Turley v. San Diego

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedAugust 25, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-01252
StatusUnknown

This text of Turley v. San Diego (Turley v. San Diego) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turley v. San Diego, (S.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MACEY ERBIE TURLEY, JR., Case No.: 22cv1252-GPC (AGS)

12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING PETITION FOR 14 SAN DIEGO, A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 15 Respondent. WITHOUT PREJUDICE

17 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas 18 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. 19 (ECF Nos. 1-2.) 20 REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 21 The request to proceed in forma pauperis is denied because Petitioner has not 22 provided the Court with sufficient information to determine his financial status. A request 23 to proceed in forma pauperis made by a state prisoner must include a certificate from the 24 warden or other appropriate officer showing the amount of money or securities Petitioner 25 has on account in the institution. Rule 3(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; Civ. Local Rule 3.2. 26 Because Petitioner has not provided the Court with the required financial information, the 27 Court DENIES the request to proceed in forma pauperis and DISMISSES the case without 28 1 prejudice for failure to satisfy the filing fee requirement. 2 FAILURE TO NAME A PROPER RESPONDENT 3 Petitioner has named “San Diego” as Respondent. Petitioner must name the state 4 officer having custody of him as Respondent. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 5 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Federal courts lack personal 6 jurisdiction when a habeas petition fails to name a proper respondent. Id. 7 The warden is the typical respondent. However, “the rules following section 2254 8 do not specify the warden.” Id. “[T]he ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the 9 warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in 10 charge of state penal institutions.’” Id., quoting Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 advisory 11 committee’s note. If “a petitioner is in custody due to the state action he is challenging, 12 ‘[t]he named respondent shall be the state officer who has official custody of the petitioner 13 (for example, the warden of the prison).’” Id., quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 14 advisory committee’s note. This requirement exists because a writ of habeas corpus acts 15 upon the custodian of the state prisoner, the person who will produce “the body” if directed 16 to do so by the Court. “Both the warden of a California prison and the Director of 17 Corrections for California have the power to produce the prisoner.” Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 18 F.3d at 895. 19 In order for this Court to entertain a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner 20 must name as Respondent the Warden of the institute at which he is currently confined or 21 the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 22 FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE COURT REMEDIES 23 In addition, it does not appear that state court remedies have been exhausted as to 24 any claim in the Petition. Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court 25 conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison must first exhaust state judicial 26 remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987); 27 see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“[A] state prisoner must normally 28 exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition 1 for habeas corpus.”) “A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement if: (1) he has 2 ‘fairly presented’ his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider 3 it,” which in this case is the California Supreme Court, “or (2) he demonstrates that no state 4 remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations 5 omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners 6 must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by 7 invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”) The 8 claims presented in the federal courts must be the same as those exhausted in state court 9 and the petitioner must also allege, in state court, how one or more of his federal rights 10 have been violated. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 276 (“Only if the state courts have had the 11 first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding 12 does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies. Accordingly, we have 13 required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the 14 federal courts.”); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (“If state courts 15 are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, 16 they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the 17 United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling 18 at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 19 Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.”) 20 Petitioner indicates he has not raised his claims on appeal and did not seek review 21 in the California Supreme Court. (See ECF No. 1 at 5.) In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 22 (1982), the United States Supreme Court adopted a “total exhaustion rule” which requires 23 federal courts to dismiss habeas petitions brought pursuant to § 2254 which do not contain 24 only exhausted claims. Id. at 522. Because the one-year statute of limitations imposed on 25 § 2254 habeas petitions after Rose was decided created a risk of a claim dismissed under 26 Rose becoming time-barred, the Court approved of a procedure by which the Petition is 27 stayed while the Petitioner returns to state court to exhaust. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 28 269, 278 (2005); see also Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a 1 Rhines stay may be appropriate even for a fully unexhausted petition). A federal habeas 2 court may grant a Rhines stay when (1) “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to 3 exhaust,” (2) “his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious,” and (3) “there is no 4 indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 5 544 U.S. at 278. 6 If Petitioner succeeds in satisfying the filing fee requirement and naming a proper 7 Respondent, the following options are available to him to avoid a future dismissal for 8 presenting a Petition with only unexhausted claims. 9 i) First Option: Demonstrate Exhaustion 10 Petitioner may file a First Amended Petition naming a proper Respondent in which 11 he alleges he has exhausted the claims in the Petition. If Petitioner chooses this option, the 12 First Amended Petition is due no later than October 25, 2022.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Picard v. Connor
404 U.S. 270 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Granberry v. Greer
481 U.S. 129 (Supreme Court, 1987)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel
526 U.S. 838 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Artuz v. Bennett
531 U.S. 4 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Samuel Quinton Bonner v. Tom Carey, Warden
425 F.3d 1145 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Samuel Quinton Bonner v. Tom Carey, Warden
439 F.3d 993 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Duncan v. Henry
513 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Armando Mena v. David Long
813 F.3d 907 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez
81 F.3d 891 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Turley v. San Diego, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turley-v-san-diego-casd-2022.