STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2021 CA 0351
TURBINE POWERED TECHNOLOGY, LLC
U VERSUS W VV
DAVID CROWE, KENNETH BRACCIO, DANIEL FOLEY, GEORGE JACKSON, KENT ELLSWORTH, ARIZONA TURBINE TECHNOLOGY, INC., ADVANCED TURBINE SERVICES, LLC AND TURBINE INTEGRATED POWER SYSTEMS, LLC
Judgment Rendered: OCT 0 7 2021
Appealed from the 16th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Mary State of Louisiana Case No. 130, 379
The Honorable Gregory P. Aucoin, Judge Presiding
Kevin P. Merchant Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Robert E. Torian Turbine Powered Technology, LLC Cliff A. LaCour Lafayette, LA
Adam G. Young Counsel for Defendants/ Appellants John A. Meade David Crowe, Arizona Lafayette, LA Turbine Technology, Inc., and Arizona 4 Turbine Technology, LLC I) V V1
C" A S. Patrick Skiles Co -Counsel for Defendants/ Appellants Morgan City, LA David Crowe, Arizona Turbine Technology, Inc., and Arizona Turbine Technology, LLC
Jennifer Leigh Thornton Counsel for Defendants/ Appellants
Christian S. Chaney Kenneth Braccio and Advanced Turbine William M. Ross Services, LLC New Orleans, LA
BEFORE: McDONALD, LANIER AND WOLFE, JJ.
2 LANIER, J.
In these two appeals, the defendants, Kenneth Braccio, Advanced Turbine
Systems, LLC, David Crowe, Arizona Turbine Technology, Inc., and Arizona
Turbine Technology, LLC, appeal a judgment of contempt and order for sanctions
rendered by the Sixteenth Judicial District Court against the aforementioned
defendants. For the following reasons, we vacate the judgment of the district court
and remand with instructions. Additionally, we dismiss the answer to the appeal
filed by the appellee.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying litigation of the instant appeal involves a petition for
damages and injunctive relief filed on November 7, 2016, by the plaintiff/appellee,
Turbine Powered Technology, LLC ( TPT) against the appellants and other
defendants for various claims such as declaratory relief, breach of contract,
misrepresentation, detrimental reliance, fraud, unfair trade practices, violation of
trade secrets, theft of business records, tortious interference, unjust enrichment,
breach of fiduciary duty, and injunctive relief.
The underlying facts of the lawsuit are not entirely germane to the instant
appeals.' Briefly, TPT entered into a business enterprise with the defendants to
design and build turbine -powered equipment for high pressure pumping well -
stimulation, known as " frac technology." In 2011, Advanced Turbine Services,
LLC ( ATS), agreed to provide TPT turbine engines and engine controllers. Mr.
Braccio was an employee of ATS. ATS sold the equipment to TPT through the
sub -vendor Tuscon Embedded Systems, Inc., of which Mr. Crowe was an
employee.
1 For a more detailed recitation of the instant appeals' background, see Turbine Powered
Technology, LLC v. Crowe, 2018- 0881 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 5/ 19), 2019WL4201579 ( unpublished opinion), writ denied, 2019- 1548 ( La. 11/ 19/ 19), 282 So. 3d 1063.
3 TPT claims to be the sole owner of the frac technology intellectual property.
Additionally, TPT claims that Mr. Braccio and Mr. Crowe, through their
companies Arizona Turbine Technology, Inc. and Arizona Turbine Technology,
LLC ( collectively AZT), misappropriated the intellectual property without TPT' s
consent and have misrepresented themselves as owners of the frac technology for their own benefit.
The trial court granted TPT' s request for a preliminary injunction on January
3, 2017, signing the order two days later. On May 26, 2017, the appellants and
defendant Daniel Foley2 filed a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The
trial court denied the motion on July 17, 2017. While that matter was under
advisement with the trial court, the defendants filed a notice of removal to the
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. TPT filed a
motion in the U.S. district court to remand the matter back to the trial court, and
the motion was granted on February 23, 2018. On April 2, 2018, the trial court
reaffirmed its denial of the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. In a
separate appeal, the appellants challenged the judgment of April 2, 2018. See
Turbine Powered Technology, LLC v. Crowe, 2018- 0881 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 5/ 19),
2019WL4201579, * 6- 8 ( unpublished opinion), writ denied, 2019- 1548 ( La. 282
So. 3d 1063.
While the resolution of that appeal was pending, the trial court signed a
judgment on December 12, 2018, in which the trial court granted a motion to
compel filed by TPT and gave each of the appellants 60 days to give sufficient
responses to TPT' s first set of discovery requests. The trial court signed a
judgment on March 22, 2019, in which it granted motions filed by TPT for
contempt and sanctions against the appellants and another defendant who is not a
2 The record also refers to Mr. Foley as Donald " Danny" Foley, Jr. 4 party to the instant appeals. The trial court found that after the 60 -day period, the
appellants still had not sufficiently responded to TPT' s discovery requests and
issued bench warrants for the arrest of Mr. Crowe and Mr. Braccio, who were
allegedly residing in the state of Arizona. Mr. Crowe and Mr. Braccio were
sentenced to 10 days in jail for contempt of court. The trial court also imposed
fines on the appellants, as well as fees and court costs.
On April 14, 2019, the instant case was again removed to the United States
District Court, Western District of Louisiana. On August 26, 2019, the instant case
was remanded back to the trial court. This court handed down the decision on the
prior appeal on September 5, 2019, in which we reversed the trial court and
remanded, finding that TPT had not made a prima facie showing that it would
prevail on the merits of its claims related to its alleged trade secrets, and that the
trial court erred in dismissing the defendants' motion to dissolve the preliminary
injunction. See Turbine Powered Technology, at * 13.
On September 16, 2019, Mr. Braccio and ATS filed a suspensive appeal of
the March 22, 2019 judgment. On September 19, 2019, Mr. Crowe and AZT filed
a suspensive appeal of the same judgment.
TIMELINESS OF APPEAL
This court issued a rule to show cause as to why the instant appeals should
not be dismissed for untimeliness. We noted that the appealed judgment was
signed on March 22, 2019. Mr. Crowe and Mr. Braccio filed a motion for new
trial on April 5, 2019, which the trial court denied on April 10, 2019, but no notice
of the denial of the motion for new trial is contained in the record. It appears from
the record that no motion for new trial was filed by ATS or AZT. Mr. Braccio and
ATS suspensively appealed on September 16, 2019, and Mr. Crowe and AZT
R suspensively appealed on September 19, 2019. These appeals appear to be facially
untimely, pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 2123( A).3
The instant case was removed to federal court on April 14, 2019, and then
remanded back to the trial court on August 26, 2019. With regard to removal to
federal court and the delays for taking a suspensive appeal, La. C. C. P. art. 2123( D)
provides:
The time within which to take a suspensive appeal under the
provisions of this Article is interrupted for all parties upon the filing of a notice of removal in a district court of the United States, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S. C. 1446, and commences anew on the date the proceeding is remanded.
TPT submits that the instant case' s removal to federal court and subsequent
remand do not make the instant appeals timely because the federal court never had
jurisdiction over the contempt proceedings. In support, TPT cites Kolwe v. Civil &
Structural Engineers, Incorporated, Fed. Appx. ( 5th Cir. 2021),
2021WL1727609 ( per curiam), wherein the U.S. Fifth Circuit cited the U.S.
Supreme Court:
Per Younger' and its progeny, a state court motion for contempt is not Vail5, removable. In Juidice v. the Supreme Court extended the abstention doctrine to cases involving state contempt proceedings. The Court explained: " The contempt power lies at the core of the administration of a State' s judicial system ... [ such that] federal -court interference with the State' s contempt process is ` an offense to the State' s interest ... likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding."'
The same federalism principle outlined in Juidice, however, counsels against this court making any substantive determination on the merits of Kolwe' s contempt claim. Indeed, this court has previously ordered
3 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, article 2123( A) sets the delay for taking a suspensive appeal at 30 days from either the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial, or from the date of mailing of the notice of the denial of a motion for new trial. Regardless of either circumstance, the appellants' appeals, both filed in September of 2019, would be facially
untimely.
4 Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 ( 1971).
s 430 U. S. 327, 335- 36, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1217- 18, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 ( 1977). remand after a defendant sought to remove a proceeding based on a contempt motion, notwithstanding the defendant' s argument that the contempt motion was " a disguised petition for damages." We expressly declined to adjudicate the merits of "a motion filed in state court and styled a motion for contempt" because " to do so would transgress the very principle of federalism [ that] the rule [ that contempt proceedings are non -removable] seeks to protect."
2021 WL 1727609, at * 3.
TPT also cites the following from the Juidice case:
Whether disobedience of a court -sanctioned subpoena, and the
resulting process leading to a finding of contempt of court, [ is] labeled civil, quasi -criminal, or criminal in nature, we think the salient fact is that federal -court interference with the State' s contempt process is ` an offense to the States interest ...likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding.' Huffman', supra, 420 U. S. at 604, 95 S. Ct. at 1208. Moreover, such interference with the
contempt process not only ` unduly interfere( s) with the legitimate activities of the Stat( e),' Younger, supra, 401 U.S., at 44, 91 S. Ct., at 750, but also ` can readily be interpreted ` as reflecting negatively upon the state courts' ability to enforce constitutional principles."'
Huffman, supra, 420 U.S., at 604, 95 S. Ct., at 1208.
430 U.S. at 335- 36, 97 S. Ct. at 1217- 18.
TPT asserts that because the contempt judgment could not be removed, La.
C. C. P. art. 2123( D) has no application to the contempt proceedings at issue and all
appeal delays with regard to the March 22, 2019 contempt judgment ran long
before any motions for appeal were filed in September 2019.
In response, the appellants contend that TPT' s argument " directly conflicts
with the unambiguous language of Article 2123( D)," especially in light of the
principles that " appeals are favored in the law" and " should not be dismissed
unless the ground urged for dismissal is free from doubt." See e. g., Shell Pipeline
Corp. v. Kennedy, 2000- 3207 ( La. 10/ 16/ 01), 799 So. 2d 475, 478 ( per curiam).
The appellants assert that La. C. C. P. art. 2123( D) plainly states that when removal
occurs while the delay for a suspensive appeal is accruing, the delay is interrupted
and " commences anew" if and when there is a remand.
6 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 95 S. Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 ( 1975).
7 The appellants also assert that TPT makes the conclusion that upon removal
to federal court, the contempt judgment was left behind and not removed to the
federal court with the rest of the case, resulting in a partial removal. The
appellants cite 28 U.S. C. A. 1446( d) as support:
Promptly after the filing of such notice of removal of a civil action the defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded. [ Emphasis added.]
Further, we note that 28 U.S. C. A. 1441 authorizes removal of " any civil
action," and provides a mechanism for the federal court to sever claims that are
not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the [ federal] district court
or a claim that has been made nonremovable by statute." 28 U.S. C. A. 1441( c)( B)
The appellants also cite this court' s opinion in Dantzler v. Monticino, 2007-
1611 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 6/ 08), 2008WL2567786 at * 2, wherein this court stated:
I]t is well settled that once a matter is removed from state court to federal court, " the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." 28 U. S. C. 1446( d). Thus, after removal, the
jurisdiction of the state court absolutely ceases and the state court has a duty not to proceed any further in the case. National S.S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 122, 1 S. Ct. 58, 60, 27 L.Ed. 87 ( 1882). Any subsequent proceedings in state court on the case are void ab initio. 11th Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F. 2d 1248, 1254- 1255 ( Cir. 1988).
Thus, the appellants conclude that this court should not recognize any theory of
partial removal.
Moreover, the appellants aver that other courts have rejected similar
arguments of partial removal. For instance, in Eckert v. Administrators of the
Tulane Educational Fund, No. 15- 5546, 2016WL158919, * 9 ( E. D. La. 1/ 14/ 2016),
the court stated that " once a case has been removed to federal court, a state court is
without power to proceed in a case." The court further noted that " the entire case
is removed," even though " portions thereof may be subject to remand." Id. See
5th
also E.D. Systems Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 674 F. 2d 453, 457 n.2 ( 8 Cir. 1982) ("[ E] ven if a case is not properly removable, the filing of the removal
petition in federal court ends the state court' s jurisdiction until the case is
remanded.")
Based on the aforementioned law and jurisprudence, and considering the
timeline of the instant case, we find that both the appeals of the contempt hearing
were timely filed. When the notice of removal was filed into the record on April
14, 2019, the appellate delays for seeking review of the March 22, 2019 judgment
had not run. Thereafter, following the federal court' s remand to the trial court on
August 26, 2019, both motions for appeal were filed within 30 days. Under the
plain language of La. C. C. P. arts. 2087( E) and 2123( D), which relate to devolutive
and suspensive appeals respectively, "[ t]he time within which to ... appeal under
the provisions of [either article] is interrupted for all parties upon the filing of a
notice of removal in a district court of the United States, pursuant to the provisions
of 28 U.S. C. 1446, and commences anew on the date the proceeding is remanded."
Further, as noted by the appellants, while Kolwe recognizes that a state
contempt ruling " is not removable" to federal court, it begs the question of why a
federal court would be required to remand something back to state court if it had
never been removed in the first place and was otherwise incapable of being
removed from state court. Otherwise, such an expansive reading of Kolwe that a
contempt ruling is incapable of being removed from state court conflicts with other
well- recognized federal principles that a state court is without power to proceed
until the case is remanded in whole or in part. Rather, it is clear to us that if an
entire matter is removed to federal court, the federal court has jurisdiction until it
remands all or part of the case, including a state court contempt ruling, back to
state court. For the foregoing reasons, we maintain the appeals and proceed to our
review of the merits.
0 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The appellants make the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred by proceeding with the contempt trial when TPT did not request or accomplish service as mandated by La. C. C.P. art. 225( A).
2. The trial court erred by holding the appellants in constructive contempt of court for disobeying a discovery order and oral reasons when: ( 1) TPT offered no evidence and failed to sustain its burden of proof, and ( 2) there was no finding that any disobedience was willful.
3. The trial court violated Mr. Braccio' s and Mr. Crowe' s fundamental right to due process by putting them on trial, convicting them of criminal contempt, and sentencing them to jail unconditionally in absentia and without legal representation after their former counsel was dismissed from the courtroom upon advising that he had a conflict of interest and could not represent the defendants at the contempt hearing.
4. The trial court disregarded the " void -for vagueness" doctrine by convicting Mr. Braccio and Mr. Crowe for allegedly disobeying a discovery order calling for legally sufficient responses and non-existent oral reasons, neither of which provide adequate notice of the actions to be taken to avoid a finding of contempt.
5. The trial court imposed an excessive punishment that " shocks our sense of justice," Leger v. Leger, 2000- 0505 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5111101), 808 So. 2d 632, 638, by sentencing Mr. Braccio and Mr. Crowe to 10 days in jail based on former counsels' failure to provide separate written responses to joint discovery requests.
6. The trial court erred by ordering the appellants each to pay a contempt fine of $100 per day when: ( 1) the actions to be taken to stop the fines are not reasonable discernible; and ( 2) the accrual of the fines will exceed the $ 500 maximum contempt fine prescribed by La. R.S. 13: 4611.
7. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding unreasonable and
unsupported amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses to TPT.
DISCUSSION
TPT filed one rule for contempt of court and motion for sanctions on
February 12, 2019 against Mr. Braccio, Mr. Crowe, and ATS and another rule for
contempt and sanctions against AZT on the same date. In the first rule, TPT
alleged that "[ d] espite the [ December 12, 2018] Judgment ordering Braccio, ATS
and Crowe to separately provide legally sufficient responses, those defendants
continue to refuse to produce any responsive documents ... The fact that [ the trial 10 court] granted the defendants the requested extension of time in which to respond
to the Requests shows the continuing bad -faith of defendants Braccio, ATS and
Crowe." With respect to AZT, TPT alleged that "[ c] ounsel for defendants
produced certain documents on January 13, 2019 and January 18, 2019 ... which
contained ... unidentifiable source code pulled from [ AZT' s] files.... Defendants'
Second Set of Responses to TPT' s Requests for Production of Documents is not
legally sufficient.... Additionally, Defendants intentionally and willfully failed to
provide numerous documents requested by TPT and provided unintelligible and
duplicative documents in an attempt to make the production appear more
significant." Both rules certify that they were served on counsel for the appellants
via email and certified mail.
The transcript of the March 9, 2019 hearing on the rules for contempt is not
found in the record; however, it is included in the appellate brief of Mr. Braccio
and ATS, and TPT acknowledges and even quotes the transcript in its own
appellate brief without questioning the truth of the transcript' s words.' At that
hearing, counsel for the appellants and the other defendants moved to withdraw
due to a possible conflict of interest that was discovered between the defendants.
Counsel also stated they were not making an appearance on the behalf of any
defendant, but were present " for the benefit of the Court." Neither Mr. Braccio nor
Mr. Crowe individually, nor any representative or agent for ATS or AZT were
present in court. Mr. Braccio and Mr. Crowe were allegedly in the state of
Arizona.
At that point, the trial court asked, " Do [ the defendants] understand there is a
very strong possibility that David Crowe may go to jail today?" Counsel for the
defendants acknowledged that they understood. The trial court then granted
7 The disposition of this ruling is reflected in the court minutes for the date of "March 6, 2019." 11 counsel' s motion to withdraw as to two other defendants who are not appellants in
the instant case. The trial court then stated it was ready to proceed with the
contempt hearing on the appellants.
Counsel for the appellants advised the trial court that they could not
represent the appellants due to the aforementioned conflicts of interest, to which
the trial court replied, " Very well. You are free to go." Counsel for the appellants
then exited the courtroom without any response. Once counsel for the appellants
were gone, the trial court proceeded with the contempt hearing.
Counsel for TPT provided legal argument to the trial court, but did not
submit any evidence to the court with regard to the appellants' contempt of court.
The trial court then found the appellants in contempt of court and sentenced Mr.
Braccio and Mr. Crowe to serve 10 days in jail, without any condition on which
they could purge the jail sentence. The trial court issued arrest warrants for both
Mr. Braccio and Mr. Crowe. The trial court ordered a fine of $100 per day until
the discovery requests were completed. The trial court also ordered the appellants
to pay attorney' s fees and costs.
Contempt is considered civil if the court' s purpose is to force compliance
with its order, while it is considered criminal in nature if the purpose is to punish
disobedience of a court order. Geo -de' s Civic Ass' n, Inc. v. Reed, 525 So. 2d 192,
197 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1988). In sentencing Mr. Braccio and Mr. Crowe to time in
jail without the possibility to purge the jail sentencing by complying with the
discovery request, the trial court clearly intended to punish them for willful
disobedience of the order. See La. C. C. P. art. 224( A)(2). Mr. Braccio and Mr.
Crowe were therefore found in criminal contempt of court. If the penalty imposed
is criminal in nature, the burden of proof of the elements of contempt must be
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rogers v. Dickens, 2006- 0898 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
2/ 9/ 07), 959 So. 2d 940, 947. 12 Since criminal contempt is criminal in nature, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects a defendant in a criminal
proceeding against conviction upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the contempt charge. Dauphine v. Carencro High School,
2002- 2005 ( La. 4/ 21/ 03), 843 So. 2d 1096, 1108. Furthermore, a person charged
with a crime is entitled to written notice of the charges against him. See State in
Interest ofNewton, 559 So.2d 801, 802 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1990).
Proceedings for contempt must be strictly construed, and the policy of our
law does not favor extending their scope. Estate of Graham v. Levy, 636 So. 2d
2879 290 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1994), writ denied, 94- 1202 ( La. 7/ 1/ 94), 639 So. 2d
1167. We find that the trial court did go beyond the scope of both a contempt and
a criminal proceeding in several respects.
Mr. Braccio and Mr. Crowe, who were sentenced to time in jail, did not
receive written notice of their charges. See La. C. C. P. art. 225( A). Mailing notice
to their attorney is not sufficient, just as it would not be sufficient in a standard
criminal case to mail a bill of information or indictment to a defendant' s attorney
in lieu of a formal arraignment. Furthermore, a final judgment shall be annulled if
it is rendered against a defendant who has not been served with process as required
by law. La. C. C. P. art. 2002( A)(2). TPT points out that the appellants did not
raise an objection to the insufficient notice. We find that argument to be of no
moment in the instant case. As stated above, the appellants were charged with a
crime, which required written notice upon the defendants, and which cannot be
waived through a lack of objection. As such, the appellants' first assignment of
error has merit, and the contempt judgment of the trial court must be vacated due
to insufficient service on the appellants.
There were additional irregularities in the trial court' s contempt proceedings
that must also be addressed. The appellants were tried in absentia. Pursuant to La. 13 C. Cr.P. art. 832, a defendant initially present for the commencement of trial shall
not prevent the further progress of the trial. The appellants were not present for the
proceedings on March 9, 2019, and the contempt proceedings did not begin until
their counsel had left the courtroom. Counsel for the appellants left the courtroom
after the trial court permitted them to do so. Whether counsel made a prudent
choice in deciding to leave is not relevant in the instant matter. What is relevant,
however, is that the appellants were never present for the contempt proceeding and
had no opportunity to present a defense to the charges against them. Unless the
appellants are given the opportunity to be present for the contempt proceedings
against them, the proceedings cannot take place. The appellants' third assignment
of error also has merit.
Finally, no trial on the contempt charges took place, as TPT did not submit
any evidence of the appellants' guilt. In a typical criminal proceeding, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt through evidence sufficient to prove that guilt. We would also apply the
standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d ( 1979)
here, which is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. With absolutely no evidence presented at the contempt
hearing of the defendants' willful disobedience of a court order, the defendants
could not be found in contempt. See La. C. C. P. art. 224( A)(2). The appellants'
second assignment of error also has merit.
Due to our vacating the trial court' s judgment on contempt and remanding to
the trial court with the above instructions, all other assignments of error raised by
the appellants are pretermitted. Additionally, TPT filed an answer to the instant
appeals, in which it requests additional attorney' s fees in connection with its
14 defense of the instant appeals. Pursuant to our above ruling, we deny any
additional attorney' s fees in favor of TPT and dismiss the answer to the appeal.
DECREE
The judgment of contempt of court rendered by the Sixteenth Judicial
District Court is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings with
instructions. The answer to the appeal, filed by the appellee Turbine Powered
Technology, Inc., is dismissed. All costs associated with the instant appeals are
assessed to the appellee.
APPEAL MAINTAINED; JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS; ANSWER TO APPEAL DISMISSED.