Turan v. Universal Plan Inv. Ltd.

70 F. Supp. 2d 671, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17782, 1999 WL 1021830
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedNovember 9, 1999
DocketCiv.A. 99-1096
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 70 F. Supp. 2d 671 (Turan v. Universal Plan Inv. Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turan v. Universal Plan Inv. Ltd., 70 F. Supp. 2d 671, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17782, 1999 WL 1021830 (E.D. La. 1999).

Opinion

ORDER AND REASONS

FALLON, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion to dismiss of defendants Tyson Foods, Inc. and Universal Plan Investments Limited pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The present ease arises from the efforts of Louisiana resident, Charles Turan, and his Louisiana corporation Deep Ocean Resource Developers (“DORD”), to establish a seafood processing venture in China. In October, 1990, DORD entered into a processing agreement with Shanghai Fish Processing Factory of Shanghai, China to create a joint venture for the purpose of processing and marketing of fish products. To further their business venture in China, the plaintiffs created the defendant corporation Universal Plan Investments Limited (“UPI”) and incorporated it in Hong Kong in December, 1990.

UPI entered into an agreement with the Shanghai Fish Processing Factory in March, 1991 to establish a joint venture corporation called Ocean Wealth Fish Products Corporation (“Ocean Wealth”). The plaintiffs marketed the fish processing services of Ocean Wealth and attracted the interest of Arctic Alaska Fisheries Corporation (“Arctic Alaska”), a large deep sea fishery based in Seattle, Washington. Arctic Alaska expressed interest in the fish processing project and acquired eighty percent ownership of UPI by November, 1991, while Turan retained the remaining twenty percent interest.

The defendant Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson”) later merged with Arctic Alaska and acquired its ownership interest in UPI. According to the plaintiffs, Tyson then employed the directors of UPI and managed the role of UPI in the Ocean Wealth joint venture project. The plaintiffs believe that UPI’s board meetings occurred in Seattle rather than Hong Kong and that Arctic/Tyson rather than UPI named the directors of the Ocean Wealth project. They also contend that in April, 1997, Tyson Foods caused UPI to issue 23,992 shares of voting stock and 5,998 shares of non-voting stock in UPI to Tyson’s subsidiaries. Following this stock offering, Tu-ran’s twenty percent share of UPI was reduced to less than one percent.

The plaintiffs argue that the defendants issued stock in UPI without notice and caused them damages in the form of lost profits that could have been realized from the Ocean Wealth joint venture, lost investment in UPI, and lost opportunity for profits from other projects. They claim a breach of fiduciary duties including mismanagement and waste and/or breach of contract and quasi-eontractual obligations, and continuing tortious conduct. They also initially sought writs of quo warranto and mandamus directing Tyson to disclose records relating to UPI and its investments, but Tyson produced materials that have satisfied the plaintiffs’ request.

The defendants move to .dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for both procedural and substantive reasons. Proeedurally, defendants argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over UPI and that the Court should dismiss the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The defendants further allege that plaintiffs failed to properly serve defendant UPI. Substantively, the defendants assert that the plaintiffs have not supported their tort and contract claims with specific factual allegations. The defendants also maintain that even if they breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs, they did not breach a duty to the plaintiff DORD because the defendants never owed that plaintiff a duty.

The plaintiffs contend that their claims should not be dismissed on forum non *674 conveniens or other grounds because they have not had sufficient opportunity for discovery. Even if the claims against UPI were dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, the plaintiffs claim that their action against Tyson should remain in this Court. The plaintiffs attest that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants because the defendant UPI availed itself of Louisiana law by traveling to Louisiana to meet with the plaintiffs and by communicating with the plaintiffs through mail, telephone, and facsimile. The plaintiffs also explain that they intend to file a second amended and restated complaint that will moot the defendants’ objections including its allegation of improper service. Substantively, the plaintiffs argue that Hong Kong is not an available forum because all parties, including their documents and witnesses, are from the United States except UPI. Finally, they insist that Hong Kong is not an adequate forum because it does not provide them with a meaningful cause of action.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

The defendants argue that this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over UPI because it has never done business in Louisiana or with anyone located in Louisiana, and the sole purpose of UPI is to further a Chinese joint venture.

To exercise personal jurisdiction over UPI, a non-Louisiana resident, the Court must satisfy the requirements of Louisiana’s long-arm statute and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dickson Marine Inc. et al. v. Panalpina, Inc., et al., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1999). Because Louisiana’s long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process, the Court need only consider whether subjecting UPI to personal jurisdiction would offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.

The Due Process Clause requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction are satisfied if UPI has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Louisiana by establishing minimum contacts in Louisiana and if exercising personal jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Marathon Oil Co., et al. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 295 (1999) (quoting Asahi Metal Idus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)). Minimum contacts are established if the Court has either specific or general personal jurisdiction. See id. Specific jurisdiction arises if UPI’s contacts with Louisiana arise from or are directly related to the plaintiffs’ causes of action. See id. General jurisdiction exists if UPI has continuous, systematic, and substantial contacts with Louisiana, even if unrelated to the events giving rise to the present litigation. See id.

The Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over UPI under a theory of specific jurisdiction because the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ causes of action did not occur in Louisiana. The plaintiffs allege that UPI has sufficient contacts with Louisiana to sustain specific jurisdiction because of travels to Louisiana by UPI shareholders and because of telephone, mail, and facsimile communications exchanged between plaintiffs and UPI during the formation of UPI.

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70 F. Supp. 2d 671, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17782, 1999 WL 1021830, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turan-v-universal-plan-inv-ltd-laed-1999.