Turner v. Linton

109 S.W.2d 642, 270 Ky. 297, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 72
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedOctober 22, 1937
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 109 S.W.2d 642 (Turner v. Linton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turner v. Linton, 109 S.W.2d 642, 270 Ky. 297, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 72 (Ky. 1937).

Opinion

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The appeals in these nine eases are taken from .'judgments of the Logan circuit court. The cases were tried before H,on. John B. Rodes, sitting as special judge for this purpose. Judge Rodes has written a careful and full opinion, in which we concur, and we. adopt such parts as we deem necessary to a disposition of these appeals. He said:

“The above nine election contest cases were all heard and tried together. The evidence was heard orally, subsequently transcribed by the official stenographer, and I have had the benefit of the record. The petitons substantially charge the same grounds of contest. Concisely stated, these grounds are as follows:
“(1) A conspiracy to violate the Corrupt Practice Act [Ky. Stats, sec. 1565b-l et seq.] by the use of money in the purchase of votes; the expenditure of a larger sum of money than is permitted by that act, coupled with a pooling of such money for such illegal purposes; in order to make effective this conspiracy for the purchase of votes with money, a system of the use of official ballots was established, commonly known as the chain ballot System.;
“(2) A conspiracy to cause the county court clerk, Riley, to fraudulently manipulate the registration books and to incorrectly copy and alter same and to make incorrect lists of the persons registered and entitled to vote.
“(3) A conspiracy to intimidate numerous persons legally entitled to vote and to prevent them from voting, and, further, by offering to build highways in certain portions of the county as an inducement to voters to cast their votes in favor of the cpntestees.
“(4) A conspiracy to permit persons neither blind nor physically disabled to vote upon the table, in order that contestees might know how the voter cast his vote; and to cause to be registered as voters a large number of persons not entitled to vote.

*301 ■“'There were other acts mentioned not necessary now to be - referred to, but which will be referred fo. later on. In view of the fact that a conspiracy was charged, the evidence took a wide field. Much of the record is devoted to the question of whether there were two groups, slates, or tickets in the field, and the contestees are inclined to protest that the so-called Ehea ticket had no existence except in the minds of their opponents. But it may confidently be said there were two tickets or groups, one against the other, the members of which, with a few exceptions, supported and voted for each other. Their designations are unimportant, whether called Ehea and anti-Ehea or Ehea and Chandler or Ehea and Coke or Honest Election League. Contestants admit the fact of the organization of their group under the style of anti-Ehea candidates, for the purpose of opposing all other candidates as a group. "When a number of candidates group themselves to oppose others, it is almost inevitable those others will likewise group for mutual support. This they have the right to do, provided they stop short, in their mutual efforts, of engaging in .unlawful practices, nor is the unlawful act of any member of any particular group to be attributed to the rest unless done with their knowledge or under such circumstances as that knowledge and consent may be logically and reasonably inferred.

“The doctrine of ‘imputed knowledge’ was rejected by our Court of Appeals in the case of Prewitt v. Caudill, 250 Ky. 698, 63 S. W. (2d) 954, 963, where it was said: ‘The common meaning of imputed knowledge or liability is to attribute it to one on account of another or to hold one vicariously responsible for the knowledge of another, such as a principal and agent. The legal doctrine of imputed knowledge of conditions necessarily rests upon the duty to know or the assumption of responsibility for the undisclosed acts of another. The Corrupt Practice Act does not fasten liability upon the candidate by the' application of that doctrine. It does, of course, permit the courts to infer a knowledge on the part of a candidate from evidence showing that he was aware of certain facts and circumstances. That is but to recognize proof of actual knowledge by circumstantial evidence.’

*302 “The grouping of a number of candidates for mutual support by lawful means does not itself constitute an unlawful conspiracy. A conspiracy, to be unlawful, must be a common agreement to use' unlawful means, or means not unlawful to gain an unlawful end. See Leech v. Farmers’ Tobacco Warehouse Co., 171 Ky. 791, 188 S. W. 886.

“No such conspiracy is proven by this testimony.

' “The major charge is one of bribery by the purchase of votes, but the record wholly fails to establish any common fund for that purpose, or indeed, for any purpose, to which all the candidates of the Rhea ticket or any two or more of them contributed. Sample ballots were printed showing cross-marks in the squares opposite the names of the contestee candidates. This was done by John A. Whitaker, contestee candidate for county attorney, and there is no proof that other candidates authorized or joined in it. The use of such a sample ballot was not unlawful, any more than those furnished by the county clerk for which the law provides.

“If any sample ballot was folded and used to conceal a bribe, the evil lies not in the paper, but in the corrupt purchase, of votes with money. Even though all the contestees had authorized, and helped to pay for the Whitaker sample ballots, yet none of them can be held accountable for the corrupt use of same unless this was done with their knowledge or consent. Each contestee then remains liable for his own conduct and the conduct of his supporters of which he knows or where his knowledge may be reasonably inferred. The same thing may be said of ■any fraudulent act of the county court clerk' with reference to the registration books or to the threats or efforts to intimidate on the part of any particular candidate (if any such existed), unless shown to have been with the knowledge and consent of another; or the other candidates. As I view these contests, they require a consideration of each particular case and the acts of each particular candidate who is a contestee or defendant herein; but there are some general questions and charges mentioned which may be disposed of, as they refer more or less to more than one candidate, and should be *303 swept away before we reach the major charge of bribery.

“It is alleged that the contestees, or some of them, with their supporters, fraudulently engaged in litigation for the purpose of controlling the election and obtaining illegal votes.

“It appears that the anti-Rhea group had obtained control of the county Democratic executive committee. On July 26, 1937, Whitaker and Mc-Endree filed a petition in the Logan circuit court, No. 8,398, against the board of election commissioner and the county court clerk, by which they sought to prevent the purgation of the registration books and the cancellation of a long list of registered persons said to have been illegally registered. It was alleged that the list had been selected by the county Democratic executive committee when no quorum was present, etc. A temporary restraining order was secured, no answer was filed, and no purgation had.

“On August 2, 1937, B. A.

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Bluebook (online)
109 S.W.2d 642, 270 Ky. 297, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 72, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turner-v-linton-kyctapphigh-1937.