TURNER v. BARRETT AND FARAHANY

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 13, 2020
Docket5:20-cv-00214
StatusUnknown

This text of TURNER v. BARRETT AND FARAHANY (TURNER v. BARRETT AND FARAHANY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
TURNER v. BARRETT AND FARAHANY, (M.D. Ga. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

TERRANCE TURNER, Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. v. 5:20-cv-00214-TES BARRETT AND FARAHANY, et al., Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION ______________________________________________________________________________

“Subject matter jurisdiction in a federal court may be based upon federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.” Walker v. Sun Trust Bank of Thomasville, 363 F. App'x 11, 15 (11th Cir.2010) (per curiam). If a court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); accord Walker, 363 F. App'x at 16–17 (affirming sua sponte dismissal of case on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the pro se plaintiff failed to allege an essential element of his federal claim). As discussed in more detail below, the Court finds that neither diversity jurisdiction nor federal question jurisdiction exists in this action. DISCUSSION A district court should “inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings” and is obligated to do so “sua sponte whenever [subject matter jurisdiction] may be lacking.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco

Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). If a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it “is powerless to continue” and must dismiss the complaint. Id. On June 5, 2020, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this case should

not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See [Doc. 3]. The Court noted in its Order that Plaintiff’s Complaint stated no private cause of action under federal law and all Defendants were from Georgia. [Id., pp. 1—2]. In Plaintiff’s response, Plaintiff

again identifies Defendants as being from Georgia and fails to provide a federal cause of action. See generally [Doc. 4]. “Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity; every plaintiff must be diverse from every defendant.” Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). Further, “[a]bsent diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff

must present a ‘substantial’ federal question in order to invoke the district court's jurisdiction.” Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 566 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974)). “An insubstantial question is one that is “obviously

without merit.” Id. As already noted, the federal statutes Plaintiff alleged Defendants violated do not have a private cause of action. See [Doc. 3]. Therefore, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff has failed to adequately identify the basis for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court DISMISSES the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

SO ORDERED, this 13th day of June, 2020. s/Tilman E. Self, III TILMAN E. SELF, III, Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

1 The Court also notes that venue is improper. The relevant venue provisions state that “[a] civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located,” or in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2). According to the allegations in the Complaint, no events giving rise to this suit occurred in the Middle District of Georgia; nor does Plaintiff identify the residence of any named Defendant as being in the Middle District of Georgia. [Doc. 1]. Instead, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Atlanta, which is in the Northern District of Georgia. [Id., pp. 4—5]. Thus, the Middle District of Georgia is not the proper venue.

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Related

Rev. Tom Walker, II v. SunTrust Bank of Thomasvill
363 F. App'x 11 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.
154 F.3d 1284 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co.
168 F.3d 405 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Hagans v. Lavine
415 U.S. 528 (Supreme Court, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
TURNER v. BARRETT AND FARAHANY, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turner-v-barrett-and-farahany-gamd-2020.