action.’
{¶10} “[3.] The trial court erred in concluding that Appellant’s claims were barred
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by the statute of limitations at the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) stage.
{¶11} “[4.] The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant leave to file a First Amended Complaint under Civ.R. 15(A).”
{¶12} We initially note that Turner’s brief contains little in the way of substantive legal arguments. Nonetheless, we will address his arguments to the extent we are able to discern them.
{¶13} We will address Turner’s first and second assignments of error jointly since examination of the individual claims and their elements are necessary in both assignments of error. In his first assignment of error, Turner contends that the complaint was sufficient to meet the requirements of notice pleading under Civ.R. 8(A), provided fair notice to the defendants of his claims, and should be liberally construed. In his second assignment of error, he argues that claims for takings and due process, as well as 1983 claims are recognized claims under the law and should not have been dismissed as unrecognized causes of action. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
{¶14} “A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is procedural and tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Taylor-Winfield Corp. v. Huntington Bank, 2021-Ohio-3480, ¶ 5 (11th Dist.). “To dismiss a complaint pursuant to Civil Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, ‘it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought.’” Yehudah v. Gallagher, 2025-Ohio-1600, ¶ 7 (11th Dist.), citing Valentine v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 2022- Ohio-3710, ¶ 12. In reviewing a decision to grant a motion to dismiss under Civ.R.
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12(B)(6), this court must “accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint,” and “‘[t]hose allegations and any reasonable inferences drawn from them must be construed in the nonmoving party’s favor.’” Valentine at ¶ 12, citing Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley, 2011-Ohio-4432, ¶ 12. “The decision to grant a motion to dismiss is reviewed by an appellate court under a de novo standard.” Yehudah at ¶ 7. Requirements for Pleading Under Civ.R. 8
{¶15} “A pleading that sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.” Civ.R. 8(A). “‘[A] plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage.’” Mohat v. Horvath, 2013-Ohio-4290, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.), quoting York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145 (1991). “Rather, a plaintiff is only required to allege a set of facts, which, if proven, would plausibly allow for recovery.” Id. at ¶ 14. This court has observed that, “[b]ecause it is so easy for the pleader to satisfy the standard of Civ.R. 8(A), few complaints are subject to dismissal.” Pugh v. Sloan, 2019-Ohio-3615, ¶ 28 (11th Dist.).
{¶16} Civ.R. 8(A) and 8(E) “require that a claim concisely set forth only those operative facts sufficient to give ‘fair notice of the nature of the action[.]’” (Citation omitted.) Ganzhorn v. R & T Fence Co., 2011-Ohio-6851, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.). However, “[s]imply stating legal conclusions is insufficient . . . [o]perative facts are those underlying facts that relate to and support, and tend to show the existence of merit for, appellant’s claims against appellee.” Walker v. Metropolitan Environmental Servs., Inc., 2018-Ohio- 530, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.).
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{¶17} In the present matter, Turner’s complaint provided limited facts but, in sum, claimed that he was charged relating to a sanitation violation on his property, incarcerated, the charge was dismissed, but his real property was demolished and the title transferred to Narog. It appears that he is alleging that this property was wrongfully taken from his ownership although there is little detail explaining the demolition or transfer of the property, why it occurred, or why it was wrongful. We recognize that Turner provided no analysis as to the claims that were listed nor did he present legal argument in favor of these claims. However, we also again emphasize the minimal requirements for pleading given that Ohio is a notice pleading state. With the foregoing in mind, we review the individual causes of action asserted by Turner. Takings Claims
{¶18} In his first two claims, Turner alleged violations of the Fifth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 1 and 19. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution prevents a person from being deprived of property without due process or just compensation. Article I, Section 1 generally provides for the inalienable right to possess property. Article I, Section 19 relating to eminent domain prevents property from being taken from an individual without just compensation. Again, while the facts alleged are limited, it can be discerned that the property was demolished and sold following the alleged dismissal of a sanitation related charge. This could arguably constitute a taking of property without due process and/or proper compensation when presuming the truth of the fact that the charge against him was dismissed. We note that “inartful” drafting does not constitute a violation of Civ.R. 8. Pugh, 2019-Ohio-3615, at ¶ 31 (11th Dist.). Courts are “obligated to make a determined effort to understand what the pleader is
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attempting to set forth.” Id. Thus, we find that the claims relating to Section 19 in the first and second causes of action were pled sufficiently to give the defendants notice of the claims. As will be discussed in the third assignment of error, however, we nonetheless affirm the dismissal of these causes of action because they were filed outside of the statute of limitations. As to the claim under Article I, Section 1, however, this court has held that this section is “not self-executing and do[es] not create an independent claim or cause of action.” Widdowson, Admr. of the Estate of Widdowson v. Lake Cty., 2026- Ohio-67, ¶ 67 (11th Dist.). Unlawful Incarceration/Abuse of Process Claims
{¶19} In his third cause of action, Turner alleges “unlawful incarceration/abuse of process.” Appellees allege there is no claim in Ohio for unlawful incarceration. It appears Turner’s claim was one for wrongful imprisonment. However, his complaint provides no allegations relating to this claim except to note that he had a sanitation violation and was incarcerated. He attached to his complaint documents from the underlying proceeding, which indicated he was charged with a violation of Warren Codified Ordinance 1368.02 which relates to premises sanitation. Although Turner stated in his complaint that he was incarcerated for a civil matter in violation of Article I, Section 15 of the Ohio Constitution (“[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action”), proceedings against him were brought in the name of the state/city and the municipal ordinance provides that a defendant may be imprisoned for not more than six months. Even presuming this gave proper notice, on the face of the complaint, he could not prevail on an argument it was improper to incarcerate him for violation of this provision.
{¶20} Further, as to abuse of process, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that a legal
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proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (2) that the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (3) that direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process.” Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 68 Ohio St.3d 294 (1994), paragraph one of the syllabus. While this is a valid cause of action, we cannot discern from the complaint the basis for this cause of action. There is nothing alleged that would allow the court to determine that a proceeding was “perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed” or which would put the defendants on notice about the basis of the claim. ‘ Due Process Claim
{¶21} In his fourth cause of action, Turner raised a claim for a “procedural due process violation,” citing the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16. The Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution set forth an individual’s right to due process. It is not clear from the complaint what the alleged due process violation is based upon and whether it arose from the underlying proceedings, the demolition of the property, or the sale of the property. The fact that we cannot discern the basis for the claim brings into question whether Turner has failed to provide operative facts, i.e., facts that “tend to show the existence of merit” in his claim, which is necessary to give fair notice of the nature of the action. Walker, 2018-Ohio-530, at ¶ 18 (6th Dist.); Ganzhorn, 2011-Ohio-6851, at ¶ 25 (11th Dist.).
{¶22} Even presuming that Turner’s claim for due process relates to the factual allegation that the property was sold after his criminal charge was dismissed, which is the only factual allegation pertinent to the due process issue, we observe that “to the extent
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that appellant presents a cause of action solely for the violation of his due process rights under Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution,” it “is not self-executing, and no such private cause of action exists.” Johnson v. Port Clinton, 2025-Ohio-3100, ¶ 62 (6th Dist.); PDU, Inc. v Cleveland, 2003-Ohio-3671, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.) (Section 16 does “not create [an] independent cause[] of action). “[U]nlike the federal system where 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private cause of action to remedy violations of the United States Constitution, there exists no statute in Ohio analogous to Section 1983” and a claim raised for violation of due process under Section 16 is properly dismissed where it is not based on an underlying statute. PDU at ¶ 27. Further, claims for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment are not direct causes of action and “42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations by state and local officials.” (Citations omitted.) Blue Train, Inc. v. Cleveland, 2026 WL 21278, *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan 5, 2026). In other words, Turner’s claim for a general violation of “due process” is not properly maintained. To the extent that Turner intended to allege a violation of his rights occurred when the property was destroyed and/or sold after the sanitation violation was dismissed, this is raised in his first and second claims and to the extent that he intends to advance a 1983 claim, this was raised in his fifth cause of action. Thus, we find that this claim is not a properly pled cause of action for the reasons discussed above and/or is duplicative of other claims. As such, it was properly dismissed. See Hamilton v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio App.2d 55, 58 (9th Dist. 1973) (dismissal of claim is proper where it duplicates others in the complaint). Civil Rights Claim
{¶23} Turner’s fifth cause of action is a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
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of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”). A complaint alleging a 1983 claim “must meet two requirements”: an allegation that the conduct was performed by a person acting under the color of state law and an allegation that the conduct deprives the plaintiff of a federal right. State, Dept. of Taxation v. Smith, 1996 WL 210778, *2 (11th Dist. Mar. 29, 1996). Given the limited facts provided and the lack of any allegations relating to the elements of a 1983 claim, we do not find this was sufficiently pled to sustain a claim. See Id. at *3 (“[A] Section 1983 claim must be alleged with particularity. . . . [A]bsent a specific demonstration of a violation of a federally-protected right, the action is not a Section 1983 claim.”); Aloi v. Carroll, 1994 WL 590425, *2 (11th Dist. Sept. 23, 1994) (“[b]are bones assertions that a federal right was violated [are] insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss”). Fraudulent Concealment and Fraudulent Conveyance Claims
{¶24} In his sixth and seventh causes of action, Turner sets forth claims for fraudulent concealment and fraudulent conveyance. Appellees argue that “fraudulent conveyance” is not a cause of action. It appears this cause of action is one for “fraudulent transfer,” which has sometimes been referred to as a fraudulent conveyance. To succeed on a claim of fraudulent transfer, plaintiffs must prove: “(1) the transfer of an asset or the incurrence of a new debt; (2) done with actual intent to defraud, hinder, or delay; and (3) present or future creditors.” Fade v. Morris, 2015-Ohio-5337, ¶ 29 (11th Dist.). There are no facts alleged in the complaint to demonstrate any transfer that was made with intent to defraud creditors.
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{¶25} A claim of fraudulent concealment has generally been found to require pleading with particularity, which means including allegations of what the facts show for each element. “The elements of a fraudulent concealment are:” (1) a concealment of a fact (2) which is material to the transaction at hand, (3) “made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred,” (4) with intent of misleading another into relying upon it, (5) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment, and (6) a resulting injury. Minaya v. NVR, Inc., 2017-Ohio-9019, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Groob v. KeyBank, 2006- Ohio-1189, ¶ 47. Not only does the complaint lack sufficient facts to determine what the fraudulent concealment is, it also fails to meet the requirements to set forth facts on all of the elements to plead the claim with particularity. Property Damage/Forcible Entry Claims
{¶26} In his eighth cause of action, Turner raises a claim for “Property Damage/Forcible Entry.” Turner fails to specify what property damage he is claiming but since this is raised with a claim of forcible entry it would appear it would relate to property damage caused when the real property was entered prior to demolition. We cannot find that a claim can be sustained based on mere speculation, however. “[W]e have never construed Civ.R. 12(B)(6) as permitting either speculation or complaints that are devoid of factual allegations supporting the legal claims.” Sacksteder v. Senney, 2012-Ohio- 4452, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.); Tuleta v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2014-Ohio-396, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.) (“[t]he ease of entry into the judicial arena introduced by ‘notice pleading’ was never intended to eliminate the need for a properly researched and factually supported cause of action”) (citation omitted). To the extent that he is raising a “forcible entry” claim, there is an action
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under the law for forcible entry and detainer, however, such a claim is brought to return property to a rightful owner. R.C. 1923.02. It is unclear to what extent this claim is raised and whether Turner seeks to remove Narog from the property (which is unlikely given that he seeks a declaration that the forcible entry was improper, an issue we will address in relation to the declaratory judgment claim) or whether he is taking issue with the entry of the property prior to its demolition. Again, we decline to guess what claim Turner is making. Quiet Title/Declaratory Judgment Claims
{¶27} Turner’s final cause of action is one for Quiet Title/Declaratory Judgment.
It has been held that “[i]f a plaintiff is not in possession of the real property in question, an action to quiet title would not lie.” Huron v. McCune, 2023-Ohio-575, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.). The facts as alleged by Turner demonstrate that he is not in possession of the property and a quiet title action could not be successful.
{¶28} As to declaratory judgment, “declaratory relief is available to a plaintiff who can show that (1) a real controversy exists between the parties, (2) the controversy is justiciable, and (3) speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.” Moore v. Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 49; Owen v. United Ohio Ins. Co., 2006-Ohio-5170, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.); Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 2018-Ohio-2165, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.) (the court may dismiss a complaint seeking declaratory judgment when there is not “an actual controversy between the parties requiring speedy relief to preserve rights which may be lost or impaired”). It is evident that “speedy relief” is not warranted from the face of the allegations in the complaint. The real property in question was demolished in 2017 and the property was transferred to Narog in 2018, over eight years ago.
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{¶29} Turner also raises an unclear argument that “post-dismissal demolition exceeded authority” and “minor violation no basis for destruction.” This appears to relate to the merits of the claims rather than the issue here, which is what was alleged in the complaint and whether those constituted causes of action, and has no bearing on the resolution of these assignments of error.
{¶30} The first and second assignments of error are with merit, in part.
{¶31} In his third assignment of error, Turner argues that dismissal on a statute of limitations ground was improper because there were issues delaying reasonable discovery in relation to his claims. Statute of Limitations and Discovery Rule
{¶32} “Generally, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the wrongful act was committed.” (Citation omitted.) New Wembley LLC v. Klar, 2022-Ohio-4250, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.). “For certain types of cases, a discovery rule applies, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered a possible cause of action.” Id., citing Mattlin Holdings, L.L.C. v. First City Bank, 2010-Ohio-3700, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.), citing Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2006-Ohio-2625, ¶ 21.
{¶33} It has been held that “a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss based on a violation of a statute of limitations should be granted only where the complaint conclusively shows on its face that the action is time barred.” Hall v. Coleman Behavioral Health Servs., 2020-Ohio-4640, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.); Ricketts v. Everflow Eastern, Inc., 2016- Ohio-4807, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.) (“[i]n order to conclusively demonstrate that the action is time barred, the allegations in the complaint must demonstrate both (1) the applicable statute
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of limitations, and (2) the absence of factors which would toll the pertinent statute, or make it inapplicable”).
{¶34} We will address those claims remaining which were not properly dismissed as addressed above, the takings claims. For the claims relating to takings/Article I, Section 19, the statute of limitations is four years. Byers DiPaola Castle, L.L.C. v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2015-Ohio-3089, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.). “A cause of action for injury to real property and relief on the grounds of a physical or regulatory taking accrues, and the four-year statute of limitations commences to run, when the injury or taking is first discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 40. We recognize that dismissal on statute of limitations grounds at the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) stage is uncommon given the difficulty of establishing from the face of the complaint that there are no possible defenses to a statute of limitations claim such as a tolling event. Taylor-Winfield, 2021-Ohio-3480, at ¶ 26 (11th Dist.). In the present matter, however, we observe that the complaint is straightforward in its timeline and the basis for the property claims. Turner contends that there was a taking which occurred in 2017 and 2018 when his property was demolished and sold. Nothing about the fact that he was deprived of property was not public information. Turner should have been aware that he was no longer in possession or ownership of his property for over seven years.
{¶35} The third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶36} In his fourth assignment of error, Turner argues that the trial court’s denial of leave to amend his complaint was an abuse of discretion, noting that such relief should be liberally granted.
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Leave to Amend Complaint
{¶37} “Appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for leave to file an amended pleading.” Dilley v. Davis Auto Group, Inc., 2025-Ohio-432, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004).
{¶38} Pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A), if a party wishes to amend their complaint more than 28 days after it is served or after a responsive pleading is filed, “they may only do so with the other parties’ written consent or the court’s leave,” which the court shall “freely give . . . when justice so requires.” (Citation omitted.) Dilley at ¶ 11. “Although Civ.R. 15(A) allows for ‘liberal amendment,’ such motions are properly denied ‘if there is a showing of bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.’” Shamrock v. Cobra Resources, LLC, 2022-Ohio-1998, ¶ 51 (11th Dist.), quoting Turner v. Cent. Local School Dist., 85 Ohio St.3d 95, 99 (1999). Additionally, “[a] motion for leave to amend may be denied when the proposed amendment would be futile.” (Citation omitted.) Dilley at ¶ 11.
{¶39} Turner sought leave to file an amended complaint, attaching such complaint with additional facts underlying the claims and removing several causes of action. We recognize that motions to amend a pleading shall be liberally granted by the trial court. However, we also find that there existed a justification for denying the motion that fell within the trial court’s discretion. It has been held that “a trial court’s ‘primary consideration is whether there is actual prejudice to the defendants . . .’” (Citation
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omitted.) Darby v. A-Best Prods. Co., 2004-Ohio-3720, ¶ 20. Further, courts have recognized that a “spectre of prejudice” arises “when plaintiff requests leave to amend the complaint after a defendant has filed a dispositive motion.” Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp., 2024-Ohio-1671, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). In the present matter, the motion to amend was a direct response to the motion to dismiss. Turner did not seek to make changes on his own accord nor to correct a minor error. He sought to remove claims as well as add significant facts to his complaint after the appellees had already presented arguments demonstrating the failure to establish his claims. Under these circumstances, we do not find the court failed to exercise sound judgment in ruling on the motion to amend.
{¶40} The fourth assignment of error is without merit.
{¶41} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing Turner’s complaint, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., ROBERT J. PATTON, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Opinion of this court, the first and second assignments of error are with merit in part and the third and fourth assignments of error are without merit. The order of this court is that the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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