Turner v. Reno Police Department

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Kerry Turner, Case No. 2:24-cv-01516-CDS-EJY

5 Plaintiff Order Overruling Objection, Adopting the Report and Recommendation of the 6 v. Magistrate Judge, and Closing Case

7 Reno Police Department, et al., [ECF Nos. 16, 17] 8 Defendants

9 10 Plaintiff Kerry Turner, proceeding pro se, brings this lawsuit alleging civil rights 11 violations against the Reno Police Department and several of its officers and employees. 12 Following a review of Turner’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), United States Magistrate 13 Judge Elayna Youchah issued a report and recommendation (R&R) that this case be dismissed 14 with prejudice. R&R, ECF No. 16. Turner filed a timely objection. Obj., ECF No. 17. For the 15 reasons set forth herein, I overrule the objection and adopt the R&R in its entirety. 16 I. Legal Standard 17 “A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report 18 or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 19 636(b)(1)(C). The judge may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 20 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. A magistrate judge’s order should only be 21 modified or set aside if it is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). A 22 magistrate judge’s order is “clearly erroneous” if the court has “a definite and firm conviction 23 that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); 24 Burdick v. Comm’r, 979 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1992). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to 25 apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law[,] or rules of procedure.” UnitedHealth Grp., Inc. v. 26 1 United Healthcare, Inc., 2014 WL 4635882, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 16, 2014). In light of Turner’s 2 objection, I engage in a de novo review to determine whether to adopt Judge Youchah’s R&R. 3 II. Discussion 4 As set forth in the R&R, Turner’s complaint alleges that the defendants violated his 5 rights by conducting an unlawful search “exposing [his] private parts in public” during the 6 execution of a misdemeanor bench warrant. ECF No. 2-1 at 6. Turner asserts that the search was 7 conducted without probable cause, his consent, or a warrant. Id. Based on these allegations, 8 Turner asserts violations of (1) human rights under sexual behavior, (2) his Fourth Amendment 9 rights, (3) sexual misconduct, and (4) 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. Id. Judge Youchah recommends that 10 Turner’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a viable claim for relief and 11 based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. R&R, ECF No. 16. Turner argues that the 12 magistrate judge’s finding that the matter was adjudicated in state court is flawed. Obj., ECF 13 No. 17. Turner’s sole objection is that Judge Youchah recommends that his claims be dismissed 14 with prejudice.1 Id. 15 First, the magistrate judge recommends dismissal of Turner’s Privacy Protection Act 16 (“PPA”) claim. Id. at 2. In particular, Judge Youchah found that “the PPA is only applicable to 17 work product materials or documentary materials ‘possessed by a person reasonably believed to 18 have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form 19 of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.’” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 20 2000aa(a)–(b)). She reasons that because Turner alleges that the defendants violated him by 21 performing an invasive strip search, it is highly unlikely Turner would be able to plausibly allege 22 that the search was directed at papers and documents. ECF No. 16 at 2. Indeed, the PPA was 23 enacted to afford innocent third parties—such as the press—who are not suspected of 24 1 Based on Turner’s objection, and some of the language contained in his complaint, it appears that 25 Turner mainly takes umbrage with the fact that he was humiliated by being exposed in a public parking lot during the search. ECF No. 2-1 at 5, 6; ECF No. 17. If Turner wishes to pursue claims related to his 26 claims of humiliation, perhaps he can contact a pro bono legal organization for guidance or assistance on potentially bringing civil claims under state law. 1 committing a crime, with protections not provided by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Guest v. 2 Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 340 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Those PPA protections do not apply 3 here, therefore Judge Youchah’s recommendation of dismissal with prejudice is not clearly 4 erroneous or contrary to law. 5 Second, the magistrate judge finds that Turner’s Fourth Amendment claim must be 6 dismissed because it is barred by collateral estoppel. ECF No. 16 at 3–4. In her analysis, Judge 7 Youchah weighed the facts and procedural background of this case under the four elements 8 necessary for collateral estoppel to apply. Id. She determined that all of the elements are met and 9 thus Turner is estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the search performed by 10 defendants. Id. at 4. 11 Collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior 12 proceedings.” Diruzza v. Cnty. of Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Turner alleges a 13 Fourth Amendment claim related to what he believes was an illegal, unreasonable, and overly 14 intrusive search. The bases for Turner’s suppression motion during the trial in the underlying 15 criminal action was that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because it not lawful 16 and it exceeded the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest. Turner v. State, 558 P.3d 1212 17 (Nev. Ct. App. 2024). The issues presented here are identical to the issues decided at Turner’s 18 suppression hearing; and, after testimony from the witnesses and the argument of counsel, 19 Turner’s motion was denied. Id. The district court found, and the appeals court affirmed, that 20 Turner’s arrest was lawful and reasonable. Id. Thus, the issues were actually litigated and fully 21 determined. Finally, because Turner was the defendant in the underlying criminal action and is 22 the party against whom collateral estoppel is now asserted, his Fourth Amendment claim for 23 unreasonable search and seizure is subject to dismissal with prejudice based on the doctrine of 24 collateral estoppel. Thus, I find Judge Youchah’s recommendation to dismiss with prejudice is 25 not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 26 1 In sum, after conducting a de novo review of the record, and considering Turner’s objection, I adopt the report and recommendation in its entirety. 3 TI. Conclusion 4 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Turner's objection [ECF No. 17] is overruled, so the 5] report and recommendation of the magistrate judge [ECF No. 16] is adopted in full. 6|| Accordingly, Turner’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 7 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and to close this case. 8 Dated: April 10, 2025 /, Lh. 0 igo States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26