Turner v. Luer

149 F.2d 51, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2553
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedApril 23, 1945
DocketNo. 8713
StatusPublished

This text of 149 F.2d 51 (Turner v. Luer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turner v. Luer, 149 F.2d 51, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2553 (7th Cir. 1945).

Opinion

EVANS, Circuit Judge.

The trial court dismissed, for want of equity, the plaintiff’s suit which was brought to establish a trust and require the defendants, as trustees, to account to her for her one-fifth share therein.

Plaintiff and the three individual defendants (her brothers) were the children of August Luer, an elderly, wealthy resident of Alton. A fifth child, a daughter, is dead. Mr. Luer created a trust on February 17, 1930,1 for the life benefit of himself and wife, with remainders to the children. He announced the trust at a meeting of all members of his family who all read the instrument. In December, 1932, Mr. Luer destroyed this trust instrument and copy, and in January, 1933, the two stocks which had been transferred to the trust, along with a note, were reconveyed by the trustees to him.

Plaintiff’s suit is predicated on the theory that the 1930 trust created by her father was irrevocable. If irrevocable, plaintiff argues, it is still in force, and its corpus should be divided as provided in the trust, and not included in August Luer’s estate.

On the issue of irrevocability, the trial judge announced orally:

[52]*52'T don’t think there is evidence here that the Court would be justified in undertaking to find that this trust instrument was not under any circumstances irrevocable. * * I do not hardly feel I could possibly as a finding of fact here conclude there was any such trust instrument as contended for by the Plaintiff in her complaint. I think her evidence falls short of •the degree of proof the Court must have to reconstruct this trust instrument. I think she is not at fault being unáble to produce anything, but on the other hand the circumstances all indicate here that the trust was terminated by her agreement. I think the circumstances clearly indicated, I thought they did on the motion for the summary judgment on the documentary ■proof of what transpired in Probate Court the other day would rather indicate she acquiesced in its termination. It may be such a trust they could not terminate on .agreement, but I have no evidence it was such a trust instrument as that.”

The plaintiff, her husband, and the secretary of the attorney who drew the trust instrument testified that the trust contained a clause making the trust irrevocable. The brothers testified they did not remember any such clause.2

Decision turned upon the credibility of these witnesses. There was, we believe, substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that plaintiff failed to establish her allegation of irrevocability of the trust.

Hers was a somewhat difficult burden in view of the destruction of all copies of the trust instrument. It is rather hard to believe that one so reliable and upstanding as Mr. Luer would destroy a trust agreement, by tearing it up, were it irrevocable.

The story which the record unfolds is that of a father whose devotion to his children and whose business acumen and integrity were sorely strained by the finan[53]*53■cial crash of ’29 and the economic depression which followed and the failure of plaintiff’s husband’s business venture. There is evidence that the father borrowed $135,000 from his sons to pay the bondholders of his son-in-law’s corporation which was adjudged a bankrupt. It was on this note that a judgment has been taken by the sons which has been presented as a claim against the father’s estate. This judgment will lessen, if it does not exhaust the assets of the father’s estate, a part of which plaintiff might otherwise inherit.

In the suit on the note, plaintiff intervened and moved to vacate the judgment in defendants’ favor against the estate. She was unsuccessful, but did not appeal.

In 1929 the father was a cosigner on a $30,000 note of plaintiff’s husband. It was a judgment note. It was not paid. On February 24, 1943, judgment was taken by the estate against Mrs. Turner for $106,-449.21 on a $56,993.94 note she executed on the same day the trust was created, and which note had been a part of the corpus of the trust.

The trial court also found that plaintiff had knowledge of the revocation of the trust and acquiesced therein. As one of its findings, it stated:

“ * * that plaintiff has failed to establish by the evidence in this case that such action on the part of August Luer was without authority and void, but has by her conduct accepted such revocation of the trust as valid and binding upon all the parties.”

As one of its conclusions it said:

“That * * plaintiff is by her conduct estopped from now asserting the existence of a valid trust.”

In support of this finding and this conclusion Judge Briggle discusses the evidence of plaintiff’s participation in the meetings of the corporations, the stock of which constituted the corpus of the trust. She knew that her brothers did not participate as trustees. The stocks of these companies were listed in the inventory of her father’s estate and she made no protest thereto; nor did she protest the sale of such stocks or the report of their sale.

As to her knowledge of the termination of the trust, the court was doubtless influenced by the fact that plaintiff must have learned of said cancellation from her attendance of the stockholders’ meetings. It was perhaps equally impressed by the testimony of the vice-president of the local bank who told of a visit of the Turners, after the death of the father, seeking from him some documents the nature of which they were not certain. He called it a “hunting expedition.” He enumerated many documents in an attempt to ascertain the nature of the instrument they were seeking and asked if it were a trust, and “They said, no, that has been cancelled out a long time ago. Mr. Turner made that statement.” “Q. In the presence of Mrs. Turner? A. Yes, sir.”

The recital of the foregoing evidence is merely to show there was substantial evidence to support both findings, either of which necessitated a decree for the defendants.

The judgment is

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
149 F.2d 51, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2553, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turner-v-luer-ca7-1945.