Turageon v. Goodnow CV-95-054-L 07/11/95 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Paul E. Turqeon
v. #C-95-054-L
Donald E. Goodnow, et al.
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE _________ OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT DONALD GOODNOW
The defendant Donald Goodnow, by and through his attorneys,
the Office of the Attorney General, files this motion (Doc. 10)
reguesting that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the court
grants defendant's motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff was incarcerated on May 14, 1992 in the New
Hampshire State Prison, for a minimum period of three and one half
years, up to a maximum period of seven years. The plaintiff,
appearing pro se, filed his complaint on January 31, 1995 under
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments under the United States Constitution were
violated. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges violation of his
rights under the New Hampshire Constitution, Part 1, Articles 14, 15, and 23.
The plaintiff's suit arises out of the alleged refusal of the
Clerk of the Strafford County Superior Court to schedule a hearing
on the plaintiff's motion to suspend the balance of his minimum
sentence. The plaintiff alleges that according to New Hampshire
law, he had the right to a sentence reduction hearing every two
years. The plaintiff brought suit against: 1)Donald Goodnow in
his individual capacity; 2) Donald Goodnow in his official capacity
as Clerk of the Strafford County Superior Court; and 3) the County
of Strafford, New Hampshire.
On May 18, 1995, the defendant Strafford County filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action due to the fact
that the Clerk of the Strafford County Superior County is an
employee of the State of New Hampshire, rather than an employee of
Strafford County. By order dated June 1, 1995, this court
dismissed Strafford County as a party to the action.
On June 1, 1995, the defendant Goodnow, filed an Assented-To
Motion to Dismiss. Apparently, there was a miscommunication
between Assistant Attorney General Christopher Reid and the
plaintiff regarding consent to the motion. On June 2, 1995, the
court received a "Clarification" from the plaintiff, in which he
stated that he had misunderstood Attorney Reid's telephone call and
he withdrew his consent. See Doc. 11. The plaintiff filed an
2 objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss on June 13, 1995.
DISCUSSION
For the sake of providing guidance for the plaintiff, the
court feels compelled to note the difference between suits brought
against a person in his or her individual capacity and those
brought against a person in his or her official capacity.
Individual capacity suits, also known as personal capacity suits,
seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for
actions taken under color of state law. Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Comparatively, official capacity suits seek
to impose liability upon the government entity itself. I_ci. at 166.
Therefore, in situations where the official is named as a party in
an official capacity suit, it is the government entity of which the
official is an agent that is the real party in interest. Id.
Thus, an award of damages against an official in his or her
individual capacity can be executed only against the official's
personal assets, while an award of damages in an official capacity
suit must be satisfied by the government entity. Id.. Defenses
available to an official in a personal capacity action include
personal immunity defenses. I_ci. Contrastingly, in official
capacity actions, the only defenses that apply are forms of
sovereign immunity, such as the Eleventh Amendment. J-d. at 167.
3 With the above principles in mind, the court reiterates that
the plaintiff's two remaining claims are an individual capacity
suit against Goodnow, and a claim against Goodnow in his official
capacity, which is in effect a claim against the State of New
Hampshire.
The defendant asserts the following grounds for dismissal.
First, the defendant contends that, in his official capacity, 1) he
is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution; and 2) he is not a "person" as
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, the defendant claims that in
his individual capacity, he is a judicial officer and as such is
entitled to absolute immunity for actions performed within the
scope of his duties.
I. OFFICIAL CAPACITY SUIT
Regarding plaintiff's claim against Goodnow in his official
capacity, the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or eguity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
While the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts.
4 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9, n.7 (1980), the amendment
provides immunity to States from suits in federal court. Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991) . Essentially, a State cannot be sued
in federal court unless 1) the State consents, or 2) Congress
abrogates the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Welch v. Texas
Dept, of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 486-87 (1987).
In the case at bar, the State of New Hampshire has not
consented to suit in this court. Additionally, it is well settled
that Congress did not intend to abrogate the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity by passing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the cause of action
in this case. Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
65-66 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). Therefore,
plaintiff's claims against Goodnow, as a state official in his
official capacity, must be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
Notwithstanding the impact on plaintiff's action by the
Eleventh Amendment, the defendant, in his official capacity, is
also shielded from liability in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.
Succinctly, 42 U.S.C § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
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Turageon v. Goodnow CV-95-054-L 07/11/95 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Paul E. Turqeon
v. #C-95-054-L
Donald E. Goodnow, et al.
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE _________ OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT DONALD GOODNOW
The defendant Donald Goodnow, by and through his attorneys,
the Office of the Attorney General, files this motion (Doc. 10)
reguesting that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the court
grants defendant's motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff was incarcerated on May 14, 1992 in the New
Hampshire State Prison, for a minimum period of three and one half
years, up to a maximum period of seven years. The plaintiff,
appearing pro se, filed his complaint on January 31, 1995 under
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments under the United States Constitution were
violated. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges violation of his
rights under the New Hampshire Constitution, Part 1, Articles 14, 15, and 23.
The plaintiff's suit arises out of the alleged refusal of the
Clerk of the Strafford County Superior Court to schedule a hearing
on the plaintiff's motion to suspend the balance of his minimum
sentence. The plaintiff alleges that according to New Hampshire
law, he had the right to a sentence reduction hearing every two
years. The plaintiff brought suit against: 1)Donald Goodnow in
his individual capacity; 2) Donald Goodnow in his official capacity
as Clerk of the Strafford County Superior Court; and 3) the County
of Strafford, New Hampshire.
On May 18, 1995, the defendant Strafford County filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action due to the fact
that the Clerk of the Strafford County Superior County is an
employee of the State of New Hampshire, rather than an employee of
Strafford County. By order dated June 1, 1995, this court
dismissed Strafford County as a party to the action.
On June 1, 1995, the defendant Goodnow, filed an Assented-To
Motion to Dismiss. Apparently, there was a miscommunication
between Assistant Attorney General Christopher Reid and the
plaintiff regarding consent to the motion. On June 2, 1995, the
court received a "Clarification" from the plaintiff, in which he
stated that he had misunderstood Attorney Reid's telephone call and
he withdrew his consent. See Doc. 11. The plaintiff filed an
2 objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss on June 13, 1995.
DISCUSSION
For the sake of providing guidance for the plaintiff, the
court feels compelled to note the difference between suits brought
against a person in his or her individual capacity and those
brought against a person in his or her official capacity.
Individual capacity suits, also known as personal capacity suits,
seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for
actions taken under color of state law. Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Comparatively, official capacity suits seek
to impose liability upon the government entity itself. I_ci. at 166.
Therefore, in situations where the official is named as a party in
an official capacity suit, it is the government entity of which the
official is an agent that is the real party in interest. Id.
Thus, an award of damages against an official in his or her
individual capacity can be executed only against the official's
personal assets, while an award of damages in an official capacity
suit must be satisfied by the government entity. Id.. Defenses
available to an official in a personal capacity action include
personal immunity defenses. I_ci. Contrastingly, in official
capacity actions, the only defenses that apply are forms of
sovereign immunity, such as the Eleventh Amendment. J-d. at 167.
3 With the above principles in mind, the court reiterates that
the plaintiff's two remaining claims are an individual capacity
suit against Goodnow, and a claim against Goodnow in his official
capacity, which is in effect a claim against the State of New
Hampshire.
The defendant asserts the following grounds for dismissal.
First, the defendant contends that, in his official capacity, 1) he
is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution; and 2) he is not a "person" as
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, the defendant claims that in
his individual capacity, he is a judicial officer and as such is
entitled to absolute immunity for actions performed within the
scope of his duties.
I. OFFICIAL CAPACITY SUIT
Regarding plaintiff's claim against Goodnow in his official
capacity, the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or eguity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
While the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts.
4 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9, n.7 (1980), the amendment
provides immunity to States from suits in federal court. Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991) . Essentially, a State cannot be sued
in federal court unless 1) the State consents, or 2) Congress
abrogates the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Welch v. Texas
Dept, of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 486-87 (1987).
In the case at bar, the State of New Hampshire has not
consented to suit in this court. Additionally, it is well settled
that Congress did not intend to abrogate the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity by passing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the cause of action
in this case. Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
65-66 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). Therefore,
plaintiff's claims against Goodnow, as a state official in his
official capacity, must be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
Notwithstanding the impact on plaintiff's action by the
Eleventh Amendment, the defendant, in his official capacity, is
also shielded from liability in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.
Succinctly, 42 U.S.C § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . . (emphasis added).
5 Moreover, in Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court held that both a State and its
officials "acting in their official capacities" are outside the
class of "persons" subject to liability under § 1983. For this
reason as well, the court dismisses the suit against Goodnow in his
official capacity as Clerk of the Strafford County Superior Court.
II. INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY SUIT
With respect to plaintiff's claim against Goodnow in his
individual capacity, the defendant contends that he is a judicial
official (i.e. Clerk of the Strafford County Superior Court), and
as such, he is entitled to absolute immunity for all those actions
performed within the scope of his official duties.
As a threshold consideration, the law is apodictic that judges
are immune from suit. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. C t .
1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The policy reason for this absolute
immunity is clear: a judge should be able to perform his or her
duties without being afraid of personal conseguences. This veil of
immunity from suit will only be pierced in situations where a judge
does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thompson v.
Sanborn, 568 F. Supp. 385, 391 (D.N.H. 1983) (citing Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872) .
Similarly, judicial immunity also applies to "other officers
6 of government whose duties are related to the judicial process."
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959). Judicial officials
include court clerks, Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st
Cir. 1980), parole board and probation officers, Sullivan v.
Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1968), court appointed medical
examiners, Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), and
court reporters, Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969).
Immunity is extended to auxiliary judicial personnel due to the
"danger that disappointed litigants . . . will vent their wrath on
[them] ." Scruggs v. Moellerinq, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) .
It is axiomatic that when a court clerk carries out the orders
of a judge, absolute immunity will apply. See, e.g., Kincaid v.
Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that clerks who
returned inmates' complaints and filing fees and directed them to
file in small claims court were immune because their actions were
performed at judicial direction); Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d
at 166 (holding that court clerk who filled out commitment papers
was immune because he was acting under the official directive of a
judge).
Notably, the case at bar does not involve a situation in which
a court clerk acted under the directive of a judge. The guestion
that remains, therefore, is whether the defendant is entitled to
judicial immunity in his duties of scheduling hearings. This court
7 holds that defendant is so entitled.
Fundamentally, defendant is entitled to immunity for tasks,
like those performed in the instant case, which form an integral
part of the judicial process. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy
Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that court
clerks have absolute judicial immunity from damages for civil
rights violations when "they perform tasks that are an integral
part of the judicial process.") Therefore, the claim against the
defendant in his individual capacity is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, defendant Donald Goodnow's
motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) is granted.
July 11, 1995
Martin F. Loughlin Senior Judge Paul E. Turgeon Chris Reid, Esg. Office of the Attorney General