Turben v. Douglass

1919 OK 145, 183 P. 881, 76 Okla. 78, 1919 Okla. LEXIS 131
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedMay 13, 1919
Docket10164
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 1919 OK 145 (Turben v. Douglass) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turben v. Douglass, 1919 OK 145, 183 P. 881, 76 Okla. 78, 1919 Okla. LEXIS 131 (Okla. 1919).

Opinion

RAINEY, J.

On March 24, 1916, Chas. E. Douglass, as plaintiff, filed his petition in the district court of Cotton county against I. *79 E. Turben, John C. Keys, and H. L. Thompson, defendants, the principal allegations therein being as follows:

“That in 1915 plaintiff and defendant I. E. Turben entered into an agreement to promote an oil and gas prospect in Cotton county, Okla., each to share equally in the enterprise, that in pursuance of said agreement leases were to be obtained in said county which leases were to be the joint property of this plaintiff and the defendant I. E. Turben; that all the leases so taken were taken in the name of I. E. Turben, and still remain in the name of the defendant I. E. Turben.
“Plaintiff has requested and demanded of the said defendant Turben that he convey or assign an undivided one-half interest in and to all of said leases to this plaintiff, but the defendant Turben refuses to do so.
“The leases referred to above are as follows, and all are located in Cotton county, Okla., and are made to the defendant I. E. Turben, to wit: [Then follows a description of each lease.]
' “Plaintiff is entitled, under the terms of the agreement hereinbefore referred to, to an undivided one-half interest in and to each and all of the above-described oil and gas leases and the defendant I. E. Turben holds the same in trust for the use and benefit of this plaintiff.
“The defendant I. E. Turben has executed an assignment of a portion of the above-described leases to the defendant H. L. Thompson, which assignment is recorded in Book 12, at page 438 of the records in the office of the county ckrk of Cotton county, Okla., and is for the leases on the following lands: [Description of certain leases.]
“The said defendant H. L. Thompson, at and before the time he took said assignment, had actual knowledge that this plaintiff owned and was entitled to an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the leases to which he took the above assignment.
“Wherefore plaintiff prays that the court decree and order that the plaintiff herein is entitled to and does own an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the leases herein described, and that the defendants be required to execute to this plaintiff an assignment of such interest, and that in lieu of said assignment the court make an order assigning such interest to this plaintiff, and that pin intiff recover his costs herein expended, and for such other and further relief as to the court shall seem equitable.”

Issue was joined by the respective defendants, and the cause tried to the court, resulting in a judgment decreeing the plaintiff to be the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the leases remaining in the name of the defendant Turben on the date of the institution of the action, and ordering said defendant to execute and deliver to the plaintiff a good and sufficient assignment thereof. The judgment also awarded the plaintiff an undivided one-half interest in a lease conveyed by the defendant Turben to the defendant Keys after the institution of the suit, and provided that in the event defendants failed to make the assignments to the plaintiff the judgment of the court should have that effect. No judgment was entered against defendant Thompson. Erom the judgment aforesaid Turben and Keys have appealed to this court, assigning numerous errors.

Hereinafter the parties, for convenience, will be referred to as plaintiff and defendants, respectively.

It is first asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. If we accurately comprehend the objections to the sufficiency of the petition, they are that it is impossible to deduce therefrom whether' plaintiff’s claim is on an express trust, a resulting trust, an implied trust, or a constructive trust, and it is earnestly insisted that it is impossible to conclude from the allegations therein whether plaintiff ever contributed any money, time, or anything of value whatever to the project. It is also insisted that the petition does' not disclose whether by the terms of the alleged agreement the leases in contemplation were to be taken in the name of the defendant Turben, or whether Turben, in subsequently taking them in his own name, did so either with or without plaintiff’s knowledge, and whether the contract had been fully performed, or what, if anything, was to be done by either or both of said parties thereunder. Another criticism of this pleading is that it does not appear therefrom what either party had contributed in money, property, or services to the project, what consideration was given for the leases, what was necessary for the lessees to do in order to render the same valid, and in what manner the alleged agreement lvd been viola fed by either of the parties thereto.

In this jurisdiction, where the forms of action theretofore existing were abolished by the adoption of the Oode and there ‘was thereby substituted only one form of action known as a civil action, it is not necessary that the petition should contain averments of all the facts necessary to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to recover under any particular form of action that existed at common law. R. J. Hawkins v. T. J. Overstreet, 7 Okla. 277, 54 Pac. 472; Joseph Gabriel v. Kildare Elevator Co., 18 Okla. 318, 90 Pac. 10, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 638, 11 Ann. Cas. 517; Kee v. Satterfield, 46 Okla. 660, 149 Pac. 243.

*80 Under section 4737, Rev. Laws of 1910, a petition is sufficient where it contains a statement of facts constituting a cause of action in ordinary and concise language and the demand for relief to which the party supposes himself entitled.

Although plaintiff’s petition is somewhat indefinite and uncertain in many of the respects complained of, in that it fails to allege with precision the exact terms of the alleged contract, it does allege the making of an enforceable contract by the plaintiff and defendant Turben, and it is fairly inferable from; the averments in the petition that under the terms of said contract the leases taken pursuant thereto, whether by the plaintiff or the defendant, were to become the joint property of the contracting parties, that said leases were taken in the name of the defendant Turben, and that he had breached the agreement by refusing to recognize the plaintiff’s claim to an undivided one-half interest in the leases so taken. It sets forth the particular leases to which the plaintiff claims title, and very clearly demands the relief to which the plaintiff thinks he is entitled. The proper way to have taken advantage of the defects in the petition was by motion to make the petition more definite and certain; and, although a motion to make the petition more definite and certain, by requiring the plaintiff to allege whether his alleged contract was oral or in writing, was filed, such motion did not direct the attention of the court to the alleged defects in the petition now so vigorously urged, and no error is assigned as to the court’s action on this motion.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1919 OK 145, 183 P. 881, 76 Okla. 78, 1919 Okla. LEXIS 131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turben-v-douglass-okla-1919.